The Economic Foundations of Authoritarian Rule by Fuller, Clay Robert
University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons
Theses and Dissertations
2017
The Economic Foundations of Authoritarian Rule
Clay Robert Fuller
University of South Carolina
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Fuller, C. R.(2017). The Economic Foundations of Authoritarian Rule. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/4202
  
THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE 
 
by 
 
Clay Robert Fuller 
 
Bachelor of Arts 
West Virginia State University, 2008 
 
Master of Arts 
Texas State University, 2010 
 
Master of Arts 
University of South Carolina, 2014 
 
 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
 
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
 
Political Science 
 
College of Arts and Sciences 
 
University of South Carolina 
 
2017 
 
Accepted by: 
 
John Hsieh, Major Professor 
 
Harvey Starr, Committee Member 
 
Timothy Peterson, Committee Member 
 
Gerald McDermott, Committee Member 
 
Cheryl L. Addy, Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright Clay Robert Fuller, 2017 
All Rights Reserved. 
iii 
DEDICATION 
 
for Henry, Shannon, Mom & Dad 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Special thanks goes to God, the unconditional love and support of my wife, parents and 
extended family, my dissertation committee, Alex, the institutions of the United States of 
America, the State of South Carolina, the University of South Carolina, the Department of 
Political Science faculty and staff, the Walker Institute of International and Area Studies 
faculty and staff, the Center for Teaching Excellence, undergraduate political science 
majors at South Carolina who helped along the way, and the International Center on 
Nonviolent Conflict. This work was partially supported by a SPARC Graduate Research 
Grant from the Office of the Vice President for Research at the University of South 
Carolina and the Sueng Yeun Kim dissertation grant from the Center for Asian Studies at 
the Walker Institute. I would especially like to acknowledge approximately half of Earth’s 
population currently living under some form of non-democracy. This work is not intended 
to disparage you or your country or your culture in any way shape or form. This work is 
designed to 1) help foster understanding and cooperation between people that reside in 
democracies and those that live in dictatorships, 2) highlight nonviolent approaches to 
governance that can hopefully prevent some of the atrocities that tend to occur more often 
in dictatorships, and 3) move us further along in the quest for a universal understanding of 
good governance. Henry, remember that knowledge is one thing that no person and no 
government can ever take away from you. Acquire as much of it as you possibly can.
v 
ABSTRACT 
 
Personal ambition and the distribution of economic goods often determine the character of 
politics. This dynamic plays out dramatically in authoritarian states where there are few 
independent arbiters outside of political violence. All dictatorships face two paramount 
problems in maintaining their tenure. First, to maintain power and distribute goods 
dictators must devise ways in which to manage a ruling coalition in the absence of explicit 
power-sharing institutions. Second, authoritarian regimes must devise ways to manage the 
desires of a population ruled with only implicit consent. This dissertation empirically treats 
the management style of authoritarian leaders as exogenous to the institutional composition 
of his regime, thus breaking from traditional authoritarian typologies. It utilizes original 
data and finds evidence that dictatorships can strengthen and survive longer, and in a 
nonviolent manner, with creative elite and popular economic management tools such as 
special economic zones (SEZs) and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). More specifically, it 
finds that violent and corrupt leaders that develop these economic tools can possibly be 
removed from power or eventually become constrained by the policies because the policies 
attach the leader and the regime to independent arbiters. At the regime level, SEZs and 
SWFs extend the survival of all types of regimes, despite institutional setting, through the 
mechanisms of labor fragmentation and sunk investments. Seemingly democratic 
institutions in dictatorships – parties, elections, legislatures – may be the foundation of 
democratic rule, but they are not the foundation of authoritarian rule – economic policy is.
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Personal ambition and the distribution of economic goods often determine the 
character of politics. This dynamic plays out dramatically in authoritarian states where 
there are few independent arbiters outside of political violence.1 All dictatorships face two 
paramount problems in maintaining their tenure. The primacy of these problems is what 
separates democratic politics from non-democratic politics. First, to maintain power and 
distribute goods dictators must devise ways in which to manage a ruling coalition in the 
absence of explicit power-sharing institutions. Political institutions like parties and 
legislatures sometimes act as these management institutions, but they are often 
purposefully opaque in dictatorships. In the absence of independent arbiters or multiple 
veto players, this work finds that economic policies enhance elite management in the 
authoritarian balance of power between leaders and elites. 
 Second, authoritarian regimes must devise ways to manage the desires of a 
population ruled with only implicit consent. The dictator’s dilemma is that one can never 
be confident of public approval in the absence of basic liberties, such as a free press or 
freedom of assembly. The ever-present role of violent repression in dictatorships further 
distorts the reliability of public statements when people express any sort of consent to rule. 
However, many dictators rule the masses for very long periods despite a dearth of official 
                                                          
1 The terms dictatorship, authoritarian regime, autocracy, and non-democracy are interchangeable throughout this work. 
The terms dictator, authoritarian, and autocrat are interchangeable as well.  
2 
popular legitimacy. In order to truly minimize negative externalities, the population in a 
non-democratic state is best managed or steered into loyalty – rather than coerced – through 
creative and effective economic policy designed to control perceived negative externalities 
brought about by economic development.2 By fragmenting the labor pool and encouraging 
sunk investments in economic success from the many, authoritarian regimes can pacify the 
masses – whether or not that is the articulated aim of the policy. For the people, legitimacy 
is often all about economic opportunity and will frequently trump ideological and political 
battles.  
These are the two central problems that all authoritarians and their regimes face – 
elite and popular management.3 Leaders frequently feel the need to intimidate elites into 
action when nonviolent management fails, creating potent and potentially destabilizing 
public confrontations. When non-democratic regimes lose control of the population 
(directly or indirectly through a loss of legitimacy), the regimes typically fall victim to the 
negative externalities of mismanagement in the form of coups, revolutions, or civil wars.  
In the post-Cold War era, non-democratic states face a global economy in which it 
is necessary to engage with foreign economies, given the state wants to economically 
develop and accrue more power. It is not likely that a country can compete internationally 
by producing everything at home (autarky). It is highly likely that a country will be able to 
compete if they leverage their own comparative advantage. At the end of the Cold War 
virtually every non-democracy was a developing country. Developing countries typically 
have a comparative advantage in either labor or natural resources. 
                                                          
2 This is similar to ensuring regime loyalty in the face of rising standards of living. In China this is sometimes referred to 
as preventing spiritual pollution. 
3 One can conceptualize this a power-sharing being an intra-regime level problem (leaders and elites) and control being 
a state-level problem (regime and the people).  
3 
The arguments here explicitly identify special economic zones (SEZs) and 
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) as internationally oriented economic tools that tend to be 
designed to extract gains from labor and resources. SEZs and SWFs can 1) enhance the 
domestic management of elites by generating mutually constraining credible commitments 
and linking the leader and the regime to independent arbiters and 2) enhance the regime’s 
popular management by fragmenting the labor pool and incentivizing citizens to personally 
invest in the success of the regime.  
Traditional legal institutions associated with democracies serve as easily 
recognizable elite and popular management tools in autocracies. According to recent 
research, authoritarian political parties, legislatures, and elections can extend regime 
survival, constrain the leader, and reward supporters (Gandhi 2008, Wright 2008, Svolik 
2012, Brancati 2014). However, dictators have options. They have a large number of 
options precisely because much of what they do is extra-institutional. A large portion of 
non-democratic politics is either “noninstitutional and entails the threat or overt use of 
violence” or “is aimed at circumventing or subverting formal institutional rules” 
(Gehlbach, Sonin, and Svolik 2016; 566). Therefore, there are a multiplicity of non-
institutional ways in which to share power when a small group or one person is able to 
operate with a monopoly on power.  
Formal theories of non-democratic politics include leaders attempting to buy off a 
certain segment of the population with the provision of private or public goods, (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al 2003) or elite manipulation of redistributive policies in the management of 
economic inequality (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). However, where formal modelers of 
authoritarian politics routinely take into account the fact that leaders and regimes are 
4 
different actors at different levels of analysis operating strategically in an assumed or given 
institutional environment, institutional empiricists almost never do.4  
The two most recent annual reviews of political science literature on non-
democracies exemplify this point. Reviewing the empirical institutionalist strand, Brancati 
concludes that “there is a dearth of empirical evidence in this literature” (2014; 324). 
Brancati further notes that “This literature is unlikely to ever provide evidence for the effect 
of these institutions on par with the kind of evidence provided about institutions in 
advanced democracies, and no one should expect it to” (2014; 324). Reviewing formal 
models of nondemocratic politics, other authors indicate that at the heart of all authoritarian 
questions are commitment problems and information asymmetry between the leader and 
the regime or other combinations of actors and suggest that what formal models of non-
democracy need is a “comparative analysis of institutions” (Gelbach, Sonin, and Svolik 
2016; 580). The authors further note that if “institutions evolve to minimize transaction 
costs (North 1990), which include incomplete information and limited commitment, then 
one must ask which institutions work best – not just show that some institutions are better 
than none” (2016; 580).  
This means that formal modelers are quite aware that the individual level 
characteristics of a leader and the different characteristics of his ruling coalition condition 
each other to produce outcomes, but, formal modelers are unsure of the role of the 
institutional environment in general models because it is usually given (assumed). 
Furthermore, formal modelers seem to argue that institutionalists should be looking at all 
                                                          
4 I do not know of one that does. A full systematic review of the literature is needed to verify this claim, but of all the 
authoritarian institutions literature that I have read, many theorize about the actions of leaders but only test the 
institutional environment. 
5 
arrangements that reduce information asymmetries and strengthen credible commitments, 
rather than just the ones we expect to see in democracies. Empiricists are convinced that 
political institutions in non-democracies matter, but researchers are plagued by a lack of 
data and the fact that democratic institutions in dictatorships are not democratic (which 
leads to confusion over what exactly these seemingly democratic institutions are theorized 
to be doing). Institutional empiricists frequently theorize about the actions of leaders and 
regimes, but they treat them as a unitary actor and do not empirically test for the conditional 
effects of management style (leader personality) and institutional environment (regime 
type). Formal modelers explicitly analyze the strategic exchanges between leaders and 
other actors in dictatorships, but they do not connect empirical tests to their models. 
These two groups of extremely smart people are speaking past each other. This 
dissertation makes a first step towards bridging this divide and addresses the concerns of 
both of these lines of inquiry. My general argument is that leader survival and regime 
survival in dictatorships is fundamentally shaped by economic policy and the interplay 
between the individual personality traits of each dictator and the institutional structure of 
his ruling coalition – historically and contemporarily. A dictatorship is not a democracy 
and we should not empirically analyze one as if it is. We should look towards other 
mechanisms and institutions that function better in a non-democratic environment 
shrouded in secrecy and try to empirically capture the interplay between leaders and elites. 
Furthermore, a leader is not a regime, so institutionalists should not treat them as if they 
are the same empirically and formal modelers should start looking for ways to empirically 
test their models.5   
                                                          
5 It should be noted that I am not saying that these extremely smart authors are incorrect. I am suggesting that there may 
be a different way to analyze these questions that will produce stickier findings. 
6 
Therefore, special economic zones (SEZs) and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) are 
presented here as 1) new data for empiricists and 2) economic policies that minimize the 
costs of commitment problems and information asymmetry for formal modelers.  
The premise of the theory that follows is that leaders that want to develop their 
economies and accrue more power must look to exploit the advantages of international 
trade and investment through comparative advantage. Empirically we see that modern 
SEZs exist or are in the process of creation in every state in the world (Economist 2014) 
and the rapid spread of these zones began in the 1980s (FIAS 2008). SWFs are less 
common, but all wealthy non-democracies use them to manage wealth and wealthy elites 
and can lead to longer leader and regime tenures. Due to the ubiquity of SEZs, the 
systematic effects of them are more interesting, but as non-democracies develop and 
become wealthier, SWFs will become just as universal.  
SEZs are not all the same size or quality. Autocratic leaders that rule with regime 
institutional level constraints on their power tend to build large and successful zone 
programs because the zones are a natural extension of the power-sharing atmosphere that 
already exists between the leader and the regime. SEZs enhance the survival of constrained 
autocrats and their constraining regimes because they significantly enhance nonviolent 
elite and popular management capabilities. If a regime led by a leader with a constrained 
management style decided for some reason to give up any constraints they held over the 
leader, we would expect the quality and size of SEZs to go down and survival rates for 
both to be conditioned by the strategies of all actors.6  
                                                          
6 This is rarely the case. A regime that has the capability to constrain its leader will likely never give up that power 
willingly. It is possible for a leader to try to take it from the regime, but if this happens it would imply that 1) the initial 
constraints were weak and 2) if some of the constraints are through internationally oriented economic policies, the leader 
will face reputation costs and ultimately will be constrained again or removed. 
7 
Autocratic leaders with an unconstrained management style, or those that act as if 
they are a god and marginalize their own regimes and people, tend to produce poor 
performing and small SEZs. Paradoxically, when these unconstrained leaders build even 
small SEZs leader tenure is reduced and regime tenure is extended. This is because the 
SEZ policy allows the regime of an unconstrained leader to begin imposing real and direct 
costs on the leader which lead to either removal, replacement, or a change in management 
style (i.e. accepting constraints). This helps explain the wide variation in the success of 
SEZ programs in non-democracies and also the apparent confusion over whether, when, 
and where they are good or bad policy (see Economist 2014, Farole 2011, Farole and 
Akinci 2011, Moberg 2017). 
The foundations of democratic rule are primarily institutional – rule of law, checks 
and balances, constitutions. It is not immediately clear that the same institutional claim is 
true for authoritarian rule, yet it is often treated as if it were. If institutions matter, and (the 
disproportional study of) democracy is understood as the result of institutional constraints, 
then it does not make logical sense to assume that political institutions in a non-democracy 
function in a similar way. By separating leader behavior from regime type and analyzing 
the effects of economic policies on the survival of different combinations of leaders and 
regimes, a new approach to looking at dictatorships emerges.  
Elite and popular management through economic policy is not new. Through the 
5th and 6th Centuries B.C.E. the Athenians set up special permanent trade areas (emporia) 
to enhance domestic interactions with foreign populations. The more authoritarian Spartans 
gave trade rights and other special economic rights to the Periokoi to distinguish them from 
the Helot slave population. Since Spartans were theoretically banned from menial labor 
8 
and trade, this policy served to enhance the loyalty of the Periokoi because they could 
exploit Lacedaemon natural resources for personal gain (Cartledge 1979). The Athenians 
viewed trade as more of a public good, used by and for the benefit of a larger segment of 
the population in a society characterized by more personal freedoms and a relatively more 
equal income distribution. The Spartans viewed economic activity as a tool, used to divide 
and control the large native Lacedaemon population.  
Before the development of the state system (1648), one traditional mode of power-
sharing amongst autocrats was intermarriage. Young women were typically seen as 
tradable economic property. Lands, titles, and rights in and related to strategic areas of 
economic activity were granted to friendly and rival actors to achieve the political survival 
of the monarchy. Charles the Simple (King of West Francia 898-922 C.E.) made the 
infamous Viking Rollo the 1st Duke of Normandy, giving him land and control of economic 
activity along the Seine River in exchange for protection from future Norsemen raids 
(Douglas 1942). Charles, like most monarchs of the period, viewed economic opportunity 
as a means for purchasing loyalty from a potential enemy. During the 15th and 16th 
Centuries the Hanseatic League brought a diverse group of German city-states together to 
dominate Baltic Sea trade (Palais 1959, Fink 2011). The League devised formal trade rules 
that allowed elites a way to monitor each other’s practices and to adjudicate disputes in the 
absence of clear jurisdiction. 
Diverse political actors have always found ways to cooperate and manage diverse 
preferences through economic policy (Keohane 1984). Today, at the international state 
level, the EU, ASEAN, and OPEC serve as examples of this type of economic power-
sharing. OPEC surprisingly manages global crude oil output and prices by bringing 
9 
together the divergent interests of Iran and Iraq (majority Shia), Saudi Arabia and the 
U.A.E. (majority Sunni), and other disparate actors such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Nigeria. It is evident that international economic policy can convince states to invest some 
of their sovereignty into complex managerial power-sharing arrangements in exchange for 
mutual gains. However, it is also evident that the preferences of individual actors cannot 
be aggregated to some rational unitary state-level social choice in pursuit of some vaguely 
defined national interest (Arrow 1951, Bueno de Mesquita 2014).7 Individuals make these 
choices according their preferences. The shape and structure of those preferences are 
determined first by domestic constraints. 
This research asserts that elites, leaders, and individual citizens are capable of 
investing a small portion of their freedom to choose actions in exchange for predictable 
and mutually beneficial outcomes. This dynamic is most clearly observable within 
authoritarian states through specific economic policies because the policies exist in the 
public setting of a global market. Special economic zones (SEZs) are a popular policy 
choice among modern autocrats.8  
The zones go by many names (export processing zones, foreign trade zones, 
freeports) and have existed in various forms as long as there has been trade. Modern 
versions of SEZs began appearing in the 1950s and are central to the Chinese, Emirati, and 
many other development models (World Bank 2008, Shimy 2008, Wang 2013, Ge 1999). 
These geographically delineated economic areas serve to attract investment through 
specialized trade rules reducing tariffs, regulations, and other barriers to trade – much like 
                                                          
7 Better known as Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem. In groups of three or larger, assuming preferences are transitive and 
complete, there are few conditions under which a rational group choice can be made, and no conditions under which this 
can be done within the rules of what is recognized as democracy. 
8 Per the data more than 75% of all states have at least one SEZ and per other sources every state without one has plans 
to build one (Farole 2011, Economist 2015). The overwhelming majority of all SEZs are in non-democracies. 
10 
the early Greek trade cities and rules associated with the Hanseatic League. Modern SEZs 
are different in that they operate within the modern nation-state system and its associated 
international organizations (IOs). SEZ rules are also more formal and public because of 
modern technology and their need to advertise and attract foreign investors who comply 
with international trade rules. Compared to historical counterparts, modern SEZs are also 
larger in size and numbers while often narrower in focus. They are also more significant 
sources of employment (Wang 2013, Palit and Bhattacharjee 2008). Chapter 2 describes 
SEZs and my original data on them in detail.  
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) serve as state investment vehicles used to stabilize 
revenues and generate profits through a diverse investment portfolio (Loh 2002). SWFs act 
much in the same way that intermarriage did for ancient kings, a diversification of the 
family fortune. SWF managers are members of the political elite (Shih 2009) and, like the 
ancient kings, they have long time-horizons. This is because investments take time to 
mature and investments are meaningless without a stable investor. This type of forward, 
long-term thinking leads to robust economic growth, especially in dictatorships (Olson 
1993). Elites and leaders see investments in global financial markets as a type of self-
insurance, as shields against the pernicious effects of commodity booms and busts (Clark, 
Dixon, and Monk 2013). SWFs work to generate profits and control vast amounts of wealth 
(explored in detail in Chapter 2). The fact that state actors control the funds lead some 
analysts to fear they will one day operate with a political motive rather than a profit motive 
(Weiner 2010, Truman 2007). In non-democracies there are few formal rules for how and 
when politics are separate from economics.9 However, much like SEZs, the international 
                                                          
9 In fact, the Chinese Constitution states this explicitly, “The Communist Party of China must persist in taking economic 
development as the central task, making all other work subordinate to and serve this central task.” 
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and domestic legitimacy of economic policies often rests squarely with the domestic 
constituents that control them and those that are affected by them. This leads to there being 
a premium on transparency in these economic transactions (Clark, Dixon, and Monk 2013, 
Truman 2007).  
SEZs and SWFs enhance the nonviolent management of elites by increasing 
monitoring and transparency, thus making commitments more credible. These policies also 
connect elites to an array of independent arbiters that can help settle disputes when they 
arise (such as the WTO, MNCs, and foreign elites). The impact of SEZs and SWFs on 
leader/elite management is explored and evaluated in Chapter 3.  
SEZs increase a regime’s ability to manage the population through labor 
fragmentation, which is an economic form of the classic divide and rule strategy. SEZs 
also encourage everyday citizens to economically invest in the long-term growth and 
survival of the regime with sunk investments, such as relocating to a zone or learning a 
new skill in order to gain employment in the zone. These dynamics are explored and 
evaluated in Chapter 4.   
This analysis uses the phrase “elite and popular management” as a different 
conceptualization of the better-known terms power-sharing and political control (as used 
in Svolik 2012 and other works). Many political scientists would identify power-sharing 
as a key component in ideas like consociationalism – a strategy for managing social 
cleavages or ethnic conflicts in diverse democracies (Lijphart 1999, McGarry and Oleary 
1993). Others conceptualize it as a sort of balance power between actors that requires 
power delegation – another form of management. An example of this type of power-
sharing is the Unites States after the Revolutionary War where 13 newly sovereign states 
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where faced with a situation in which no single free colony was powerful enough to 
overtake the rest (Olson 1993). This balance of power provided the impetus to adopt the 
Articles of Confederation and later the Great Compromise (a bicameral legislature) and the 
Constitution of the United States. Another example would be when a dictator is credibly 
threatened by his ruling coalition with removal from office, thus achieving a balance of 
power between them necessitating power-sharing (Svolik 2009). In dictatorships, power-
sharing is theorized to take place through legislatures and political parties. In short, power-
sharing is typically believed to be induced by a balance of some sort of political power 
(such as between a legislature and the executive) or societal cleavages that require political 
management (such as ethnic or religious divisions).  
Throughout this work, what others recognize as power-sharing is effectively 
conceptualized as the rational delegation of economic management to limit the effects of 
negative political externalities that can result from opening up to international trade and 
markets, or in simpler terms “elite management.” In economics, a negative externality is 
considered to be some sort of economic activity that generates a bad effect on an 
uninvolved third party (Buchanan and Stubblebine 1962). Negative externalities in the 
authoritarian setting can be considered a political coup (as they are in Svolik 2008), but 
they also can include calls for reform, a declining economy, or even some sort of pollution 
of the soul of the state.10 A negative externality always represents something that directly 
or indirectly threatens the tenure of the leader or reduces the regime’s ability to manage the 
population.  
                                                          
10 See Gold (1990) for a review of sporadic Chinese campaigns in the 1980 against “spiritual pollution” and “bourgeois 
liberalization.” Other examples of this desire to reduce negative externalities would be when Russia recently required all 
foreign NGOs to register as “foreign agents.” 
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“Popular management” is a term related to the conceptualization of political 
control. When readers see the term political control, they may conjure images of riot police 
beating up protestors, mass incarceration, or propaganda filled streets – especially in an 
authoritarian state. While these events definitely happen in non-democracies, it is not what 
is meant by the concept of popular management. SEZs and SWFs, and the people that 
choose to build them and manage them, likely do not consciously go around trying to 
subdue national populations into capitulation or loyalty. However, even if not chosen for 
that purpose, these policies can have that effect. This is an important distinction because 
general concepts of political control typically require some sort of violent coercion. Popular 
management involves managing the desires and needs of the people in a non-violent and 
constructive manner that leads to economic growth.11  
This dissertation makes three contributions to the study of authoritarian politics. 
First, it identifies economic policies as a fruitful avenue for exploring authoritarian politics. 
Second, it offers original data on specific modern economic policies (SEZs and SWFs) that 
can be used to examine a large set of other questions, and not just those in comparative 
politics or international relations. Third, it offers a new avenue for empirically 
distinguishing between two basic types of authoritarian leaders – unconstrained and 
constrained leaders (referred to respectively as established and contested in Svolik 2012). 
This third contribution can also be considered a way to measure the management style of 
                                                          
11 Lake and Baum (2001) designed a “theory of the state as a firm in a contestable political market” where public services 
are the goods exchanged for revenue (p. 617). Sovereignty, or a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercion, gives states 
a comparative advantage in producing. Lake and Baum argue that a democracy will produce public services as a regulated 
monopoly because the barriers to exit and the cost of political participation are low. Their theory further predicts that an 
autocratic regime “will exercise its monopoly power, provide fewer public services, and earn greater rents” because the 
barriers to exit and price of political participation are high (2001). In this sense, what is meant by popular management 
in this context is the selective use of monopoly powers by the regime – the dictator and his ruling coalition acting together 
– to incentivize loyalty and minimize negative externalities among the maximum number of those residing outside of the 
ruling coalition. 
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a leader, or in other words, how “personalist” a leader is. The first two contributions were 
briefly discussed in the introduction. The following subsection (1.1) describes the 
miserable conditions of authoritarian rule that lead to puzzling problems and explore the 
third contribution in brief – a distinction between management styles of autocratic leaders.  
 
1.1 AUTHORITARIAN RULE 
 
Few, if any, rulers proudly accept the label of dictator. Fewer societies will happily 
advertise that their government is authoritarian.12 Instead, we observe countries with 
contradictory labels like the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) ruled by a 
Supreme Leader and his Worker’s Party, or, misused and seemingly lifted labels like the 
Republic of Equatorial Guinea ruled by a President and his Democratic Party. All non-
democratic regimes claim to be democratic. These nominal titles hold little or no 
substantive meaning, but they do tell us that dictators are exceedingly vain.13 
Authoritarian politics do exist, despite few dictators accepting personal ownership 
of academic and political conceptualizations that can carry pejorative connotations. 
Authoritarian politics inspire great novels, movies, and television, and increasingly hold a 
steady interest in mainstream news, academia, and popular culture.14 When agreements are 
made amongst authoritarian elites there are few independent sources of authority with the 
ability to enforce them (Svolik 2012). Therefore, when disagreements occur, politics can 
                                                          
12 The Chinese Constitution frequently refers to its government as the “Democratic Dictatorship.” I am not sure what a 
democratic dictatorship is empirically. I assume it must be along the lines of a “dictatorship of the proletariat.” 
13 It is interesting to note here that dictators frequently have a very distinctive outward appearance. 
14 The wildly popular AMC series “Walking Dead” begins with the lead character declaring to his group that “This is not 
a democracy” and proceeds to tell the story of a number of different non-democratic groups trying to survive in the 
aftermath of a zombie apocalypse. The show actually exemplifies many of the behaviors analyzed within this dissertation.  
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quickly degenerate to violence, secrecy, and betrayal. These are the dramatic interactions 
that legends are made of.  
In 2013, Supreme Leader Kim Jong-Un purged his uncle (Fisher 2013) for being 
“counter-revolutionary” and “despicable human scum,” likely having him executed by 
firing squad (although rumors still swirl that he was fed alive to a hungry pack of dogs). In 
February 2017, Un had his half-brother killed in an elaborate poisoning with a nerve agent 
in a Malaysian airport (Sang-Hun & Gladstone 2017). In 1979, a young Teodoro Obiang 
in Equatorial Guinea (now 74) observed his uncle, President Macías, publically executing 
family members in a fit of paranoia induced by the extended abuse of marijuana and local 
hallucinogens (locally called “bhang” and “iboga”) (Sundiata 1988). Macías was removed 
from power, executed, and Teodoro proclaimed himself president (McSherry 2006). Still 
president today, he later asserted that he is God (just as his uncle had), claimed all the 
state’s oil wealth for himself, and began systematically executing political opponents (with 
the help of a legendary familial good luck charm – a shrunken head).15 In these miserable 
authoritarian settings, there are few independent remedies other than violence or silence. 
Exit and loyalty become the only reasonable options, as voice falls on deaf ears.  
The examples of North Korea and Equatorial Guinea are a brief introduction to the 
brutal and secretive nature of authoritarian rule amongst elites, but they differ in systematic 
ways from other autocratic leaders.16 Both of these men have effectively terrorized and 
purged their supporting regimes to the point that they have little need to share power with 
                                                          
15 Equatorial Guinea is considered to be a “perfect kleptocracy” where all state wealth is effectively stolen by the leader 
and small group of elites. Obiang’s son (Vice President and heir apparent) owns a hip-hop music label in New York, a 
$30 million estate in Malibu, and Lamborghinis to match his outfits. He also owns significant portions of Michael 
Jackson’s estate (Grimaldi 2014). 
16 For a clearer picture of the miserable settings of authoritarian rule, add in the experiences of the citizens. It should also 
be noted that I use the masculine pronoun throughout this work because there have been relatively very few instances of 
female dictators, and none that rose to power outside of familial connections. 
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them. Their management style is essentially that of corruption and violence. They 
effectively command almost all aspects of government by decree. Svolik (2012) refers to 
these as established autocrats, whereas other authors refer to them as personalist (Kendall-
Taylor, Frantz, and Wright 2016). Here, I refer to them as unconstrained. Unconstrained 
autocrats emerge when power-sharing among elites fails or becomes less necessary. Kim 
Jong-Un (North Korea) and Teodoro Obiang (Equatorial Guinea) are prime examples. 
Examples of other unconstrained autocrats include Saddam Hussein (hanged) and 
Muammar Qaddafi (shot by rebel forces). Both had little need for power-sharing because 
they effectively removed threats from their inner circles. Both met violent deaths, though 
notably only after foreign interventions. 
Scholars have long argued that unconstrained (personalist or established) leaders 
are different from those that rule with some sort of institutional constraint. These arguments 
exist in work on Africa (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 1984), Southeast Asia (Liddle 1985, 
Thompson 1995), 17th Century Europe (Sharpe 1992), the Middle East and West Asia 
(Ansari and Moten 2003), nuclear proliferation (Way and Weeks 2014), international 
conflict (Peceny and Beer 2003, Colgan and Weeks 2015), political theory (Guliyev 2011), 
among formal modelers (Acemoglu, Verdier, and Robinson 2004), and psychologists 
(Brandstatter and Guth 2002). The general theme among all this research seems to be that 
political institutions do not matter very much to rulers with unconstrained management 
styles. They rule in the way 16th and 17th Century monarchs did, they are more war prone, 
they act – and are sometimes treated – as if they were a god or at least chosen by God.  
In an experimental setting, Brandstatter and Guth (2002) find that an individual’s 
personality (levels of benevolence, emotional stability) influences bargaining strategy. 
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Interestingly, they find that intelligence levels has no significant effect. This should not be 
a surprise to anyone. Most people know someone that is exceedingly selfish and 
emotionally unbalanced. Most people also know somebody that is exceedingly altruistic 
and steady – or some other combination. One could imagine that these personality traits 
have more influence in a political environment characterized by a monopoly on power as 
compared to a democratic government characterized by multiple veto players. In short, 
institutions matter, but, only to those with a management style conducive to sharing power.  
Having an unconstrained management style can require the use of extreme violence 
in order to mollify all opposition, often against family members and close acquaintances. 
One could imagine that the answer to the following question would help one determine the 
management style of a leader: “How willing are you to kill your closest relative in order to 
retain power?” If the answer is anywhere past “somewhat willing” the leader is likely to 
manage his government without constraint and work to undermine any possible constraints 
on his power.17 Although the tenure of autocratic leaders with an unconstrained 
management style tends to last longer on average, they are typically marred with poor 
economic growth, corruption, and egregious records of civil liberty violations.  
Autocrats with a constrained management style are leaders that need some sort of 
cooperation from the elites and the institutions they represent. They rule through delegation 
and deliberation. Svolik defines these types as having an elite coalition that maintains a 
credible threat of rebellion against the leader (Svolik 2012). This works in formal models, 
but empirically it is practically impossible to determine if a ruling coalition has credible 
                                                          
17 This behavior typically can and will draw the ire of democratic states, IOs, and NGOs that promote human rights. If 
intense enough, sometimes this attention leads to foreign interventions (Weeks 2012), sanctions (Escriba-Folch and 
Wright 2010), or civil wars (Gurses and Mason 2010). 
18 
threat of rebellion. One could argue that just having physical access to the leader or 
knowledge of where he resides gives a regime a credible opportunity to remove the leader. 
Therefore, I operationalize a constrained leader as one with a management style that 
prioritizes formal, deliberative, institutional decision and delegating powers to other elites.  
For example, Xi Jinping depends on the Communist Party, the National People’s 
Congress and the State Council – full of officials with diverse views – to implement vast 
and complex Chinese policies. Theoretically, these actors could rebel against the leader’s 
wishes and by all accounts Xi depends on these political institutions. However, in these 
situations with an elevated importance of the institutional environment, the institutional 
environment is conditioned by the personality (or management style) of the leader. Xi’s 
willingness to use or preference for institutions like the Communist Party makes those 
institutions important. Obiang’s preference for violence and corruption as a management 
tool in Equatorial Guinea requires institutions to be marginalized.18 
Autocrats with a constrained management style of delegation and deliberation 
always retain the option to pursue unconstrained rule through violence and corruption, but, 
arguably, once he unshackles himself from institutional constraint, there is no going back.19 
                                                          
18 The power-sharing through political institutions argument says that the decision makers in each Chinese body act 
according to formal rules and procedures rather than rule by decree or by terror. Therefore, authors conclude, power-
sharing is working in China, and in most authoritarian regimes with functioning legislatures. Logically, the condition of 
secrecy in autocracies casts some doubt on how much power is actually being shared and especially what type of power. 
Authoritarian parties and legislatures are theoretically capable of balancing power among elites and the leader, but it 
would behoove us to look at other avenues for cooperation (such as economic policies) in such secretive environments. 
One of the problems with using authoritarian political institutions such as legislatures or parties to indicate things such 
as power-sharing or management style is that these elites meet in secret and the level to which they actually share power 
cannot be known to anyone but the people in the room. We cannot observe the disagreements or dysfunction that 
theoretically may or may not exist within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or the National People’s Congress (NPC). 
SEZs and SWFs provide a way to publically observe elite behavior in non-democracies because they seek foreign direct 
investment (FDI). 
19 Recent research supports this claim based on the analysis of term limits (Baturo 2014). The more personal a ruler 
becomes the more likely he is to face punishment for his behavior if he leaves office voluntarily. Therefore, once a ruler 
goes down this path, the costs of going back or getting out become prohibitively high, leading him to try and stay in 
office until his death.  
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In other words, personalist unconstrained leadership can form in any type of institutional 
environment. This means that if an autocrat can remove his constraints (or, alternatively 
inherit a role with no constraints on his rule), he will likely survive in office indefinitely 
(limited by the human life span). Being limited by how long he will live,20 the autocrat 
with an unconstrained management style is more likely to steal as much as possible while 
alive and is more likely to fall victim to the same violence that he uses to rule. 
Therefore, when looking at only political institutions in autocracies, what almost 
all authoritarian typologies are based on, the findings can be spurious because analysis fails 
to take leadership style and extra-institutional arrangements into account. A power-hungry 
autocrat with an unconstrained management style will generate relationships in extra-
institutional settings through coercion or bribery. In an authoritarian political environment 
it is more likely that individual leader behavior influences levels of violence, corruption, 
and economic development, rather than the mere existence of a legislature or political 
party.  
By analyzing economic policies as a form of elite management, we see that all 
autocrats that are more willing to use formal and deliberative decision making processes 
rather than violence and corruption are likely to develop delegated power arrangements 
through economic policies to either compliment political institutions or act in their 
absence.21   
                                                          
20 It is possible to bribe an unconstrained autocrat out of office under special circumstances. Yaya Jammeh of The 
Gambia, left office for exile in Equatorial Guinea in 2017 after losing an election. To get him to step down, leaders across 
Africa were asked to pledge not to come after him and he was given a very impressive relocation package from the 
dictator of Equatorial Guinea – Teodoro Obiang – to compliment everything he has already embezzled from The Gambia. 
21Svolik (2012) is the first (and only scholar that I know of) to distinguish between established autocracies (those in 
which power-sharing is less important) and contested autocracies (those in which power-sharing is necessary). The 
distinction is intuitive and helpful in explaining authoritarian leader exits and transitions from one ruler to the next, but 
it can be confusing because it blends levels of analysis (leader/regime). However, like many formal models, Svolik’s 
distinction carries no clear method for empirically distinguishing between the two. It is simply assumed. To my 
knowledge the division of autocratic leaders and regimes has never been empirically defined.  It is my understanding that 
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1.2 ECONOMIC POLICIES AND ELITE MANAGEMENT 
 
No dictator can rule alone. All must delegate powers and all must manage insiders 
with varying agendas no matter how violently the leader terrorizes his elites. Leader with 
an unconstrained management style still face an internal threat even when it appears as if 
they have eliminated all internal threats. Stalin was possibly poisoned by his minister of 
internal security, Beria, and Qaddafi is rumored to have been shot by one of his own 
bodyguards just prior to capture. The majority of extralegal leader exits in dictatorships are 
coups from regime insiders (Svolik 2012). A dictator can solve the dilemma of elite 
management by either removing all institutional constraints (in this case violence and 
corruption become essential management tools) or by truly sharing power with his ruling 
coalition (in this case the sky is the limit, but requires the leader to accept that he will lose 
power at some point).  
Much of the recent work on authoritarian political institutions argues that 
legislatures and parties allow dictators to co-opt the opposition through a variety of 
mechanisms (Brancati 2014).22 Regular interaction within these political institutions 
generates greater transparency and believable commitments amongst members of the 
ruling group. Misperceptions of intentions, which can often be violent and destabilizing in 
the authoritarian environment, become less likely in the presence of formal deliberative 
political institutions. The basic idea is that when the ruler and elites regularly meet in a 
                                                          
Jennifer Gandhi, Jane Sumner, and others, are currently working on data project related to measuring personalim, 
however, nothing has been published as of this writing. 
22 The most convincing arguments are that formal deliberative political institutions facilitate power-sharing. Svolik argues 
that any institution that establishes “formal rules concerning membership, jurisdiction, protocol, and decision making 
that both facilitate the exchange of information among the ruling elites and provide an easy assessment of compliance 
with those rules” will foster a more stable leader tenure (2012; 7). These institutions are typically recognized as rooted 
within legislatures and parties which are both connected to elections, fraudulent or not (Brancati 2014). 
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legislature, council, or party headquarters to discuss laws, development, and strategy, the 
ruler can more easily and quickly detect possible defections and deal with them, while at 
the same time elites are more assured that any attempt by the dictator to violate his own 
promises will be quickly and publicly exposed (Svolik 2012). The idea is analogous to the 
cliché that “sunlight is the best disinfectant” – or, making decisions in an open and 
predictable manner reduces the likelihood of corruption on all sides. But what if the 
leader’s management style is one of corruption and violence? 
Certain economic policies within dictatorships may in fact create stronger, or at 
least equivalent, arrangements despite the ruler’s management style. Relatively little work 
has been done on how authoritarian leaders and elites create self-enforcing patterns of 
cooperation. Economic arrangements generate self-enforcing cooperation through greater 
transparency and credible commitments amongst elites. In an analysis of FDI in China, 
Zheng (2014) finds that “development zones functioned as a platform to align the interests 
of different government agencies, which created a self-enforcing mechanism that rendered 
the policy credible” (p. 75). Power is generally equated with money, therefore it is a logical 
extension to argue that where money is involved there will likely be a greater desire for 
transparency than in a rubber-stamp legislature or a party platform.  
My arguments surrounding elite management include two additional points. First, 
economic policies have the ability to directly distribute benefits. Legislatures and parties 
offer mostly indirect benefits provided by the prestige of the position. Other than providing 
a salary, legislatures and political parties do not directly distribute anything other than 
constituency spending. However, it is widely believed that authoritarian legislatures are 
used to generate patronage. But when management of a specific economic policy is 
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awarded to a loyalist, it not only rewards him, it also gives him the ability to generate his 
own revenue streams (rather than merely collect them). It gives him specific economic 
information and privileges that can then be used for personal gain. The loyalist can then 
use these privileges and revenues generated through direct control of economic activity to 
purchase patronage from other elites and subordinate populations. If the manager of this 
policy is also a legislator it only increases his original power.  
Second, economic policies – especially those involving foreign trade – directly 
connect the ruling coalition to independent arbiters, such as the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) and foreign economic elites such as multinational corporations (MNCs). 
Connections to independent sources of power able to arbitrate disagreements and monitor 
transactions greatly reduces the possibility of costly and potentially violent public 
disagreements within the regime. While these independent arbiters may not always be able 
to enforce contracts, they can impose expensive reputation, business, and political costs on 
members of the regime by withdrawing investment or exposing corruption.  
In sum, economic policies make commitments more credible and connect the 
regime to independent arbiters, thus enhancing a dictator’s ability to manage his regime – 
given that he is amenable to accepting constraints on his power. If the dictator rules with 
violence and corruption, these same mechanisms allow the regime to either remove the 
leader or impose constraints on him outside of or within a legislature or a political party. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of this theory (outlined in detail in Chapter 3) is that 
the regime can remove or change the unconstrained leader without resorting to violence.23  
                                                          
23 A violent exit from office, such as an assassination, coup, revolution, or foreign intervention, represents a type of 
economic shock that depresses the economy and increases the likelihood that another unconstrained leader will step in to 
fill the vacuum. 
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1.3 ECONOMIC POLICIES AND POPULAR MANAGEMENT  
 
Events like the Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring provide ample evidence that 
the masses can and sometimes do pose a credible threat to not just the ruler, but the entire 
regime. The “original sin” of rule without explicit consent means that repression will be 
present in every dictatorship (Svolik 2012). There will always be unhappy customers 
(citizens) who seek change. Rule without explicit consent merely raises the stakes for these 
actors, because in a dictatorship there is no pressing need to trust or even to gain trust from 
the population. Dictators and their regimes use a mixed strategy of repression and co-
optation to prevent mass uprisings – a version of sticks and carrots.  
Repression is a double-edged sword because if used too heavily it will equip the 
repressive apparatus (typically the military) with the means and possibly the motive to 
remove the regime from power (Acemoglu et al 2010, Svolik 2012, 2013). Repression 
makes protest less likely, but when public opposition does occur under the conditions of 
state violence it is likely to be more effective because it signals stronger resolve in the 
opposition (Kricheli et al. 2011). Repression typically hinders economic activity, much in 
the way that roving banditry (random theft) does (Olson 1993), and is not the most efficient 
long-term method for exerting political control. 
However, buying loyalty from the masses cannot work without the regime’s 
credible threat of violent repression. Otherwise there is little incentive for the masses to 
accept co-optation and no incentive to stop demanding more and accept what they get. The 
dictator and his regime need both repression and co-optation. Different structural and 
institutional factors (such as resource wealth, inherited military role, and regime type) are 
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typically used to help predict the levels of repression and co-optation (Davenport 2007b, 
Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014, Kim and Gandhi 2010).  
Many authors focus heavily on the role of violent repression. The argument here 
contends that violent repression exists in all states and all governments as one of the 
defining characteristics of a state – a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (i.e. 
militaries). Treating repression as a constant, the argument turns here to focus on the 
incentive structure created for everyday citizens to accept co-optation and support the 
regime (or at a minimum not work against it). Remember, the concept of popular 
management in this work is related to the idea of an authoritarian regime using its 
monopoly power to incentivize loyalty and minimize negative political externalities.  
Svolik argues that authoritarian political parties provide a stable incentive structure 
by encouraging a sunk investment from individuals throughout society by  
assigning costly, politically valuable party service – often in the form of ideological 
proselytizing, intelligence gathering, and mobilization for regime-sanctioned 
events – early in a party member’s career while delaying the benefits of party 
membership – which typically entail better employment and promotion prospects 
or privileged access to education and social services – to a later point (2012; 11-
12).    
This delayed gratification incentive structure encourages party members to marginalize the 
opposition on their own volition in a rational effort to improve their own lot, thus limiting 
the need to use costly and potentially destabilizing violent repression. 
Economic power structures can also impose the same rigid hierarchal assignment 
of services and benefits, control over positions, and selective recruitment that many 
scholars describe political parties as doing. The caste system in India is a clear example of 
how powerful socio-economic assignment can be, surviving even through the transition to 
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democracy (albeit informally now). Popular management through a political party is a 
direct approach, but it only works for party members who are generally a very small 
proportion of the population. There are over 80 million members of the Communist Party 
in China, but this only represents about 6% of the population. Popular management  
through an economic policy is 1) indirect, meaning when it works it works whether control 
was the intention of the policy or not and 2) it can work for everyone, including those in 
the party, and in China’s case, including the approximately 94% of the population outside 
of the party. 
A complete and abrupt liberalization of the entire economy poses a great danger to 
authoritarians because they are naturally conservative, but more importantly, a completely 
open economy requires rights and liberties that would have to apply to the entire society. 
To avoid this problem, authoritarians have almost universally adopted the policy of special 
economic zones (SEZs) or “selective spatial liberalization” (Park 2005).24 
For an individual to help a non-democratic regime deploy economic liberalization 
policies, like SEZs and SWFs, it is costly to the individual worker and valuable to the 
regime whether it is in the service of a party or not. For example, in the 1980s as China 
began to open up to trade with the West, the Communist Party launched a campaign against 
“bourgeois liberalization” as they simultaneously pursued controlled economic 
liberalization experiments in SEZs. When involving foreign trade, this service in the 
process of partial liberalization can potentially be dangerous to the regime because it can 
                                                          
24 If these economic policies can create a more efficient and wider-reaching delayed incentive structure, this helps explain 
the remarkable resilience of some non-party regimes (such as the Gulf monarchies and personalist regimes like Belarus) 
and multi-party dictatorships (such as Venezuela and Zimbabwe) that have yet to be adequately explained in the literature.  
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expose individuals to foreign elites and ideologies that may not be in line with the regime’s 
orientation. A modicum of trust is needed.  
This management is achieved through labor fragmentation (explained in detail in 
Chapter 4). Partial liberalization through the use of SEZs typically involves employing a 
number of people in a concentrated area.25 By employing people in a concentrated 
geographic area, the regime can better detect and manage the demands of workers as their 
lot improves. Geographic selective control is an easier and cheaper approach when 
compared to a complete or full liberalization of the entire economy. Costly service in the 
process of implementing and being employed within new economic policies also delays 
the individual’s benefits of such service, as benefits will typically depend on whether or 
not the policy (and the regime) succeeds in its goals – generally to increase tax receipts, 
employment, and development.  
Successful economic endeavors will always attract new actors interested in gaining 
their piece of the pie. Economic migration of this sort is most evident in China’s coastal 
cities where its first SEZs were established, but it is a global phenomenon. A successful 
and geographically limited economic policy increases employment, development, and 
services in the area, thereby attracting large numbers of migrants from lesser developed 
areas (commonly referred to as urbanization). The need for a sunk investment in the success 
of the policy and the delayed benefits it generates can lead low-level individual employees 
to marginalize non-loyal or non-participant members of the populace and work harder out 
their own self-interest.  
                                                          
25 Park (2005) described this approach as “spatially selective liberalization” in South Korea’s efforts to concentrate 
specifically skilled laborers in specific geographic areas using SEZs. 
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This process can lead to direct incremental economic gain for the individual, 
something that is likely to be far more valuable to most individuals than lofty ideological 
goals, party prestige, or even privileged access to social services. It also leads to general 
economic development – typically the original goal of these policies. The result is an 
orderly and loyal population largely free of negative political externalities from a partially 
liberalized economy. Citizens are too busy trying to get their piece of the pie to invest what 
little capital they have in opposing the regime responsible for creating the pie for them.
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CHAPTER 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE 
 
Authoritarian regimes are similar to the mafia. In the mafia, loyalty to the family is 
demanded above all else, and profits take primacy over everything else. The problem that 
organized crime families face is the same that all criminals face, their actions are illegal 
and thus cannot be shared openly (Arlacchi 1986). This means that in the beginning, family 
bosses had to trust underbosses and other made men solely on their word. One can imagine 
that when large sums of money are involved, everyone is heavily armed, and secrecy is of 
utmost importance to carry on, things often get violent. One way the mafia attempted to 
control this violence was by electing an unrelated consigliere (an independent arbiter) to 
impartially mediate disputes within the family (Paoli 2008). In the early 1930s, in an effort 
to stem the steady flow of familial assassinations, the mafia created “the commission,” a 
governing body of all mafia families that distributed lists of all made men and proposed 
made men for approval. The formal distribution of more information (greater transparency) 
created more stability within each family. 
Non-democracies are not illegal in an anarchic international system, but they are 
similar to the mafia in that they are generally characterized as having a small group or an 
individual with a complete or near-total monopoly on domestic political power. Generally, 
authoritarian regimes are not very transparent, plagued by corruption, and more likely to 
enter into conflict (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003, Brancati 2014). They are secretive, 
manipulative, and censor the press, possibly explaining why we often know so little about
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them. Even though some non-democracies have a relatively strong rule of law score 
(Ginsburg and Moustafa 2008, Barros 2003), their judiciaries are by definition beholden to 
whoever maintains the monopoly on power (Brancati 2014).  
These problems of secrecy and the lack of a truly independent arbiter to decide 
political disputes – such as a free press, free and fair elections, or an independent judiciary 
– make high levels of violence in the form of repression, extrajudicial killings, and political 
imprisonment a common characteristic amongst these regimes as well. In a phrase, the 
limits of power are ill-defined, if defined at all. Consequently, who exerts power when and 
where can be extremely unclear. The amount of uncertainty that can revolve around 
authoritarian politics further elevates the importance of economic transactions. Like the 
mafia, loyalty and power are often equated with monetary transactions, not formal 
institutions.  
Modern non-democracies are a diverse group. There are literally hundreds of 
different names for them.26 Throughout this exercise I will continue to use the terms 
dictatorship, autocracy, authoritarian and non-democracy interchangeably, but will briefly 
discuss their differences here. They all refer to any government that is not democratic. The 
definitional differences in the terms dictatorship, autocracy and authoritarianism are 
somewhat trivial, but interesting and enlightening nonetheless.27  
Dictatorship is a very old term that dates to the Roman Republic when the emperor 
would appoint a transitory dictator to restore order in provinces with rebellions or other 
                                                          
26 Totalitarian, hybrid, mixed, competitive authoritarianism, anocracy, autocracy, partly free, bureaucratic 
authoritarianism, monarchy, absolute monarchy, communist, single-party, dominant-party, sultanism, 
neopatrimonialism, kingdom, sheikhdom, tyranny, oligarchy, illiberal democracy, disciplined democracy, personalist, 
fascist, military, theocracy, are just a few. 
27 It is important to note that all of these words can be used as either nouns or adjectives and can apply to either leaders, 
the regime, or both. 
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social unrest (Lintott 1999). The appointments started out as temporary and the people 
generally viewed them positively (Gandhi 2008). Over time, Roman dictators began 
devising and experimenting with ways to stay in power. They ultimately succeeded. The 
course of history – from the thousands of European kingdoms, Eastern dynasties, 
colonialism, and eventually WWII (think Hitler and Mussolini) – brings us to the strongly 
pejorative connotation that the term dictator provokes in one’s mind today. Often, incorrect 
use of the term is not dissimilar to when the term fascist is incorrectly employed by an 
angry student to describe a teacher they believe to be too demanding. Here it only means 
not democracy. There is no pejorative connotation intended here.28 
Autocracy is a term meaning something akin to automatic rule by the self. It is an 
old term as well. Its partner term, autocrat, was first used in France to describe Napoleon. 
Today, this academic term is largely associated with the Polity project. On a scale from 10 
to -10, ranging from democracy to autocracy, this project attempts to measure and map 
regimes according to how closed or open their political structures are – among other things. 
It is one of the most widely used continuous measures of democracy and autocracy today, 
but the measure’s conceptual validity is frequently challenged. Most of the controversy 
circles around the middle region (5 to -5) referred to as anocracy – or a mixed and 
incoherent regime. Researchers have found that using the additive scale employed by 
Polity, there are eleven unique regime constellations that can equal to the middle score of 
‘0’ (Gandhi and Vreeland 2014). There is some evidence that SEZs actually work to 
stabilize these diverse middle regimes (Fuller 2015). In the literature, all regimes with a 
                                                          
28 For younger students, the pejorative connotation that older adults feel seems to be less of an issue. In the dictatorship 
course I teach, I frequently find that millennials do not equate the term dictator with Hitler or Stalin, instead they 
frequently associate it more with the skylines of Dubai, Beijing, and Singapore and other symbols of opulent wealth. I 
have not explored this phenomenon systematically yet, but will be doing so in future research.  
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score less than a positive 6 are traditionally treated empirically as a non-democracy – as 
most researchers conceptualize anything with a score of 6-10 as an established 
democracy.29  Furthermore, the scale is often criticized as focusing too heavily on the 
dimension of competitiveness and executive recruitment. Here, the term autocracy will 
simply mean not democracy.  
Authoritarianism typically refers to the general preference of political order over 
political freedom (Huntington 1968). This is a newer term that came into mass usage just 
prior to the Russian Revolution of 1917 that ushered in the Soviet Union. It made its way 
into the political science literature with the works of Juan Linz (1975), Samuel Huntington, 
and others as the field sought to broaden the study of dictatorships from the totalitarian 
regimes of WWII (Arendt 1951) to the diverse field of non-democratic regimes outside of 
Europe. This term is now frequently used in psychology to describe and measure different 
personality attributes and preferences, including parenting techniques. It has recently been 
widely used to describe and measure the mindset of Donald Trump supporters in the 2016 
US Presidential Race (MacWilliams 2016). An authoritarian disposition – a psychological 
preference for action and obedience over deliberation and discussion – is apparently the 
strongest predictor of one’s support for now President Trump (although there is some 
debate surrounding this finding). Here, authoritarian and its derivatives will simply mean 
not democracy.     
Therefore, non-democracy is defined by what it is not. It is a residual catch-all 
category used to draw a clear distinction from democracy amongst extreme non-democratic 
heterogeneity. This means that the middle regime Polity anocracy type and Freedom 
                                                          
29 The next subsection discusses the comparison between established democracy and established autocracy. 
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House’s partly free category reside within the classification of non-democracy. Non-
democracy is treated as a residual category (for classification or subset purposes) because 
just as a woman cannot be half-pregnant, it is not normatively or scientifically correct to 
treat any regime as half-democratic (Przeworski et al 2000).  
The rest of this chapter will discuss authoritarian political institutions, such as 
elections, parties, and legislatures, before developing a framework for conceptualizing 
constrained and unconstrained autocrats. Lastly, it describes special economic zones 
(SEZs) and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in detail before outlining the process of data 
collection concerning these policies.  
 
2.1 AUTHORITARIAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
Historically, many authoritarian governments have subsidized rigged elections to 
confer legitimacy to domestic and international audiences.30 Single-party Communist 
regimes made a regular practice of this. Mexico’s Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 
figured out how to do this for over 70 years, even with a legal domestic opposition 
(Magaloni 2006). However, all modern authoritarian regimes now sponsor these elections. 
Furthermore, these elections have become ostensibly more and more competitive over the 
years. Figure 2.1 shows the average change in the effective number of political 
(parliamentary) parties in all regimes from 1946-2010, divided between democracies and 
                                                          
30 Single-party elections are often very competitive; however, they are referred to here as rigged because of the exclusion 
of opposition parties. Without viable opposition parties the state is in de facto control by the party and the elections 
cannot be free. 
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non-democracies. In 2010, the average dictatorship had just over three effective political 
parties competing in elections, the same number the average democracy had in 1946.  
 
FIGURE 2.1: Effective Number of Political Parties 
 
 
Some of the stories surrounding these rigged elections are legendary. In Belarus, 
Aleksandr Lukashenko won his fifth – and probably not his last – presidential term in early 
October 2015. All key opposition leaders had successfully been kept off the ballot and the 
Belarussian Electoral Commission was seen offering doughnuts at polling stations to attract 
crowds. Lukashenko won all five times with more than seventy-five percent of the vote 
and very high turnout. In previous elections he threatened to wring the necks of opposition 
protesters “as one might a duck” (Walsh 2006). In 2010, international news covered the 
beatings and arrests of Belarussian opposition leaders and protesters by police during the 
casting of ballots. After independence in the 1990s, Belarus had around 4.19 effective 
political parties. In the years since then, as Lukashenko has consolidated power in himself, 
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the number has dwindled down to 1.14.31 However, this statistic is debatable and not 
representative of the trend in average numbers in Figure 1. This is because the 
overwhelming majority party in Belarus is not a party at all.  
They are legislators that identify as non-partisan and pledge allegiance to President 
Lukashenko. This fact further obfuscates the idea that parties are effective power-sharing 
institutions. In the 2016 Belarus lower house elections independents won 94 out of 110 
seats and the opposition parties won three. Turnout was around 75% and the second largest 
ticket was the “Against All” option (which awards no seats and is essentially a protest 
vote), beating the loyal Communist Party of Belarus by over two percentage points! The 
only real parties that manage to win seats are ones that pledge loyalty, and even then, in 
this case the independents win the majority. Party structure is essentially meaningless in 
Belarus, as all power is consolidated in Lukashenko and his family, who is frequently seen 
with his illegitimate youngest son (age 12) believed to be being groomed as a successor.   
In October 2013, the Central Election Commission of Azerbaijan accidentally 
released the country’s election results through a smartphone app a full day before voting 
began. The app announced that Ilham Aliyev won with 72.76% of the vote. The final count 
ended up being 85% with the regime pointing to the difference in numbers as proof they 
were not fixed (Keating 2013). Before dying in 2003 of heart failure in Cleveland, Ohio, 
Heydar Aliyev appointed his oldest son, Ilham, as the sole presidential candidate and head 
of the New (Yeni) Azerbaijan Party (YAP). Heydar presided over Azerbaijan after the split 
of the Soviet Union and developed an intense cult of personality. Over 50 cities have statues 
                                                          
31 Data collected and calculated by the author. Source: Wikipedia Elections.  
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of him, two films commemorating his rule were produced for his 80th birthday, and 
buildings and parks named after him are ubiquitous throughout the country.  
The New Azerbaijan Party (YAP) is more central to rule in Azerbaijan than 
Belarus, but similarly, power is concentrated mostly in one small familial group - Ilham 
and his immediate family. Under Heydar the effective number of political parties was 
around 1.6 and today it stands around 2.7. However, the calculation of this number again 
includes independents (or non-partisans) as a political party, as they won over 40% of the 
seats in the 2015 Azerbaijani parliamentary elections. It seems that in Azerbaijan the use 
of independents is likely more strategic. Each candidate is allowed his own observer at 
polling stations in Azerbaijan (Ismayilov 2005). Thus, if loyalists register as independents, 
loyal election observers can crowd out opposition observers and ensure positive results for 
the regime. Similarly, independents in Azerbaijan (often with no political background or 
experience) are thought to register in large numbers in contested districts to split the ticket 
in favor of regime favorites (Ismayilov 2005).   
Teodoro Obiang Nguema – in office for over 36 years now – won reelection in one 
precinct of Equatorial Guinea in 2002 with reportedly 103% of the vote (Smoltkyzk 2006)! 
The Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (or Partido Democrático de Guinea 
Ecuatorial, PDGE) exemplifies another strategy of institutional obfuscation. The party was 
the only legal party until the early 1990s when opposition parties were allowed due to 
international pressure stemming from recently discovered oil reserves. Opposition parties 
have only managed to win a handful of seats since then and frequently they are banned for 
various reasons shortly after winning a seat. While the PDGE might seem on the surface 
to be more important than the Azerbaijani YAP, Equatorial Guinea is closer to the 
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personalist rule of Lukashenko. The PDGE platform has no discernable ideological stance 
and basically consists of 1) loyalty to President Obiang, 2) support for foreign investment 
in the oil sector, and 3) support for Fang tribal dominance (Kraus 2010). Similarly, the 
elderly Teodoro is grooming his only son, Mangue, for succession.  
All three are classified as the same type of institutional environment (in GWF 2014 
– “personalist”) yet they differ in the role of political parties on paper. Upon closer 
inspection Belarus effectively has no political parties despite what data may indicate, 
Azerbaijan has one that wins about half the seats with almost all the other seats occupied 
by murky independents, and Equatorial Guinea has effectively one party that does little or 
nothing but heap praise upon the president.  
However, all three have familial structures that serve to groom future leaders, yet 
none are monarchies. All three have some of the highest levels of executive corruption. All 
three have relatively poor performing economies despite structural advantages (Equatorial 
Guinea and Azerbaijan have extensive oil deposits and Belarus strategically sits right in-
between the EU and Russia). Focusing on political institutions like parties in realms where 
institutions do not matter very much or at all can be highly problematic.  
Counting political parties and legislatures, brought to power through fraudulent 
elections, becomes even more difficult to decipher as we pan out to look at other regimes. 
The Iranian Green Movement voted in huge numbers in the rigged 2009 presidential 
reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. After winning in the first round, the results were 
augmented and the opposition was violently repressed in a regime where presidential 
candidates are vetted by the Assembly of Experts and ultimate power resides in the 
unelected Supreme Leader. The Guardian Council interprets the constitution and 
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supervises elections. It is a 12-member body, half of which are appointed by the Supreme 
Leader and the other half elected by the Majlis (or Iranian Parliament), however, all 
candidates are approved by the Head of Judicial Power, who is appointed by the Supreme 
Leader. Simple, right? Add in that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) controls 
a big portion of the Iranian economy (Ilias 2010), and the relevance of economic policy 
should become much more apparent. 
Close examination of Iranian elections and parties reveal stiff competition among 
shifting alliances in a deluge of political parties. However, Iran has only had two supreme 
leaders since the 1979 revolution and in 2009 it was made very clear that internal dissention 
would not be tolerated. If one were using political parties and legislatures as an indicator 
of power-sharing in Iran, there is a lot of something happening. However, the Islamic 
Republic has many traits that would lead us to believe it is led by an unconstrained autocrat 
that manages with violence and corruption. It has only had two leaders in its short history, 
it has moderate levels of corruption, and a poor performing economy. The state of the 
economy may be largely due to Western sanctions, but these sanctions are a result of pariah 
behavior similar the actions of other unconstrained autocrats such as Saddam Hussein and 
Muammar Qaddafi – namely the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, which some have 
found to be general characteristic of personalist leaders (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and 
Wright 2016). Iran’s leader likely exists somewhere between constrained and 
unconstrained, but the point is that number of political parties tells us little in the 
determination of this classification. 
In Egypt, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi won the 2014 presidency with 96.91% of the vote 
after deposing the democratically elected Mohamed Morsi in a military coup and then 
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banning the Freedom and Justice Party from participation.32 All non-democracies hold 
elections in the 21st century. Some have parties and some do not. One of the defining 
characteristics of authoritarian elections is that they are not free and fair. Considering the 
varieties of opaqueness in authoritarian political parties and the manipulation of elections, 
what can really be said about the authoritarian legislatures that parties and elections fill?  
Looking at legislatures, the National People’s Congress (NPC) in China has 2,987 
seats, arguably making its legislature more representative than the United States Congress. 
Even with a population of about 1.36 billion people, China has one representative in the 
NPC for approximately every 455,306 people. The United States has one House of 
Representatives member for approximately every 733,011 citizens (596,000 if the Senate 
is included).33 In 2009, four women were elected to the 50 seat National Assembly in 
Kuwait – a hereditary monarchy in the center of the Middle East – after the Crown Prince 
dissolved the legislature three times in order to get a cabinet he liked. In the DPRK (North 
Korea), the Mansudae Assembly Hall holds 687 elected representatives. All but 86 of these 
seats belong to members of the foundational Workers’ Party. Early in the 21st Century, the 
military leaders of Myanmar decided to move the capital city and the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw 
(bicameral legislature) 200 miles north from Yangon (Rangoon) to a remote and 
uninhabited jungle region called Naypyitaw. The decision to move the capital and build 
the mysterious (and gigantic) complex there is popularly rumored and believed to have 
been made after a warning of foreign attack was delivered to General Than Shwe by an 
astrologer. Many analysts believe the move was an attempt to prevent any type of popular 
                                                          
32 The Freedom and Justice Party is an Islamist party with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. This is why the US 
and Western countries did not strenuously object to the coup. 
33 The United States Constitution requires one House Representative for every 30,000 people, but this rule has been 
ignored since the early 1900s when the House was capped at 435 Representatives for seemingly arbitrary reasons. 
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non-violent uprising like a color revolution (Seekins 2009). All non-democracies have 
some form of a legislature and all of them are manipulated in an effort to monopolize 
power. 
The literature on non-democratic governance makes a strong argument for why 
seemingly democratic political institutions in a dictatorship matter. Legislatures in 
dictatorships are more than “mere window dressing” – they can be used to co-opt the 
opposition (Gandhi 2008), can reduce levels of terrorism (Aksoy, Carter & Wright 2012), 
and can act as binding commitments to alleviate expropriation risk (Wright 2008, 2015). 
Political parties in non-democracies are unifying institutions that ease the problem of 
succession, allow for elite competition, and create a subset of elites to counterbalance the 
military (Ezrow and Frantz 2011). Furthermore, parties and legislatures can increase the 
likelihood of violent repression by allowing regimes to clearly identify opposition members 
in the general public (Frantz & Kendal-Taylor 2014). Judiciaries are signaling institutions 
that often add legitimacy to the political regime and help enforce property rights regimes.34 
All non-democracies now hold elections to varying degrees of legitimacy (Levitsky & Way 
2010).35  
Given the diversity of authoritarian political institutions and the fact that they 
purposefully manipulated, secretive, or faked to various degrees, what can they actually 
tell us about dictatorships? To answer this question we must first determine when and why 
                                                          
34 Military institutions play an obvious role in the tenure of authoritarian leaders with over eighty percent of all non-
constitutional exits from power being the result of a coup d’état (Svolik 2009, Frantz and Ezrow 2011). 
35 Elections are often instrumental in receiving foreign aid, identifying the opposition, and shoring up domestic 
legitimacy. One argument concerning authoritarian legislatures, parties and elections is that these institutions alleviate 
the inherent problem with secrecy in non-democracies by creating credible commitments for leaders to follow through 
with promises and empowering elites with a credible threat to remove the leader. These political institutions can create 
an atmosphere of power sharing with elites (Svolik 2009, Svolik and Boix 2011) allowing them to possibly find a self-
enforceable equilibrium among elite preferences. But, considering the opacity surrounding these institutions and the 
variety of choices dictators have outside of institutional constraints (if they exist), it is highly likely that there are other 
avenues for power-sharing in autocracies. 
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they play the roles that scholars attribute to them and second we should search for means 
of solving credibility and monitoring problems outside of political institutions. Economic 
policy is a good place to start. 
Globalization and technological advances have made economic transactions faster, 
more public, and more accessible to observation – but it has not done the same for 
legislatures. While the political institutions non-democracies create often mimic those of 
democracies, these institutions are murky, fungible, and rarely live up to the standards they 
espouse. This is because they are not designed for democratic purposes. However, 
economic policies are designed to generate goods and profits, regardless of government 
structure. 
 Another strand of literature focuses on non-democratic economics (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2009, Wintrobe 1998), but does little to address the actual institutional and policy 
mechanisms at work in authoritarian economics. Instead of looking at how investment is 
encouraged, brought in, or managed, it looks at broader trends of domestic inequality or 
the effect of repression on economic outcomes. Perhaps it is best to start at the beginning 
to better understand the relationship between political institutions and economic policy in 
dictatorships.  
In Olson’s (1993) seminal piece, he explained the idea of government institutions 
arising from a roving bandit able to monopolize the greatest capacity for violence. Once 
the roving bandit establishes a monopoly on violence, he decides to settle down, wear a 
crown and become a stationary bandit that rationalizes theft through taxation. This is one 
of the clearest arguments for where government (in general) comes from. In Olson’s article, 
the stationary bandit succumbs to the encompassing interest and must provide public goods 
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like safety and education in order to encourage domestic production. The provision of any 
public good generally requires functioning political institutions.  
Bandits existed in a world where leaders only had to worry about their immediate 
neighbors and contracts were signed with a handshake (or blood). Today, non-democratic 
regimes face a swarming deluge of information and communications that require very 
sophisticated planning and high levels of skill to manage. They must pursue economic 
growth in a way that is perceived as credible (commitment), can be excluded from 
unwanted groups (opposition), and will enhance productivity (be efficient).36 Modern 
bandits have a much larger toolkit, a wider variety of institutions to choose from, and 
various non-institutional means of achieving these goals.   
This research argues that, assuming non-democratic leaders or regimes have a 
domestic monopoly on power, a rational interest in collecting more tax revenue will drive 
regimes to look for ways to experiment with liberal economic policies in the modern global 
economy, whether or not they have parties, legislatures, or elections.37  
 
2.2 AUTHORITARIAN TYPOLOGIES 
 
In the analysis of democratic transitions and consolidation, the strongest and most 
established democracies are often referred to as consolidated. Empirically these are 
typically counted as the ones with a Polity score higher than +5 for some sustained period. 
                                                          
36 These leaders and regimes must do this knowing that the majority of wealthy investors and preponderance of global 
military power emanates from mostly liberal democratic capitalist states (for now). The point is that those leaders that 
cooperate and share power should be easily distinguishable from those that do not (Fuller 2017). 
37 Experimentation with liberal political institutions is historically commonplace in non-democracies but has sped up and 
expanded dramatically over the past few decades. Most of the current literature on non-democratic institutions reflects 
the analysis of these political experiments with institutions. This research explores experimentation with economic policy 
in non-democracies. 
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Consolidated democracies are especially rare historically, but they are becoming more 
common, as the transition and consolidation research finds (Schedler 1998). Unconstrained 
autocrats leading an autocratic regime is historically common (Olson 1993) – the divine 
right of kings – but is arguably becoming less common (Walker 2016). However, this 
obfuscates things because it includes two different levels of analysis – the leader level and 
the regime level.  
 
FIGURE 2.2: Levels of Analysis 
Source: Author 
 
Figure 2.2 is the visualization of a bi-level conceptual approach to analyzing 
democracy and dictatorship. Imagine a basic measure, call it “0X,” that measures the level 
of democracy linearly or unidimensionally.38 That is essentially what the POLITY score, 
Freedom House, and most of our measures of democracy do. This is the center line in 
Figure 2.2 above that runs from 0 to X. Zero and X could be -10 to +10 or 1 to 7 or any 
                                                          
38 There is a simpler way of drawing this in a basic bi-dimensional figure. The simple graph is in Appendix A. 
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other combination of continuous numbers. The variable X is used so the figure makes sense 
when we add in a second level of analysis. The vertical scale on the far left-hand side of 
Figure 2.2 represents the relative importance of two distinct levels of analysis given the 
location of a regime on 0X. The leader and the regime are nested dyad, meaning that the 
leader is himself but is also part of the regime. The importance of the level of analysis 
ranges from 0 to 1 both up and down from the starting point of the 0X line. In Robert 
Putnam’s famous piece on levels of analysis, considering two levels and asking which one 
determines outcomes in the other, he retorts that “the answer to that question is clearly 
‘Both, sometimes” (1988;427). The idea of mixing levels of analysis is not new and can be 
done statistically through hierarchical or multi-level or nested models, but here it is purely 
conceptual as it is being used to lay the groundwork for the use of dictator personality traits 
in the analysis of dictatorships in general. 
The left side of the figure is where the individual level becomes of utmost 
importance. In general this is area A in figure 2.2, the land of the unconstrained autocrat 
that manages with violence and corruption. It does not make much sense to speak of an 
unconstrained autocracy (regime) when we have already defined unconstrained autocrats 
(leaders) as anti-institutional players. Moving from 0 towards X on the generic democracy 
measure, when any autocrat displays a management style of institutional deliberation and 
power delegation, this elevates the importance of the regime level of analysis 
proportionally to the decreasing importance of the individual level, giving us constrained 
autocrats and constrained autocracies (section C in Figure 2.2). This is because institutions 
(such as legislatures, parties, constitutions) are more influential in the realm of the regime 
with which the leader is sharing power.  
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The right hand side of the 0X unidimensional measure of democracy is where 
consolidated democracy resides (section D in Figure 2.2). Here, because of the strong 
institutional basis of democracy (rule of law, peaceful transition of power, checks and 
balances), it makes intuitive sense that the individual personality traits of the leader will 
matter much less. In fact, this assertion is supported by prominent theories and arguably 
the historical record. Selectorate theory posits that democratic leaders (large winning 
coalition) are rewarded for good policy by being fired and replaced (Bueno de Mesquita et 
al 2003). This bi-level conceptual approach implies that there are likely unique processes 
of leader and regime survival in each of the sections denoted by a vertical dashed line (A, 
C, and D) in Figure 2.2.  
In the area of unconstrained autocratic managers (A) we should expect that leaders 
will survive longer with an extra-institutional management style of violence and 
corruption. They are able to collect and store large amounts of private goods. We should 
expect the regimes of unconstrained autocrats to survive at about the same rate as their 
leaders. When unconstrained (personalist) leaders lose power, in the absence of 
constraining institutions the next leader will likely choose a new supporting regime. So we 
should expect leader and regime survival to be relatively equal among regimes ruled by an 
established autocrat. We should also not expect survival to be no longer than the human 
life span. 
In the area of democracy (D), we should expect leaders to have relatively short 
tenures and regimes that have very long tenures. Because democracies are based on the 
rule of law, elections, and peaceful transitions of power, once a democracy becomes an 
established democracy there is no reason to expect the regime to transition to anything else 
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in the short or long run (although it is surely possible). Institutions in democracies are 
mostly exogenous to the power held by an individual leader. Once democracy becomes the 
only viable path (Linz and Stepan 1996, O’Donnell 1996) and there are peaceful transitions 
of power, democrats are rewarded for their service by being kicked out of office and 
replaced with a new one (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). In democracy, the regime survives 
a very long time, the leader does not.  
The area of constrained autocracy and constrained autocrats (C) is where things can 
get murky. Since this analysis is only about non-democratic regimes, we can begin to 
simplify by removing the democracy section (D). This is simple given that we can clearly 
identify regimes that are democratic or non-democratic (which is not always so simple).39  
Moving down Sartori’s “ladder of generality” (Collier and Levitsky 1997) to 
differentiate amongst regimes in this constrained category (because unconstrained rulers 
basically are the regime) we should first review the classic non-democratic regime types 
and discuss how they might fit or not fit in the constrained category. Non-democratic 
regime typologies proliferated throughout political science during the past few decades as 
the study of dictatorships became more and more popular in the subfields of comparative 
politics and international relations.  
Authoritarian typologies perhaps began with a distinction between totalitarianism 
and authoritarianism (Arendt 1951) and grew with later realizations that few regimes were 
totalitarian and that authoritarianism was too broad to gain much analytical traction 
                                                          
39 The basic minimalist definition of dictatorship – in the spirit of Schumpeter (1950) and Dahl (1971) – is any regime 
lacking in either of the following two categories: 1) legislative elections that are free and fair and 2) free and fair executive 
elections either directly from the electorate or indirectly through the legislature (Svolik 2012). Essentially, this boils back 
down to the basic procedural definitions of democracy (Dahl 1971), participation and contestation, or in other words, 
civil liberties and free and fair elections. But the purpose here is not to define democracy – democratic empiricists are 
currently re-evaluating these classical theoretical notions of democracy (Achen and Bartels 2016). 
46 
(Brooker 2000). Linz (1975) sought to expand upon authoritarianism. What resulted was 
an ever-expanding group of subcategories likened casually by some as dictatorship with 
adjectives, in reference to Collier and Levitsky’s (1997) critique of the democratization 
literature. Some examples include: military (Nordlinger 1977; Perlmutter 1977); 
bureaucratic authoritarian (O’Donnell 1973); one-party (Huntington 1970); soft 
authoritarian (Scalapino 1992; Roy 1994); patrimonial (Weber 1964); neo-patrimonial 
(Snyder 1992; Bratton and Van de Walle 1997); and sultanistic regimes (Linz and Stepan 
1996, Linz and Chehabi 1998).  
Technology and trade expanded rapidly as the Cold War died down and elections 
proliferated around the globe. Scholars began to focus more on specific institutional 
characteristics when building typologies of non-democracy. Geddes (1999), is probably 
the most well-known typology, giving us personalist, single-party, and military regime 
types. The contribution of Geddes’ (1999) typology has arguably had the most lasting 
impact, but shows a lack of conceptual stability with the inclusion of traditional monarchy 
and the addition of dominant party regimes such as the PRI in Mexico or UNMO in 
Malaysia (Geddes, Wright, Frantz 2013, Magaloni 2006).  
The problem with the Geddes typology is that its categories are not mutually 
exclusive or exhaustive. To patch over this issue, scholars have begun to use hybrid types 
(i.e. Single-Party/Personalist), while inventing new types (i.e. competitive autocracy). 
Levitsky & Way (2002, 2010) focus on competitiveness in non-democratic elections and 
add a new competitive authoritarian type where elections are perceived as a viable path to 
power for opposition groups but the existing regime has manipulated the playing field in a 
manner that makes it close to impossible to win. Because competitive authoritarians hold 
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competitive elections it is likely that the supporting regime holds at least as much 
importance as the individual leader or more and therefore resides towards the right hand 
side of section C in Figure 2.2.40  
Geddes explicitly warned against using her regime types as indicators of specific 
institutional settings (Geddes 2003). However, scholars continue to use them as such. 
Because the typology is central to so much of the research on authoritarian regimes, and 
because this work uses completely different labels, the following paragraphs briefly discuss 
each type and how they relate to leader management style. 
Single-party regimes come the closest to democracy in the sense that they often 
have regular fair elections41 and they tend to have better traditions of following the rule of 
law. However, the exclusion of opposition political parties leads to frequent civil liberty 
violations like censorship (the Great Firewall) and violence against (Tiananmen Square) 
and by opposition groups (Uighurs). China and Vietnam serve as ideal type example. 
Opposition parties sometimes exist in these regimes (such as the Revolutionary Committee 
of the Koumintang or the China Democratic League), but in a single-party regime these 
opposition parties have little or no chance of exerting significant political power. 
 However, the single party regime category has nuance. There are also dominant 
party regimes (such as Mexico under the PRI, Singapore under the PAP, or Malaysia under 
UNMO) where one party can secure a consistent majority for a very long period of time. 
Dominant party regimes are sometimes classified as single-party regimes in the data, which 
                                                          
40 Weeks (2012) incorporates audience costs into the Geddes typology and offers a new typology of “machines, juntas, 
strongmen, and bosses.” However, recent experimental work on audience costs shows that the argument that audience 
costs drive policy is likely not tenable – especially in dictatorships (Kertzer and Brutger 2016). However, this may be 
fruitful avenue for exploration in this research. 
41 These elections are generally ‘fair’ but not ‘free’ – characterized by the absence of competition from other viable 
political parties. 
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can generate spurious results. The most important aspect of all of these party/competitive 
regimes is that they have open competition, even if it is only competition within one party 
(elites compete with each other).  
Regarding a single-party regime’s relationship with leader management style, these 
regime types are most likely to be led by an institutionally constrained leader (the right-
hand side of section C in Figure 2.2.) where the regime level of analysis is of equal or more 
importance than the individual leader of a non-democracy. Open competition (even within 
one party) will not work without 1) some level of power delegation among elites to 
facilitate the competition and 2) some procedural method linked to an independent power 
source to settle disputes and questions of legitimacy. We should expect that on average 
these types of regimes will survive longer than others and leaders to have shorter tenures, 
simply because they are closer to the institutional makeup of democracies. Because these 
types of regimes have experience with power delegation, these regimes and leaders are 
well-equipped to develop robust policies of economic power-sharing.42  
Military regimes are characterized by a military that exercises effective political 
control. In these regimes it can be very difficult to decipher who is in the military and who 
is in control. For example, if a general takes over a country in a coup and then two weeks 
later takes off his uniform and is elected in a rigged election, is it still a military regime? It 
depends. In Myanmar (Burma), Pakistan, and Egypt there may be a “civilian” in charge, 
but close examination shows that the military is still playing the most effective role. 
Thailand is a constitutional monarchy where the king is worshipped as if he is a deity. In 
                                                          
42 Given that the chosen leader prefers to rule through formal deliberation and power delegation rather than corruption 
and violence. The leaders of these regimes always retain the option to delegitimize the regime institutions and rule by 
corruption and violence. Possibly a good example of this would be the difference between Lenin’s USSR and Stalin’s 
USSR. 
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May 2014 the Commander-in-chief of the Royal Thai Army, Prayut Chan-o-cha, took over 
in a military coup. He formed the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). Chan-o-
cha then packed the legislature with hand-picked military and police leaders and was 
unanimously elected Prime Minister. He passed a new constitution, granted himself and 
everyone else involved amnesty for the coup and has led a campaign against civil liberties 
ever since, threatening to kill journalists, banning meetings with more than five people, 
and introducing a whole host of bans on freedom of expression (including a ban on 
criticizing the government) (Fawthrop 2016).  If the NCPO is counted as a political party, 
then Thailand is a monarchy, a party regime, a military regime, and arguably personalist, 
at the same time!  
Military regimes are often described as highly bureaucratic and often characterized 
by instability and internal power-struggles. The military regimes of South America inspired 
much of this literature. It appears that every military regime is unique and likely can be led 
by either a constrained or unconstrained ruler. For example, the Myanmar regime was 
likely dominated by and unconstrained ruler under the 18-year rule of General Than Shwe. 
In 2011 he decided to step down and hand over power to Thein Sein (retired general). Not 
much is known about why this happened. However, Thein Sein seemed to have more of a 
constrained management style since he held elections that he lost (sort of) and transferred 
some power to Aung San Suu Kyi.43 The secretive, pragmatic, and efficient behavior of 
                                                          
43 Recall that it was stated earlier that once a non-democratic ruler becomes unconstrained, he will not go back to being 
constrained. This brings up an interesting question of whether and how unconstrained rulers leave office. I leave this 
question to future research, but suspect that the pragmatic nature of military regimes might actually allow for easier 
peaceful exits of unconstrained leaders. 2011 is also the year that Myanmar built its first SEZs, made plans for more and 
welcomed the first ever visit of the U.S. Secretary of State. In other cases it is likely a huge bribe that could account for 
the peaceful exit of an unconstrained leader (see The Gambia – Yaya Jammeh). Also, Htin Kyaw is the actual president 
of Myanmar, but he has publically promised to only do exactly what Kyi and the National League for Democracy says 
since Kyi is constitutionally barred from holding the presidency because she has no military experience and holds dual 
citizenship. Her late husband was British and their two children are British citizens. Her husband died in 1999 of prostate 
cancer on his 53rd birthday.  
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military regimes makes it even more difficult to observe exactly what is going on 
politically. In most military regimes the military takes an excessively large role in the 
management of the economy, highlighting the importance of observable economic policies 
in dictatorships. We should expect that military dictators can be either constrained or 
unconstrained and can exist anywhere but democracy in Figure 2.2. This is possibly why 
theories and evidence on military regimes lack consistency. 
Monarchy is one of the oldest forms of government. Hereditary succession defines 
the structure of these regimes, but one must recognize that this tradition is not exclusive to 
monarchies only or even dictatorships in general.44 The Kim dynasty in North Korea, the 
Obiang family in Equatorial Guinea, the Bongo family in Gabon, the Kabila family in 
DRC, or the apparent Lukashenko dynasty in Belarus are all examples of hereditary rule in 
non-democracies that are not considered to be monarchies. Furthermore, succession rules 
are different in each monarchy, ranging from succession to the next oldest brother in Saudi 
Arabia – which has led to a succession of octogenarian kings – to the childless King of 
Oman who upon his death if there is no unanimous choice of a successor, there is reportedly 
one named in an envelope in a safety deposit box in the Bank of Oman (Economist 2014). 
Hereditary succession generally leads to more stability because it extends the monarch’s 
time horizon and reduces uncertainty in the elite and the general population – despite the 
near zero chance of a first-born son or any other person in line for succession to be the best 
equipped to lead a country (Olson 1993). In fact, Saudi Arabia has created a Guardian 
Council to vote in the event there is no clear successor if the next in line is incapacitated in 
health.  
                                                          
44 Clinton, Bush, Kennedy come to mind, democrats cannot install their first born, but they can and do groom their 
relatives for positions in government.  
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All monarchies also have some sort of legislature and court. They typically have 
very high military participation in the regime. Typically, all royal family members occupy 
high positions in the military. In 2015, after ISIS broadcasted globally the gruesome killing 
of a downed Jordanian pilot, the king personally put on a flight suit and reportedly flew 
sorties over Syria in retaliation. 
Monarchy exists in shades of grey. There are constitutional monarchies, like the 
United Kingdom, that are actually established democracies.45 There are mixed monarchies 
that have a constitution and maybe some civil liberties, but still fail to live up to democratic 
standards (such as Morocco or Jordan). And then there are absolute monarchies, like Saudi 
Arabia and Swaziland. As of 2010 there are only seven dictatorial monarchies in the world 
(GWF 2014): the U.A.E., Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Swaziland. 
There has been relatively little theorizing about monarchies, so I take a little space here to 
discuss them.  
This small number of non-democratic monarchies makes using them as a 
categorical independent variable in the analysis of modern dictatorships problematic. 
Statistically we cannot generalize much of anything about monarchies. All but one is 
Muslim. Of the Islamic monarchies, all but one is majority Sunni. Oman is majority Ibadi 
Islam – a lesser known school of Islam considered to predate the formation of Sunni and 
Shia denominations. The only lasting Christian dictatorial (or absolute) monarchy is 
Swaziland – a tiny country in Southern Africa. Modern non-democratic monarchies range 
in size from 6,880 sq. mi. (Kuwait) and 1.1 million people (Swaziland) to 830,000 sq. mi. 
(Saudi Arabia) and 34.7 million people (Morocco). Four of the seven have extensive oil 
                                                          
45 Even though the British Constitution is not technically written down. 
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reserves (Saudi Arabia, U.A.E., Oman, and Kuwait) and oil exports make up the vast 
majority of exports (See Figure 2.3 below for visual comparison).46 It is not immediately 
clear that we can generalize anything about monarchies other than that they typically wear 
really elaborate and tailored outfits and have grandiose palaces and expensive toys.  
Morocco                                                               Oman 
             
Jordan                                                                   Kuwait 
              
FIGURE 2.3: Proportional Representation of Exports in Four Monarchies  
Source: R. Haussmann, Cesar Hidalgo, et al. Economic Complexity Observatory, MIT Media Lab and the Center for 
International Development at Harvard University. 
 
It would perhaps be more useful to measure monarchies according to leadership 
management style. Without reciting the hotly debated and extremely mixed findings of a 
general oil curse (Haber and Menaldo 2011, Wright, Frantz and Geddes 2015, Dunning 
                                                          
46 If one takes into account the fact that the U.A.E. is actually a confederation of seven monarchies, 1) this still does not 
give us enough observations to make statistical generalizations and 2) confounds the problem with the fact that only one 
of the seven Emirates has extensive oil reserves. 
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2008), with a cursory glance at Figure 2.3 it would seem that the presence of natural 
resource deposits lessens the need to delegate power, as Morocco and Jordan have very 
little oil and relatively more active legislatures and their kings have made public gestures 
towards more power-sharing. But again, oil wealth (or free resources like foreign aid) are 
exogenous to a personal style of monarchial rule. It has little bearing on whether or not the 
king himself is just a terrible power-hungry person that does not want to be constrained in 
any way or if he is a benevolent philosopher king. It does give him the opportunity to be 
more terrible, but only if he has the willingness to do it.47 Because of this we should expect 
monarchies to periodically have constrained or unconstrained rulers.  
Personalist regimes are characterized by aggregated power in one individual where 
he purposefully weakens political institutions and steals from his country in order to 
maintain power and enrich himself. Often they are called kleptocracies. These regimes 
experience political violence on a regular basis as there are few other viable paths for 
opposition groups to lodge a complaint. These regimes also retain their leaders longer than 
any other type of non-democracy and generally have the poorest performing economies. 
Ideal type examples include Equatorial Guinea where Teodoro Obiang killed his uncle in 
1979 in order to take power, declared himself God and remains in power today. Other 
examples include The Gambia, where Yayah Jammeh claimed to have the power to cure 
AIDS and asthma with his bare hands while promising to decapitate all discovered 
homosexuals – he now lives in exile in Equatorial Guinea.  
Personalist regimes, like Bokassa’s Central African Republic where he declared 
CAR an empire and himself an emperor and bankrupted the country with his celebration 
                                                          
47 See Starr (1978), Cioffi-Revilla and Starr (1995), and Most and Starr (1989, 2015) for a review of the opportunity and 
willingness framework and its many uses.  
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after overseeing the execution of school children for not wearing uniforms with his face 
printed on them, are chock full of some of the strangest stories of violence and depravity. 
Their histories often read like fictional dramas. This is because personalist regimes are 
more a style of rule than a structural type. This assertion seems intuitively true when one 
considers the list of personalist dictators including, Saddam Hussein, Muamar Gaddafi, 
and Mobutu, or historical ones like Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini. This means that 
established rulers have taken over and ruled all the types of regimes in Figure 2.2, including 
democracy! This implies that once a ruler solidifies unconstrained rule, the structure of the 
regime becomes of little or no importance and the regime follows the leader back to left 
hand side of Figure 2.2. This is explored further in the next section. 
If we look at trends over time in the classification of regimes, personalist regimes 
have grown the most in number, representing 21% of all non-democracies in 1973 and 42% 
in 2010 (GWF 2014, Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and Wright 2016). See Figure 2.4 below. 
Rather than more personalists taking over, which is what many scholars imply, there is a 
possibility that the reason for this is the problem that Geddes (2003) points out. These 
regime types are not meant to represent specific institutional settings, yet scholars have 
tried to make them.  
Three of the types (monarchy, single-party, and military) have empirical observed 
implications that can be searched for. Respectively, hereditary succession, a dominant 
party, a leader in a military uniform, are all easily observable things. Personalism is a style 
of rule that can involve all of the previously mentioned observations. It is possible that over 
time, as more scholars researched non-democracies, these conceptualizations blurred. 
There is no evidence (that I know of) of this constructivist idea that our conceptualization 
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of personalist regimes morphed over time, but Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2017) recently 
cited this growth in personalist regimes, but do not speculate as to why. This is explained 
further in the next subsection. 
 
 
FIGURE 2.4: Regime Types, 1973 (left) and 2010 (right) 
 
The reader here may have further questions. Iran, is it a personalist regime or a 
single-party or something else? A similar question is often raised about North Korea and 
many others. I have the same questions. Iran is usually referred to in every day parlance as 
a theocracy and North Korea is often referred to as totalitarian. These classifications are 
not useful for analysis here because they are likely unique to just these regimes or their 
leaders currently. Technically Iran is ruled by priests (ayatollahs) in the name of God, but 
so is the Vatican. One could make the argument that Thailand is a theocracy, ruled by a 
ceremonial god-king and his military underlings. Technically, North Korea is ruled with 
an all-encompassing ideology and revolves around mass political mobilization, but so is 
China – albeit with a little less ideology and more pragmatism. One could make similar 
arguments about Cuba or Qaddafi’s Libya (and his little green book).  
48.75%
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 Svolik notes that an unconstrained “dictator succeeds in consolidating enough 
power that he can no longer be credibly threatened by his ruling coalition” (pg. 61). 
Unconstrained autocrats often achieve this “greater freedom to act as he sees fit” by 
signaling impregnability via personal attacks, personnel and military reshuffles, mass 
firings, public belittlement, among other action. It is the behavior of an individual leader, 
not a structural environment. 
 
 IDENTIFYING UNCONSTRAINED AUTOCRATS 
 
 Categorical and continuous conceptualizations each have strengths and 
weaknesses. Categorical authoritarian typologies must satisfy three assumptions to be 
useful: 1) that we can identify all regimes that are not democracies, 2) categories are 
mutually exclusive, and 3) categories are exhaustive. The previous discussions explain why 
the second and third assumptions do not hold in the Geddes typology. Scholars have 
patched over this problem by identifying hybrid regimes (mixes of categories) and creating 
more and more categories to include outliers that do not fit squarely within any type or 
hybrid. Some even use the idea of a “triple-threat” regime – a personalist, military, and 
single-party hybrid! (Ezrow and Frantz 2011)48 Categorical classifications are useful in 
that they provide an easy heuristic for schematic reasoning. The better ones (like Geddes) 
are used heavily to drill down and explore dynamics among subsets of regimes.  
                                                          
48 This would imply that there could also be a “quadruple threat” regime that is personalist, monarchy, military and single-
party. This is not that difficult to imagine, seeing how North Korea fits into all of these categories. If this is the case, that 
one case can exist in all four categories, then there is something wrong with logic behind the use of the typology. 
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Table 2.1 represents a first approach to morphing levels of analysis to identify 
unconstrained autocrats. Table 2.1a displays the framework for a continuous approach to 
identifying unconstrained autocrats given the categorical regime measures we have. 
Personalist regimes are the only ones that can be logically excluded from the constrained 
management style category. That is because personalist regimes are described in almost 
the exact same manner in which unconstrained leaders are defined.49 Table 2.1b is for 
comparative reference. It exemplifies the manner in which most institutionalists explicitly 
or implicitly model authoritarian theories about personalist regimes. 
    
TABLE 2.1. Leader-Regime Configurations of Unconstrained and Constrained Autocrats 
2.1a Personalist Monarchy Single-Party Military 
Unconstrained X X X X 
Constrained  X X X 
 
2.1b Personalist Monarchy Single-Party Military 
Unconstrained X    
Constrained  X X X 
Note: 2.1a represents a continuous approach where all regime types can have an unconstrained   
(personalist) leader. 2.1b represents the problematic categorical approach. 
 
 
 Using the GWF (2014) data, Table 2.2 is a list of all regimes that these authors 
count as personalist. This categorical personalist measure is a dummy 0, 1 dichotomous 
variable with a 1 entered for each country year that a regime is personalist (in the GWF 
2014 data) and a 0 entered for all other country years. Leader names, exits, and deaths were 
                                                          
49 There is nothing stopping a monarch from terrorizing his support coalition and consolidating power in himself. The 
majority of monarchs share power with the ruling family effectively, but historically this has not been the case and 
contemporarily there are a few outliers, such as King Mswati III of Swaziland, who behaves similar to other personalist 
leaders and seems to not be interested in sharing power with anybody. Similarly, there is nothing stopping a military 
leader or the leader of a party from doing the same thing. Stalin and Hitler both effectively removed all credible threats 
to their rule. So did Saddam Hussein and Qaddafi. Military regimes can somewhat effectively delegate power amongst 
elites, as they do in Thailand today, but others can be very personalist like Johnny Paul Koroma of Sierra Leone in the 
late 1990s or possibly Mr. Sisi of Egypt today. Hitler was the head of the Nazi Party and Stalin the Communist Party. 
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researched separately by the author.50 Dates begin with the first full year the regime is 
measured as personalist by GWF and end on the year of leader exit. The exit column 
describes the manner in which the leader left office and the death column describes the 
manner in which they died, if they are dead. 
 A few interesting trends emerge. There are approximately 107 personalist dictators 
in the time period (1946-2010). A remarkable 30% (32) are still alive and 13% (14) are 
still in power as of this writing. Only three dictators out of the 18 that are still alive and not 
in power are currently serving prison sentences.51 Of the 93 personalist dictators that are 
not currently in office, 16% (15) exited office by dying, 13% (12) were ousted by popular 
rebellions and 7% (6) were ousted by foreign intervention. 73% of those that died in office 
were assassinated. 40% were removed in a coup.  
 
TABLE 2.2 Personalist Leaders, Dates, Exit, and Death – 1946-2017 
Country Leader Dates Exit Death 
Afghanistan Mohammed Daoud Khan 1974-1978 Coup Assassin. 
Afghanistan Hamid Karzai 2010 Legal alive 
Argentina Juan Domingo Perón 1952-1955 Coup Heart Attk 
Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan 1995-1998 Resign alive 
Armenia Robert Kocharyan 1999-2008 Term  alive 
Armenia Serzh Sargsyan 2009-2017 - In power 
Azerbaijan Abulfaz Elchibey 1992-1993 Coup cancer 
Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev 1994-2003 Died Heart Attk 
Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev 2004-2017 - In power 
Benin Hubert Maga  1961-1963 Coup Heart Attk 
Benin Christophe Soglo 1963 Legal ? 
Benin Mathieu Kérékou 1973-1990 Coup natural 
Burkina Faso Maurice Yaméogo 1961-1966 Coup natural 
Burkina Faso Sangoulé Lamizana 1967-1980 Coup ? 2005 
Burkina Faso Thomas Sankara 1983-1987 Coup Assassin. 
Burkina Faso Blaise Compaoré 1988-2014 Coup alive 
Bangladesh Ziaur Rahman 1976-1990 Coup Assassin. 
Belarus Aleksandr Lukashenko 1995-2017 - In power 
                                                          
50 This was accomplished mostly by reading the Wikipedia page for each leader. The table is for illustrative purposes 
only. For me, it allows the visualization of the richness of information that is left out when one uses a dummy variable 
to measure regime type.  
51 One should find this to be interesting given the severity of the crimes many of these individuals are responsible for. 
59 
Country Leader Years Exit Death 
Bolivia René Barrientos 1965-1969 Died Helicopter 
Cen. African Rep. David Dacko 1961-1965 Coup - 
Cen. African Rep. Jean-Bédel Bokassa/Bokassa I 1966-1979 Foreign Heart Attk 
Cen. African Rep. David Dacko 1980-1981 Coup Asthma 
Cen. African Rep. François Bozizé 2004-2013 Legal Alive 
Ivory Coast Robert Guéï 2000 Legal? killed 
Ivory Coast Laurent Gbagbo 2001-2010 Coup Hague 
Cameroon Paul Biya   1984-2017 - In power 
Congo (DRC) Mobutu Sese Seko 1961-1997 Foreign cancer 
Congo (DRC) Laurent-Désiré Kabila  1998-2001 Died Assassin 
Congo (DRC) Joseph Kabila 2001-2017 - In power 
Congo (RC) Fulbert Youlou 1961-1963 Revolt Hepatitis 
Congo (RC) Denis Sassou Nguesso 1998-2017 - In power 
Cuba Fulgencio Batista 1953-1959 Revolt Heart Attk 
Dom. Republic Rafael Leónidas Trujillo Molina 1946-1961 Died Assassin. 
Dom. Republic Joaquin Balaguer 1967-1978 Legal Heart Attk 
Ecuador José María Velasco Ibarra 1946-1947 Coup Suicide? 
Ecuador José María Velasco Ibarra 1971-1972 Coup Suicide? 
Spain Francisco Franco 1946-1976 Died Parkinson 
Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia 1992 Died Suicide? 
Georgia Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze 1993-2003 Revolt Old age 
Ghana Jerry John Rawlings 1982-2000 Legal Alive 
Guinea Lansana Conté 1985-2008 Died/C Old age? 
Guinea Moussa Dadis Camara 2009-2010 At. As. Alive 
Gambia Yahya Jammeh 1995-2017 Legal Alive 
Guinea-Bissau João Bernardo Vieira  1981-1999 Revolt Shot 
Guinea-Bissau Kumba Ialá 2003 Coup Heart Attk 
Guatemala Carlos Castillo Armas 1955-1958 Died Assassin. 
Guatemala Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes 1959-1963 Coup ? 
Haiti Franck Lavaud 1946 Coup ? 
Haiti Paul Magloire 1951-1956 Revolt Old Age 
Haiti François Duvalier  1958-1971 Died ? 
Haiti Jean-Claude Duvalier 1972-1986 Legal Heart Attk 
Haiti Jean-Bertrand Aristide 2000-2004 Revolt Alive 
Indonesia Sukarno 1950-1966 Legal Kidneys 
Iraq Muhammad Najib Ar-Ruba'i 1959-1963 Coup ? 
Iraq ‘Abd ul-Salam Arif Al-jumaily 1964-1968 Died Plane Cra 
Iraq Saddam Hussein 1980-2003 Foreign Hanged 
Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev 1991-2017 - In power 
Kyrgyzstan Askar Akayev 1992-2005 Revolt Alive 
Kyrgyzstan Kurmanbek Bakiyev 2006-2010 Revolt Alive 
Cambodia Saloth Sar (Pol Pot) 1971-1975 Legal Suicide 
South Korea Syngman Rhee 1949-1960 Legal Old age 
Laos Boun Oum 1961-1962 Legal Illness 
Liberia Samuel K. Doe 1981-1990 Revolt Shot 
Liberia Charles Taylor 1998-2003 Legal Prison 
Libya Muammar al-Gaddafi 1970-2010 Foreign Shot 
Madagascar Didier Ratsiraka 1976-1993 Legal Alive 
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Country Leader Years Exit Death 
Madagascar Andry Rajoelina 2010-2014 Legal Alive 
Mali Moussa Traoré 1969-1991 Coup Alive 
Mauritania Moktar Ould Daddah 1961-1978 Coup Illness 
Mauritania Mohamed Ould Louly  1979 ? ? 
Mauritania Mohamed Ould Haidalla 1980-1984 Coup Alive 
Mauritania Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya 1984-2005 Coup Alive 
Mauritania Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz 2009-2017 - In power 
Malawi Hastings Kamuzu Banda 1965-1994 Legal Old age 
Niger Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara 1997-1999 Coup Assassin. 
Nicaragua Anastasio Somoza Garcia  1946-1955 Died Assassin. 
Nicaragua Luis Somoza Debayle 1956-1967 Died Heart Attk 
Nicaragua Anastasio Somoza DeBayle 1967-1979 Revolt Assassin. 
Pakistan Zulfikar Bhutto  1976-1977 Coup Hanged 
Panama Arnulfo Arias 1950-1951 Coup Old age 
Panama José Antonio Remón Cantera 1954-1955 Died Assassin. 
Peru Alberto Fujimori 1993-2000 Legal Alive 
Philippines Ferdinand Marcos 1973-1986 Revolt Kidneys 
Portugal António de Oliveira Salazar 1946-1968 Died Accident 
Portugal Marcello Caetano 1969-1974 Coup Heart Attk 
Paraguay Higinio Moríñigo 1946-1948 Coup Old age 
Russia Vladimir Putin  1994-2017 - In Power 
Sudan Gaafar Muhammad Nimeiry 1970-1985 Coup Old age? 
Sudan Omar al-Bashir 1990-2017 - In Power 
Sierra Leone Johnny Paul Koroma 1998 Foreign  ? 
Somalia Mohamed Siad Barre 1970-1991 Revolt Old age? 
Syria Gamal Abdel Nasser 1958 Coup Heart Attk 
Chad Hissène Habré 1983-1990 Coup In Jail 
Chad Idriss Déby 1991-2017 - In Power 
Togo Sylvanus Olympio 1961-1963 Coup Assassin. 
Togo  Grunitzky 1964-1967 Coup Car Crash 
Togo Gnassingbé Eyadéma 1968-2005 Died Heart Attk 
Togo Faure Gnassingbé 2006-2017 - In Power 
Thailand Thawan Thamrongnawasawat 1946-1947 Coup Old age? 
Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon 1992-2017 - In Power 
Uganda Apollo Milton Obote 1967-1971 Coup Kidneys 
Uganda Idi Amin 1972-1979 Foreign Kidneys 
Uganda Apollo Milton Obote 1981-1985 Coup Kidneys  
Uganda Yoweri Museveni 1987-2017 - In Power 
Venezuela Hugo Chavez 2006-2010 Legal Cancer 
Yemen Abdul Rahman al-Iryani 1968-1974 Coup Old age? 
Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh 1979-2012 Legal Alive 
Note: Years begin with first full year in office. Country and years come from GWF 2014. Leader, exit, and death 
researched by the author. Information mostly from leaders’ Wikipedia pages. 
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FIGURE 2.5: Number of Regimes Identified as Personalist by Year 
 
 
Other facts like four committed suicide, two were hanged, four were shot, and four 
were killed in transportation accidents, are likely expected from an unconstrained leader 
that rules through violence and corruption. However, what is interesting is that of the 93 
personalist dictators that exited power, 23% (21) left in some sort of legal transition, 
whether it was an official resignation (forced or voluntary) or the loss of an election. This 
is fascinating because it runs counter to what scholars theorize about personalist regimes, 
but it also implies that the GWF dummy variable for personalist regimes might not be 
measuring the underlying latent trait of rule through violence and corruption.  
Table 2.2 and Figure 2.5 illustrate several issues with the use of a dummy variable 
to measure regime type or leader behavior. Leaving aside the problems mentioned earlier 
with using the Geddes typology to measure regime type (see Geddes 2003), the first thing 
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one cannot help but notice in Table 2.2 is the richness of information that is bludgeoned by 
the dummy variable in Figure 2.5. Comparing the data within Table 2.2 to the counts in 
Figure 2.5 should emphasize the point.  
In most studies that use the Geddes typology researchers implicitly assume that 
“personalist regime” is a structural type that theoretically could be mutually exclusive to 
military regimes, single-party regimes and monarchies. This analysis deviates from that 
view. It models personalism as the behavioral choice of a leader rather than a structural 
environment. Therefore, modelled as a behavioral choice, or management style, the level 
of personalism, or how unconstrained or constrained a dictator is, can be determined in all 
non-democracies, and yes, even democracies. A continuous factor score is likely the best 
way to go about exploring a new method of measurement.52  
There are many continuous measures on scales that represent democracy and 
dictatorship, I am unaware of any continuous measures of personal leadership styles. That 
is what I am attempting to build here, a measure of personalism to be used in a bi-level 
analysis. This will be a first cut attempt at using factor analysis to create a factor score for 
all leaders.  
Applying the previous discussions and the mountains of papers published on 
personalist regimes, an unconstrained autocrat manages his regime with violence and 
corruption and has little need to share power with his elite coalition. He is likely to tax at 
higher levels than constrained autocrats and of course have higher levels of state corruption 
and state violence. Furthermore, we should expect unconstrained autocrats to have a lower 
                                                          
52 In future iterations I plan on using more and different data and Bayesian IRT models to calculate this score. One other 
option is to crowd source psychologists to study profiles of leaders and then rank them according to a set of criteria or 
standardized psychological diagnostic surveys, similar to the ones used in prisons today to identify dangerous inmates. 
This factor score is purely exploratory and a first-cut at this approach. 
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rule of law score, lower life expectancy, and a poorer performing economy. Table 2.3 
shows the different factors used in computing the score and describes the variables in the 
discussion below.  
Factor analysis is a popular technique in the social sciences. It produces continuous 
measures of underlying latent processes or qualities contained in a number of various 
variables. The reasons for using factor analysis varies from field to field and perhaps began 
in psychology (Spearman 1904) and further attempts to diagnose behavioral patterns that 
were broad and difficult to observe directly, such as schizophrenia (Peralta et al 1992). The 
general goals of factor analysis include 1) reducing the number of variables in data sets and 
2) identifying a latent variable (such as the level to which a dictator is constrained or 
unconstrained). Factor analysis comes in two basic forms, exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) (Distefano, et al 2009). Here, using the 
factors identified in Table 2.3, I have used exploratory factor analysis to compute an 
establishment score for all autocrats from 1981-2010. 
 
TABLE 2.3. Factors of Autocratic Management Styles 
 Unconstrained Constrained 
Political Corruption High Lower 
Political Violence High Lower 
Rule of Law Low Higher 
Life Expectancy Low Higher 
GDP Growth Rate Low Higher 
   
A total of seven variables are used to calculate the factor scores. The measure of 
political corruption comes from the Varieties of Democracy dataset (Coppedge et al 2016) 
and is a composite measure of the pervasiveness of corruption in a given regime and year. 
It ranges from .009 (least corrupt) to 0.95 (most corrupt) with a mean of 0.49 and standard 
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deviation of 0.28 and answers the question “how pervasive is political corruption?” 
Political violence is measured through three ordinal variables measuring the prevalence of 
extrajudicial killings, political prisoners, and torture (Cingranelli et al 2014). An 
extrajudicial killing is a political murder “by government officials without due process of 
law. Political prisoners are people that are incarcerated “by government officials because 
of: their speech; their non-violent opposition to government policies or leaders; their 
religious beliefs; their non-violent religious practices including proselytizing; or their 
membership in a group, including ethnic or racial group.” Torture is the “purposeful 
inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, by government officials or private 
individuals at the instigation of government officials.” Rule of law indicates “the extent to 
which the judiciary is independent of control from other sources, such as another branch 
of government or the military” (Cingranelli et al 2014). Extrajudicial killing, political 
prisoners, torture (the political violence indicators) are ordinal variables that range from 0 
to 2 where a 0 indicates high levels of the violence and a 2 represents the absence of them. 
 Life expectancy and GDP growth are standard variables used (UNESCO 2016). 
These are state level variables are included because it is very likely that an unconstrained 
ruler unwilling to share power will drive down both of these quickly. Because of data 
limitations, the factor score is only calculated from 1981 to 2010. The final factor score 
ranges from -1.5 to +1.5. Lower numbers indicate less constraints on management style (or 
personalism).53  
                                                          
53 Calculated using the “factor” command (using the default principal factor method) in Stata. Factor loadings and the 
orthogonal rotation matrix can be found in Appendix B. Principal component extraction is used instead of maximum 
likelihood because of problems with the variables not being normally distributed. Several different iterations of 
computations with different extraction methods, variable transformations, and subsets resulted in virtually identical 
scores so the most simple and conservative method was chosen. It should be noted that the results in Appendix B indicate 
that the political corruption variable is capturing most of the variance in the factor score. This is somewhat problematic 
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Data are rarely or never missing at random (Gleditsch 2002). Unconstrained 
dictators routinely fail to publish good data on the economy. For example, look at the 
unconstrained dictators used in Chapter 1, Un and Obiang. Notice that neither the Kims 
nor Teodoro Obiang or his uncle show up in Table 2.2. This is because all three of the Kim 
dynasty regimes are classified as single-party regimes in the GWF data and Equatorial 
Guinea, for reasons unknown to me, is missing in the GWF data. Furthermore, economic 
data and the other factors in this score are not available either.54  
The distribution of the factor score in Figure 2.6 (below) compared to the average 
score in Figure 2.7 implies a distinct difference between democracy and non-democracy.55 
In Figure 2.6, right around a positive 1, the factor score steeply rises again in its 
distribution, giving it an almost bimodal appearance. In Figure 2.7 we see that on average 
democracies have a positive score and non-democracies have negative scores. This is why 
in Chapters 3 and 4 the data are subset on only non-democracies in later chapters.56 The 
resulting factor score variable is correlated with the GWF dichotomous measure of 
personalist dictatorships at 0.43, which indicates that the factor is picking up some of the 
categorical measure but is also picking up something else that possibly the dichotomous 
measure is missing. The factor score correlates with the disaggregated POLITY “Executive 
constraints” (or EXCONST) at the 0.64 level.  
                                                          
for the idea of identifying an underlying latent variable, but it can be finer tuned in future research and it does not violate 
the logic of identifying unconstrained management styles. 
54 Scholars of international political economy (IPE) strongly warn about the dangers of ignoring missing data and note 
that there are few, if any, conclusive methods for handling missingness properly (Barbieri, Keshk and Pollins 2009). 
However, the missing data here is not catastrophic. Looking through the data, almost all missingness is in archetypal 
personalist dictatorships. Being that these brutal outliers are left out of the factor score means that 1) it is a more 
conservative approach because it is likely slightly skewed towards constrained autocrats and 2) if the score is picking up 
on personalism without these cases, we can say that the measure has face validity. 
55 I leave 1946-1979 blank in 2.7 to illustrate the time constraint of this measure. 
56 There is an interesting finding here. Assuming that this exploratory factor score is actually measuring the level of leader 
constraint, using the same factors for democracy the scores seem to indicate that on average democracies are becoming 
more unconstrained, which seems to match with the most recent historical record at face value.  
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FIGURE 2.6: Distribution of Factor Score 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.7: Average Factor Score of Leaders  
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Figure 2.8 is a basic scatterplot of all factor scores by year and by the type of 
regime. The top left graph is all regimes classified as personalist by GWF (the list in Table 
2). After 1993, no personalist dictatorship has a factor score greater than zero, indicating 
that this may be a natural cut point if one is needed for subsetting. There is relatively wide 
variation, but a central tendency right around -1. In the rest of the graphs, this personalist 
scatterplot stays the same with an overlay of factor scores in the three other GWF types.  
It is interesting that monarchs tend to fall above zero, indicating that kings are 
generally more constrained and better at sharing power. However, note that many 
observations of monarchy fall well below zero, indicating that monarchs can be either 
constrained or unconstrained.  
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The bottom left graph shows us that single-party leaders, tend to be more 
constrained than personalist dictators, but still have variation across the board, indicating 
that leaders of single-party regimes can be extremely personalist as well. This seems to 
have face validity given that the Kim dynasty in North Korea and Castro family are both 
typically counted as single-party regimes despite the personality cults that surround them. 
Lastly, the bottom right graph shows that military regimes have become less constrained 
over the years, but the number of military regimes has also dwindled sharply since the end 
of the Cold War – in 1980 there were 15 military regimes and by 2010 there were only two 
(Algeria and Myanmar).  
Figure 2.8 illustrates that fact that any type of leader can be more or less personalist, 
independent of the regime. Assuming this factor score is measuring the latent level of a 
leader’s management style, we can say that personalism is more of a behavioral style of 
leaders than a structural environment. This makes intuitive sense and immediately brings 
up the question of what should be done about the personalist regime type, if indeed it is a 
behavior rather than a structure. This will be addressed in future work, but it should prove 
to be relatively straightforward, after all, personalist regimes have parties, military leaders 
and hereditary succession. This finding has wide ranging implications and could possibly 
completely change the way we think about dictatorships. 
 Figure 2.8 begins to exemplify this new view of personalism, but this is not good 
enough. We should look through the historical record and see if this measurement is 
actually reflecting what it is intended to. Figure 2.9 plots out the scores of two modern 
democracies, the United States and Peru, one of which happened to be ruled by a 
personalist dictator from 1990-2000 and is classified as such in the GWF data. Alberto 
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Fujimori was elected President of Peru in the 1990 elections as a “dark horse” candidate 
beating Mario Vargas Llosa unexpectedly. Vargas’ party and another opposition party still 
controlled both chambers of the Peruvian Congress as Fujimori tried to implement his 
neoliberal economic reform package nicknamed “Fujishock” and battled a growing 
insurgency from the Maoist Shining Path guerillas (Palmer 2000).  
On April 5 1992, frustrated with deadlock in Congress, Fujimori carried out what 
is known as a “presidential coup” (Kenney 2004). These are fairly rare in modern history, 
but they are also called “autogolpe” (Spanish for self or automatic coup) and locally as 
“Fujigolpe.” In this so-called self-coup, Fujimori purged judges, suspended the 
constitution, and closed down congress (Palmer 2000).  
 
 
FIGURE 2.9: Factor Score Comparisons (US and Peru) 
 
 
In 1993 he passed a new constitution, granting amnesty to him and his supporters. 
In 1994 Fujimori went through a publicized divorce where he stripped his wife of “First 
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Lady” status and gave it to his eldest daughter. In 1995 he was popularly reelected as the 
domestic insurgency grew and his popularity culminated largely with the highly publicized 
successful management of the 1996 Japanese embassy hostage crisis (Carrion 2006). In 
2000 he attempted to fax his resignation in to Congress from exile in Japan, but it was 
rejected and he was later arrested. Later on, Fujimori was tried and convicted of human 
rights abuses in his campaign against the Shining Path. A lot more information came to the 
surface in these trials. During 1995-2000 it is estimated that Fujimori had around 300,000 
indigenous women sterilized in family planning campaign called “Voluntary Surgical 
Contraception.” He was also convicted of ordering the kidnapping of journalists, bribing 
and tapping the phones of journalists, and embezzlement.  
Figure 2.10 is the same setup as Figure 2.9 but with four cases. Again, the goal here 
is not to look for personalism in democracies, but rather to investigate the validity of this 
measure. Looking at factor scores for the UK over time, the score is high and positive as 
we would expect for democracies, but there is one prominent drop in 1993. John Major 
was PM in the UK, taking over after Margaret Thatcher resigned. In 1993 his government 
became embroiled in a series of so-called “sleaze” scandals that eventually drove the 
Conservatives from power and introduced a long period of Labour rule. Looking at Saudi 
Arabia the score has relatively little change over time other than one dip below zero in 
2005. King Fahd became king in 1982 and ruled until his death in 2005 when King 
Abdullah took over and ruled until his death in 2015. Typically when a new king takes over 
in any dictatorship the first thing he does is attempt to separate himself from the previous 
king and shore up his winning coalition. He usually does this through typical personalist 
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behaviors such as firing anyone that does not agree with him in purges, doling out cash 
bonuses, and cracking down on opposition groups.  
Looking at Mexico, we see the score likely reflects the problematic Mexican 
elections of 1988. The elections featured a new computer system that mysteriously crashed 
in the middle of counting the votes. The PRI still won and three years later in 1991 all the 
physical ballots were destroyed and some PRI members admitted publically that it was 
rigged. This led to the eventual loss of the PRI and the democratization of Mexico with the 
election of 2000. Mexico is not so clear of a case, but it does not put the measure in serious 
doubt. 
 
FIGURE 2.10: Factor Score Comparisons (UK, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, CAR) 
 
Looking at the Central African Republic (CAR) André-Dieudonné Kolingba took 
power from David Dacko in a bloodless coup in 1981. Ange-Félix Patassé won power in 
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an election in 1993, but stands accused of many human rights violations and embezzling 
state wealth. François Bozizé took power through military force in 2003. All four of these 
CAR leaders are listed in Table 2.2 and we can see in the graph that the score changes with 
their coming to power, indicating that 1) each ruler rules in a unique style and 2) the factor 
score is picking up individual level behavior. 
In sum, this is an individual level factor score that measures the management style 
of a leader. It estimates the level to which a leader prefers to manage by violence and 
corruption or by deliberation and delegation – the level to which a dictator is unconstrained 
or constrained.57 This new variable will be used in Chapters 3 and 4 to explore the effects 
of SEZs, SWFs, and leader management regime and leader survival.58  
 
2.3 AUTHORITARIAN ECONOMIC  POLICIES 
 
Government arises as rational theft through taxation by the group or individual best 
able to mobilize and harness the use of violence (Olson 1993). All governments started out 
as non-democracies, or in other words, stationary bandits that stole through taxation. 
Democracy happens by the accidents of history where groups of stationary bandits find 
themselves in a stalemate – a balance of power – and have no other choice but to build 
strong long-lasting institutions of power-sharing. In states where these accidents of history 
never occurred, regimes and leaders remain stationary bandits, some even still wear 
                                                          
57 In informal conversations I like to describe the measure as answering this question: If he must, how willing is the 
leader to murder his closest relative to retain power? 
58 Recently, scholars found that when personalist dictators create political parties, they become more likely to democratize 
(Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2017). Unconstrained autocrats are the most likely to go to war, they have the highest poverty 
levels, and are the most likely to turn their regime into a failed state (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2017) that can spread 
nasty side-effects to neighboring countries (Starr 2013, Iqbal and Starr 2015). Identifying unconstrained leaders correctly 
has wide ranging implications. 
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crowns, and they mostly still work to increase economic activity to rationally steal more 
through taxation. 
In Olson’s piece, he reasons that dictators will tax at a maximum allowable level 
before taxation begins to reduce productivity – similar to the Laffer curve and the concept 
of taxable income elasticity. But this is clearly not the case when we look at authoritarian 
economies like the U.A.E., Singapore, or China. They do not tax at the maximum rate and 
are very competitive internationally. Olson (1993) explains that democracies tend to do 
better economically because they tend to have lower tax rates. Democracies tend to have 
lower tax rates because different factions share power in democracies. When control 
changes hands in democracies, the outgoing faction does not want to leave the incoming 
faction with high revenues to pursue its policy agenda. Furthermore, power in democracies 
is rotated according to votes, so, factions tend to run for reelection on the basis of a record 
of lowering taxes or promises of it – surprisingly, few people enjoy paying taxes.  
There should be a correlation between tax rates and the management style of a 
leader. Power-sharing leads to lower tax rates in democracies, but all democracies power-
share by definition. In non-democracies, the constraint of power-sharing varies, so 
assuming Olson’s theory is correct, we should expect unconstrained autocrats to have high 
general tax rates and constrained autocracies to have lower general tax rates.  
SEZs and SWFs allow leaders to distort tax laws and apply them selectively. 
Special enclaves that operate outside of the normal customs area are a perfect policy for 
high taxing unconstrained autocrats and for lower taxing constrained autocrats. The tax 
rates within a SEZ can be specifically targeted to help specific investors (domestic and 
international), the geographic location can be strategically chosen, and the policies can be 
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easily justified to elites and the masses based upon expected economic development while 
keeping continuity in the existing state-wide tax rates.  
This section on authoritarian economic policies describes SEZs and SWFs in detail. 
Specific information on the collection and use of these data is presented after the 
descriptions.59  
 
SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES 
 
Special economic zones (SEZs) are geographically delineated areas managed by a 
single entity that entice investors with prefabricated infrastructure, labor pools, little or no 
taxation for import and export, cheap rents, and streamlined (i.e. relaxed) regulatory 
structures. Outside of political science, special economic zones (SEZs) receive great 
scrutiny. Work in the fields of economics, international business, anthropology, and 
geography look to varying degrees at when and where the zones do and do not produce 
favorable FDI arrangements. The literature is scattered and mostly divided into case and 
regional studies. Farole and Akinci (2011) look at zone programs in general, others focus 
on zone programs in Africa (Farole 2011), in China (Zeng 2010), in Asia (Carter & Harding 
2013), in India (Palit & Bhattacharjee 2008; Das 2009; Gupta 2012), in Latin American 
security issues (Reyes 2011) and even university zone cluster models for Western Europe 
and BRIC countries (Klimova, Kozyrev, & Babkin 2015) – including the highly advertised 
“START-UP NY” SEZ program in New York.60 This outside literature dedicated to 
                                                          
59 Appendices, data, and codebooks are available upon request. 
60 To read more about the New York SEZ program, visit http://startup.ny.gov/business-growth. While SEZs exist in all 
types of regimes, they serve the authoritarian preference to maintain a monopoly on power in non-democracies and serve 
a democratic purpose of increasing already existing competitiveness in democracies.  
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studying SEZs is quickly growing, but is plagued by a dearth of comprehensive data and 
theorizing. For several decades SEZs have been shrugged off by political scientists as 
simply a pragmatic economic policy, but some are beginning to recognize the role of SEZs 
in regime stability (Fuller 2015, 2017). 
The phrase special economic zone is a “generic expression to describe the broad 
range of modern economic zones” (Farole & Akinci 2011;3).61 The World Bank identifies 
four key characteristics that all modern SEZs have: 1) a geographically delineated area, 2) 
a single management/administration, 3) eligibility for benefits based upon physical 
location within the zone, and 4) a separate customs area (duty-free benefits) and 
streamlined procedures (FIAS 2008).  
All four characteristics represent an effort to boost investment while simultaneously 
restricting who domestically will benefit. In 1986, there were 176 special economic zones 
(SEZs) in 46 countries. During the next twenty years SEZs grew by a factor of twenty and 
nearly tripled in the number of countries with them (Farole & Akinci 2011; Boyenge 2007). 
The exponential growth in the use of SEZs is displayed in Figure 2.11 and Table 2.4.62 
Figure 2.12 shows the disparity between democracies and non-democracies in the number 
of zones. 
 
                                                          
61 “Free zones” of all sorts existed to promote economic activity around the world for centuries. A few examples of early 
free zones include Gibraltar (1704), Singapore (1819), Hong Kong (1848), Hamburg (1888), and Copenhagen (1891). 
Modern SEZs—thought to first appear in the early 1980s – are more diverse, but still perform the same functions. There 
are Free Trade Zones (FTZs) that support the re-export business, Export Processing Zones (EPZs) for onsite 
manufacturing and export of goods, Hybrid EPZs to support local economies, Freeports that are much larger and 
comprehensive and thus resemble historical free zones, and Enterprise Zones to spur on urban revitalization. The term 
‘special economic zone’ can also include Petrochemical Zones, Airport Based Zones, Tourist Attractions, Logistics Parks, 
Education Cities, Health Care Zones, Technology or Science Parks, Financial Services Zones, Media Cities, and Internet 
Zones. 
62 Special economic zones (SEZs) exist in all regime categories. The British were one of the first to begin using SEZs. 
The United States embraced the idea of using geographic areas with little or no tax barriers in order to increase foreign 
trade in 1934 with the passage of the Foreign Trade Zones Act. In 2010, US zones imported over $500billion worth of 
goods. China was the one of the first non-democracies to adopt a SEZ strategy in the late 1970s, followed by the United 
Arab Emirates in 1985, and then a large “wave” of countries in the 1990s. 
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TABLE 2.4: World Export Processing Zones, 1975-2006 
                                                                   1975            1986            1997            2002            2006 
Number of Countries with EPZs                25                47                93               116              130 
Total number of EPZs and other zones      79                176              845             3,000           3,500 
Employment (in millions)                           -                  -                   22.5            43                66 
Source: Boyenge (2007) Note: Employment figures only for years available. Export Processing Zones 
(EPZs), Free (Foreign) Trade Zones (FTZs), and number of others are all considered to fall under the rubric 
of Special Economic Zones (SEZ).  
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2.11: Growth in SEZs (1976-2006) 
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FIGURE 2.12: Total Number of SEZs by Regime Type, 2008 
 
 
 
Table 2.5 outlines the direct and indirect benefits expected from SEZs. Many 
economists agree that SEZs generally have a positive impact on growth, but there is not a 
general consensus. The Economist magazine reports that a robust zone program on average 
increases GDP growth annually by two percent (2015). Using municipality-level data in 
China, Wang (2013) reports that SEZ programs on average increase FDI per capita by 
21.7% and FDI growth by 6.9%, further noting that SEZ programs neither ‘crowd in’ or 
‘crowd out’ domestic investment. SEZs also bring technology transfer and employment. 
The stories of China copying technology from Western companies located within zones 
are legendary. Total employment estimates range from 40-60 million workers worldwide, 
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America and Mexico (Economist 2015, Palit 2009). Detailed, reliable, and up-to-date data 
is difficult to come by. My data begins to fill this gap.63 
 
TABLE 2.5: Potential Direct and Indirect Benefits of SEZs 
                                                                                             Direct                           Indirect 
Foreign Direct Investment                                                     X 
Employment Generation                                                        X 
Government Revenue                                                            X 
Export Growth                                                                       X 
Foreign Exchange Earnings                                                   X 
Upgrade in skills                                                                                                          X 
Testing Field for Wider Economic Reforms                                                                X 
Technology Transfer                                                                                                    X 
Demonstration Effect                                                                                                   X 
Export Diversification                                                                                                  X 
Enhancing Trade Efficiency of Domestic Firms                                                          X 
Source: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper #5583 by Douglas Zhihua Zeng 2011. 
 
 
 
 
SEZs exist in democracies and non-democracies alike, although we have seen faster 
and wider growth in the usage of them in non-democracies. A likely criticism of the focus 
on SEZs in dictatorships is the assertion that there is no difference between democracies 
and non-democracies concerning the effects of SEZs. I squarely disagree with this 
assertion. SEZs only enhance the already existing competitive nature of liberal democratic 
economies that naturally flows from democratic freedoms. In a democracy, investors see 
little difference between the benefits that SEZs offer and the benefits that individuals, other 
                                                          
63 Today estimates hover from 4,500 – 5,000 zones and exist in most countries. In an article titled “Political priority, 
economic gamble: Free-Trade zones are more popular than ever-with politicians, if not economists,” the Economist 
reports that 73% of all countries have SEZs with a global total of about 4,300 units in 2014 (Economist 2015). My data 
finds that 75% of countries have SEZs in 2015. Thomas Farole, Lead Economist at the World Bank, was quoted in the 
same article saying “Any country that didn’t have [an SEZ] ten years ago either does now or seems to be planning one” 
(Economist 2015). The original data presented here does not count individual zones. It codes them according to zone 
program scope and size. It is hoped that this research will lead to further funding to collect specific numbers and 
geographic coordinates of all SEZs. 
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companies, sub-national units (in federal systems), and municipalities already offer. In 
other words, SEZs blend in with and compliment the customary liberal economic 
environment in all democratic states. SEZs in India, for example, are very popular and 
controversial at the same time (Palit & Bhattacharjee 2008). When an Indian state sets up 
an SEZ, other Indian states build similar ones and then offer more competitive benefits to 
investors in a sort of race to the bottom between the states (Jenkins et al 2014, Moberg 
2015). A similar dynamic occurs in the United States and the European Union.  
Often in democracies, residents will have no idea that they live in or near an SEZ.64 
When SEZs in democracies are built, they have to be approved by regulatory boards often 
at subnational and national levels, and are subject to the laws governing those boards. 
Democracies generally provide public plans for the development that are often times voted 
on by plebiscite.65  
For non-democracies coming out of the Cold War, SEZs are a low cost approach to 
economic development and integration into global markets. The dictator builds it, if they 
(investors) come, great. If they do not come, the dictator can merely repurpose the zone by 
decree – infrastructure is infrastructure. Generally, a non-democratic regime will pass a 
SEZ law through the non-democratic legislature or by decree, appropriate some land in a 
strategic area (either a natural or man-made deep port or near urban population centers to 
draw laborers from), and then start advertising.66 When investors show up, they negotiate 
                                                          
64 For those who live in South Carolina, there is one a Columbia Metropolitan Airport (U.S. Foreign Trade Zone #127) 
and a large one in Charleston (Foreign Trade Zones #21 and #38). A complete list of US FTZs by state is available at 
http://enforcement.trade.gov/ftzpage/letters/ftzlist-map.html#washington  
65 This process can become hotly contested in less developed democracies. Even when contested, it is a very different 
process than when in a dictatorship. 
66 View an ad for Myanmar’s Thilawa SEZ on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RxPt2xlDrOY ; In Gabon 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7IVIvUYgGUY ; In Laos https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l44hUeTCWb0 ; In 
Kazakhstan https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IF58UpiFsco  
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a contract – typically requiring partial investment from a domestic partner – and enter a 
lease – usually something like a 99 year lease with zero taxes for the first 10 years and a 
gradual negotiated increase over time – and then often negotiate the building of specialized 
infrastructure or the appropriation of more lands. It is a relatively standard FDI 
arrangement, except for the fact that they are geographically restricted, managed by a sole 
government chosen entity, and theoretically under the supervision of an international 
independent arbiter (the WTO).  
We actually know very little about what goes on in many of these zones. They are 
somewhat akin to the wild west of economic liberalization, often becoming supply-chain 
workhorses for drug and human traffickers, terrorist financers, and all sorts of criminal 
behavior. There is a SEZ in the Golden Triangle (Bokeo Province, Laos) where gambling 
is rampant, tigers are openly farmed for their hides, bones, and their meat, and live bear 
cubs are available for purchase. Once purchased they will slaughter the cub in front of 
customer, and then prepare it for eating.67 Complete tiger skeletons are displayed in giant 
fish tanks filled with wine for men to drink.  
Non-democracies selectively use SEZs to experiment with liberal economic 
policies. SEZs generate more credible commitments among authoritarian elites by creating 
formal rules necessary for the management and development of the zones. Because of the 
specific geographic delineation of SEZs, elites are able to more easily monitor each other. 
Because the zones are designed to attract investment from actors that demand transparency, 
the zones are more likely to generate more transparency than with investments outside of 
zones. Since the zones deal in international transactions, the use of them ties authoritarian 
                                                          
67 View the brief documentary on the illegal animal trade in this SEZ – ‘Sin City’ – 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4GCHs-Vv84Y .  
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elites to independent power sources capable of arbitrating potential disputes. Concerning 
the problem of popular management, the geographic nature of SEZs allow for strategic 
placement by the regime. Strategic placement allows the regime to fragment the labor pool, 
breaking up potential pockets of opposition and encouraging sunk investments by regular 
people in the success of the regime. This is covered in detail in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES DATA 
 
No complete or partial dataset with temporal observations of the creation, number, 
or size and quality of special economic zones (SEZs) exists. There is no centralized source 
for data and the few sources that do exist often publish contradictory information.68 This is 
likely because 1) SEZs are very diverse and 2) there has been little if any theoretical 
development concerning SEZs over the past few decades.69  
The data are gleaned from several sources. I crosscheck the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) report of 2003 and 2007 (Boyenge 2003, 2007) and the World Bank 
Foreign Investor Advisory Service (FIAS) report (2008) when coding the SEZ program for 
each country. Neither of these sources contain temporal data, so I then search for a SEZ 
website or the actual SEZ law on a search engine. There are also several other SEZ 
                                                          
68 Currently the most used sources are the FIAS World Bank 2008 report on SEZs and the ILO 2007 report. However, 
large portions of data are missing from each and some shared data are contradictory. Several other different institutes, 
such as the Flagstaff Institute or WEPZA, have sprung up and then disappeared over the past few decades. Reporting is 
extremely sporadic. 
69 Anthropologists and geographers use intensive case studies of specific zones. None that I know of examine SEZs from 
a global structural point of view. Farole and Akinci (2011) make a direct call for political scientists to address SEZs in 
the final chapter of their edited volume. 
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descriptive data aggregators out there that I consult.70 Finally, I consult secondary online 
news sources and governmental websites for further confirmation.71  
The explanatory variable that results from this effort, special economic zone (SEZ) 
program, is a scale that ranges from 0 – 6 where 0 represents the absence of a SEZ program 
and 6 represents an extensive SEZ program (see Table 2.6).72 A score of 1 = In Name Only 
and represents the passage of a SEZ law. The SEZ program categories range accordingly; 
2 = Isolated, 3 = Small, 4 = Medium, 5 = Large, and 6 = Extensive. Each of these categories 
represents a significant step up in the size and quality.73 In the large and extensive 
categories, this coding implies that a significant amount of wealth and power is being 
restricted to a screened group of regime supporting elites. According to the theory we 
should expect that higher levels of SEZ program in contested autocracies will positively 
and significantly correlate with regime stability is such regimes, ceteris paribus. Isolated 
zone programs typically contain a small EPZ, industrial park, or single factory program 
with mostly local investment. Cameroon is an example of this type of zone system; it has 
one small EPZ, a single-factory, and mostly local investment (FIAS 2008). Small zone 
programs have moderate size EPZs or FTZs with at least one foreign investor and a limited 
number of production sectors. Belarus is an example; its Brest Economic Zone set up in 
1996, is of a moderate size and boasts investment from three neighboring countries, but 
this program has grown rapidly to cover each of its six subnational units (Oblasts).  
                                                          
70 A blog called “Living Offshore” is a good example of one of the many different SEZ data aggregators I used to 
crosscheck and add to the ILO and FIAS data. See it here http://livingoffshore.com/free-trade-zones.htm  
71 A fifty-page list of these sources by country is available upon request.  
72 Arguably, everything that goes in and out of SEZs is determinable on an exact dollar basis, however, for the purposes 
of this study such accuracy is not necessary. The dependent variables are blunt measurements as well, thus, any accuracy 
gained by attaining the exact value of SEZs would be lost in the analysis. I have not performed an official inter-coder 
reliability test, but I have convinced several others to code a few cases and results are similar.  
73 It is not obvious what a move from category to category means substantively. This poses problems for interpretation, 
but the goal of this study is to demonstrate the SEZs matter, not the exact extent to which they do. 
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Medium zone programs have several moderate sized EPZs, FTZs, and a Freeport. 
Venezuela illustrates this category; it has a Freeport (Isla Margarita) and three moderate 
sized FTZs (Paraguana Peninsula, Santa Elena de Uairen, and Merida). Large zone 
programs have multiple EPZs, FTZs, or Freeports with multiple sectors and multiple 
foreign investors. Russia and Singapore fall in the large category. Russia has over 25 SEZs 
that are ambitiously expanding and Singapore has 8 large freeports and SEZs spread over 
its small territory. Honduras, a country that declared the entire country a SEZ in 1998, falls 
in this category as well (Farole & Akinci 2011). 
 
TABLE 2.6: Coding Scheme Special Economic Zone Program 
Value      Name                        Description of observation 
  0           Absent                  SEZs and SEZ laws are absent, nonexistent 
  1           In Name Only       SEZ exist only in official law, no zones completed during FY 
  2           Isolated                 Small EPZ, industrial park, or single factory, local investment 
  3           Small                    Moderate size EPZ or FTZ, one main production sector 
  4           Medium                Moderate size EPZs, FTZs, and a Freeport 
  5           Large                    Large EPZs, FTZs, Freeports, multiple sectors 
  6           Extensive              SEZs are a foundation of macroeconomic development policy 
 
 Extensive zone programs are essentially large zone programs that represent a larger 
portion of the state’s macroeconomic outlook and contain specialized zones such as 
Education Cities, Media and Internet zones, or other purposeful zones. In essence, the SEZ 
program is the core of the state’s development model. The U.A.E., China, Egypt, and 
Jordan are examples of this category. The U.A.E. and Jordan have every type of zone 
imaginable, China creates zones for very narrow purposes that now almost cover the entire 
country, Egypt has what are called QIZ (qualified industrial zones) that have been set up 
by the U.S. in order to foster trade and peace between Egypt, Jordan, and Israel (FIAS 
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2008). Table 2.6 outlines the variable values, name, and a brief description of the 
observation. Table 2.7 gives a snapshot of the distribution of observations. 
There are a total of 9,167 observations in the SEZ data (country years). It includes 
all democracies and non-democracies. There are several variables, but only two that are 
complete thus far. These are the SEZ variable that codes every country year according to 
the scale outlined above and a dichotomous dummy variable formed from the continuous 
one. Other variables include ones taken from the World Bank FIAS (2008) and are limited 
only to the cases that the World Bank publishes. These include the number of zones that 
are privately managed and those that are publically managed. These variables are not used 
in the analysis as I have no way of verifying that the World Bank’s sample is representative 
(random) and it is exceedingly difficult to decipher whether or not a specific zone is 
publicly or privately managed, especially in a dictatorship.74  
 
TABLE 2.7 Percentage of County-years with a Specific SEZ Score over Time 
 
 SEZ=0 SEZ=1 SEZ=2 SEZ=3 SEZ=4 SEZ=5 SEZ=6 
Dictatorship 1945-79 90.7 0.6 3.2 2.8 2.1 0.6 - 
Dictatorship 1980-89 74.7 2.1 9.9 5.1 6.3 1.9 - 
Dictatorship 1990-99 60.3 2.7 17.1 9.5 6.0 3.1 1.4 
Dictatorship 2000-09 36.6 4.5 23.6 17.0 7.1 5.6 5.7 
Dictatorship > 2010 18.5 6.7 24.9 23.4 9.6 8.1 8.9 
 
Democracy 1945-79 
 
71.0 
 
0.1 
 
6.6 
 
18.5 
 
0.6 
 
3.1 
 
- 
Democracy 1980-89 51.9 - 10.4 30.9 3.8 2.9 - 
Democracy 1990-99 34.7 2.4 16.1 31.9 10.5 4.4 - 
Democracy 2000-09 22.9 1.6 18.8 35.3 13.8 7.1 0.6 
Democracy > 2010 18.6 3.8 18.1 37.0 14.0 6.4 2.2 
 
Source: Author 
                                                          
74 I have reached out to the World Bank and the authors of this FIAS (2008) report on multiple occasions and have never 
received a response. The majority of authors that study SEZs cite this same report, yet there is no explanation for why it 
is incomplete. Thomas Farole at the IMF did respond and indicated that no such complete data exist. 
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SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are essentially giant government managed hedge 
funds – large pools of capital used to invest in international and domestic markets for profit. 
Just as with SEZs, the origins of SWFs are debatable, but we know that they have grown 
to massive proportions and numbers in the past decade (Clark, Dixon, and Monk 2013). 
The most commonly accepted story is that the first modern SWF launched in Kuwait in 
1954 (Loh 2010). Of the top 80 SWFs today, 53 (or 66%) are managed by non-democratic 
governments.  
Traditionally, SWFs were used by non-democratic countries as a way to stabilize 
windfall incomes from natural resources like oil (van der Ploeg and Venables 2008). It was 
also a way to diversify, as SWFs were soon being used to fund the building of infrastructure 
for special economic zones (SEZs) – as in Dubai. China recently set up a fourth SWF 
dedicated mostly to investing in start-up SEZs in Africa. Again, democracies have SWFs 
as well, as these are liberal economic policies that are not exclusive to one type of regime. 
Democracies have close to the same number of funds as dictatorships but 80% of the ~$9 
trillion held within them is in non-democratic sovereign wealth funds. Figures 2.13 and 
2.14 visualize this trend. 
SWFs, like SEZs, take on a multitude of sizes, shapes, and names. Occasionally 
economists will disagree on exactly what is a SWF and what is not. For these data, SWFs 
are conceptually defined as “government-owned investment funds operating in private 
financial markets” (Monk 2009).75  
                                                          
75 In reality this definitional determination is made by the two sources I cross check when coding the data, the Sovereign 
Wealth Fund Institute (SWFI) (which understandably charges a very large amount of money for access to their data) and 
United States State Department business environment reports. 
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FIGURE 2.13: SWF Value by POLITY Score, 2015 
Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2015) 
 
FIGURE 2.14: Assets Held in SWFs by Regime Type, 2014 
Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2014) 
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Monk also points out that twenty years ago Cohen (1986;3) argued that “high 
finance can no longer be kept separate from high politics.” Some IR scholars seem to agree 
(Drezner 2008, Bahgat 2008, Cohen 2009, Helleiner 2009, Yi-Chong 2010), although there 
are not many quantitative or theoretical evaluations by political scientists and findings are 
scattered. 
In democracies SWFs are typically used as investment instruments for either pooled 
state employee retirement funds (401k) or to gather and invest profits from state-owned 
natural resources (or the tax-revenue collected from extracting them). For example, the US 
State of California has a SWF for the retirement contributions of all its state employees 
(Helleiner 2009), and the US States of Wyoming and Alaska each have one for mineral 
and oil incomes. In each of these instances, the SWFs are used to provide public goods 
directly to all citizens and are under control of an elected leadership (in Wyoming all profits 
are used for education and in Alaska profits are directly distributed to residents that apply 
for it in a check).76 In dictatorships, SWFs are under the control of the leader and the 
regime, who, can pick and choose exactly how to use these funds absent of democratic 
values of oversight and republican values of equality under the rule of law.  
Table 2.8 outlines 6 selected SWFs in democracies and their stated reasons for 
creation. Table 2.9 does the same for 6 selected dictatorships. It is relatively clear from 
these tables that democratic SWFs tend to be created in order to secure public goods in the 
public sector, such as social welfare. Conversely, it is relatively clear that non-democracies 
                                                          
76 The dividend calculation is made by the Permanent Fund Dividend Division and is allocated according to how many 
citizens apply each year. The checks from $300 to $2000 dependent on how well the SWF performs and the number of 
applicants. To give a sense of different these are in democracies, Alaska passed a constitutional amendment to create its 
fund and mandated that 25% of all state income from natural resources be invested through the fund. It further mandates 
that this principal amount shall never be spent, but the profits made off of investments can either be spent by the state or 
distributed to citizens through an application process. Read all about it at the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC) 
website http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/aboutFund/aboutPermFund.cfm  
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tend to create SWFs in order to either 1) stabilize windfall profits from natural resources 
or 2) achieve macroeconomic objectives, such as ambitious SEZ programs or the 
development of new production sectors.  
 
TABLE 2.8: Sample of Democratic SWFs and Impetus for Creation 
Democracy SWF Impetus for Creation 
Australia Future Fund Assist future governments meet the cost of 
public sector superannuation liabilities 
Canada Alberta Heritage 
Savings Trust Fund 
Save for future; strengthen or diversify 
economy; and improve the life of Albertans  
France Strategic Investment 
Fund 
Stabilize French firms 
Ireland National Pensions 
Preserve Fund 
Meet as much as possible of the costs of 
Ireland’s social welfare and public service 
pensions 
Norway Government Pension 
Fund-Global 
Support long-term management of oil 
revenues and facilitate savings to meet future 
pensions expenditures  
United States Alaska Permanent Fund Save a portion of the state’s oil revenue for 
future 
Source: Clark, Dixon, and Monk 2013 
 
TABLE 2.9: Sample of Autocratic SWFs and the Impetus for Creation  
Dictatorship SWF Impetus for Creation 
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding 
Company 
Diversify the economy away from oil and gas 
China China Investment 
Corporation 
Diversify foreign reserves and increase risk-
adjusted returns, facilitating macroeconomic 
objectives 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National 
Fund 
Ensures that economy is stable during price 
swings of oil, gas, and metals 
Russia Reserve Fund Ensure financing of the federal budget 
expenses and maintain budget balance 
Singapore Government of 
Singapore Investment 
Corp 
Invest reserves in long-term and high-
yielding assets 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority 
Secure and maintain current and future 
prosperity of the Emirate through prudent 
management of assets 
Source: Clark, Dixon, and Monk 2013 
 
89 
SWFs are government owned, government run funds. In all types of states the funds 
have generally followed a profit motive, but the threat of a political motive always lurks 
around the corner (Drezner 2008, Weiner 2010). Interestingly, SWFs can play a diplomatic 
role in that because they are sovereign, when they invest in democratic countries it can 
either stir conflict or create lasting linkages. For example, in 2006 one of Dubai’s SWFs 
attempted to purchase the port management of six major US seaports. Many in the US 
claimed that this sale to an Arab, non-democratic country would compromise security 
(even though Dubai, like Saudi Arabia, was and is a close ally of the US and the port 
security was already managed by a foreign British firm that was owned by Dubai Ports 
World). This became known as the “Dubai Ports World Controversy” as the US Congress 
voted nearly unanimously to block the deal negotiated by President George W. Bush (NPR 
2006).77  
These sorts of reactions have led to non-democratic countries focusing on building 
SEZs and investing SWF money in other non-democratic countries or at a minimum, taking 
steps to avoid controversies. The OBOR policy of China also uses SWF money to make 
huge investments in SEZs in Belarus and Kazakhstan. The post-soviet states along the 
OBOR appear to be very eager to accept China’s investments (Gabuev 2015). Furthermore, 
the China-Africa Development Fund (CADF) has been moving fast to help states such as 
Nigeria, Egypt, and Ghana development their own SEZ programs (AFC 2012).  
SWFs can have very positive stabilizing effects, not only within the ruling coalition 
(as I theorize in Chapter 3), but for the global economy as well. Two years after the Dubai 
                                                          
77 It is interesting to note here that the U.A.E. is currently very close to finishing several nuclear reactors capable of 
creating weapons grade nuclear material, yet there seems to be no public outcry. Find the sleek U.A.E. Nuclear Energy 
Corporation website at https://enec.gov.ae/. Find analysis of the program in Foreign Affairs (Guzansky 2017). 
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Ports World debacle, in 2008, the same SWF from the U.A.E. swooped in to purchase vast 
amounts of troubled properties in New York, including 90% of the Chrysler Building 
(Drezner 2008), helping to stabilize the US real estate market after its collapse. When 
markets abroad crash and prices tumble, often SWFs will swoop in to purchase these 
troubled assets in an effort to make a long-term profit on them when the market recovers.  
Because SWFs mainly entail elite behavior and deal with international groups, 
these policies will likely only effect the question of elite management in non-democracies. 
This is explained further in the theory section and a case study on the Abu Dhabi 
Investment Council in Chapter 3.  
 
THE SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS DATA 
 
The data collected for this project comes from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 
website and is crosschecked with US State Department business climate reports.78 The data 
covers 160 countries from 1946-2015. It contains a dichotomous variable representing the 
presence of at least one SWF in a given country-year, a continuous variable that contains 
the estimated value of all SWFs in 2014 only (measured in billion$), a variable for 
establishment year, a dichotomous variable for being commodity or non-commodity based, 
a variable for the total number of SWFs in a given country year, and a variable indicating 
the 2015 Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index. There is an observation for every country-
year only with the dichotomous presence of a SWF variable. It is the only SWF variable 
that is currently time variant. This is because this was the only information that could be 
                                                          
78 The website can be found here http://www.swfinstitute.org/. A codebook with explanations for each case is available 
upon request. 
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independently verified considering sources. All other variables come directly from the 
SWF Institute and are only available for the funds they have publicly listed on the website. 
Only 25% of all states have an SWF today. In 2015, there were 46 of them in 
existence. Twenty-three of them are in democracies, with 9 belonging to the United States. 
The other 23 are in non-democracies, with 7 belonging to the U.A.E., 5 belonging to China, 
3 to Kazakhstan and Russia each, and 2 to belonging to Oman, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
and Nigeria each.  Some typologies of SWFs have been proposed. For example, Clark, 
Dixon, & Monk (2013) propose the following typology: Postcolonial SWFs, Rentier 
SWFs, Productivist SWFs, Territorialist SWFs, and Moralist SWFs. The problem though, 
as the authors point out, is that this typology is not mutually exclusive. It is useful for them 
because the trajectory of their analysis explores why states create SWFs and where SWFs 
derive their legitimacy from.  
Using a mostly mutually exclusive binary typology, SWFs come in two basic types: 
commodity and non-commodity funds. Commodity funds tend to be created out of excess 
government revenue, typically from large natural resource deposits. The commodity SWF 
is funded through the export of natural resources and is designed, in part, to protect against 
commodity (oil) price fluctuations by turning fixed “in the ground” assets into financial 
assets that can be managed, rather than directing windfall profits into immediate 
consumption. Non-commodity SWFs are generally funded by excess foreign currency 
reserves during a current account surplus (Chopra 2013). The important point is that these 
two basic types tend to behave in different ways. Commodity funds “do not show any 
inclination towards undertaking outbound FDI investments [they] are more inclined 
towards controlling domestic inflation and undertaking investments for infrastructure and 
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social developments” (Chopra 2013). Figure 2.15 illustrates the distribution of commodity 
and non-commodity SWFs in democracies and non-democracies. 
 
 
FIGURE 2.15: Non-Democratic (left) and Democratic (right) SWFs by Type, 2015 
 
This is important because in 2015 82% of SWFs managed by non-democracies 
were commodity funds, but among democracies SWFs are split about evenly between 
commodity and non-commodity origins, funding, and actions. Combined with the fact that 
non-democratic SWFs hold over three times the worth of assets that democratic SWFs 
hold, this illustrates the idea that non-democracies are using SWFs for domestic 
authoritarian purposes. Principally, the way they do this is by funding the building of 
infrastructure for SEZs.  
Furthermore, the non-democratic SWFs that are ranked on the Linaburg-Maduell 
Transparency (LMT) Index tend to have lower transparency scores than SWFs managed 
by democracies (see Table 2.10 below). The LMT scale was developed by Carl Linaburg 
and Michael Maduell for the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute as a “global standard 
benchmark” for transparency in SWFs. The transparency of SWFs is important to many 
actors because investors frequently cite concerns that these very large government run 
81.82%
Commodity Non-commodity
Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute
45.83%
Commodity Non-commodity
Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute
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investment vehicles may one day act on political motives rather than a profit motive 
(Truman 2007). The LMT score ranges from 1-10 with a score of 1 representing the lowest 
level of transparency and a 10 the highest. The scale takes the following observations into 
account when scoring funds: 
1. Fund provides history including reason for creation, origins of wealth, and 
government ownership structure 
2. Fund provides up-to-date independently audited annual reports 
3. Fund provides ownership percentage of company holdings, and geographic 
location of holdings 
4. Fund provides total portfolio market value, returns, and management 
compensation 
5. Fund provides guidelines in reference to ethical standards, investment policies, 
and enforcer of guidelines 
6. Fund provides clear strategies and objectives 
7. If applicable, the fund clearly identifies subsidiaries and contact information 
8. If applicable, the fund identifies external managers 
9. Fund manages its own website 
10. Fund provides main office location address and contact information such as 
telephone and fax (SWFI 2016) 
 
 
  TABLE 2.10: Sovereign Wealth Funds and Transparency Ratings  
Democracy Selected SWF LMT Index 
Australia Future Fund 10 
Canada Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund 9 
Ireland Ireland Strategic Investment Fund* 10 
Norway Government Pension Fund-Global 10 
United States Alaska Permanent Fund 10 
United States Texas Permanent School Fund 9 
 
Dictatorship Selected SWF LMT Index 
Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company 10 
China China Investment Corporation 8 
Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National Fund 2 
Russia Reserve Fund 5 
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corp 6 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 6 
Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 2016. NOTE: 10=fully transparent 
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This tells us two things. First, the management of SWFs in non-democracies is 
different than that of democratic SWFs. Second, despite having low scores the mere fact 
that non-democratic SWFs have allowed the SWF Institute enough access to the inner 
workings of the funds to measure them on the LMT scale tells us that these non-
democracies are at a minimum interested in transparency, in fact, some, like Bahrain, have 
funds that are just as transparent as their democratic counterparts. There are also trends in 
the timing of startup and the regional location of SWF countries. Tables 2.11 and 2.12 
display these trends. Regarding startup timing, it is interesting to note that 67.1% of all 
SWFs were created after the year 2000 and 78.5% of all SWFs were created after the fall 
of the USSR. Regionally, as of 2015 80% of all SWFs are located in the Middle East and 
Asia. 
 
TABLE 2.11: The Timing of SWF Creation 
Creation Time Period Percentage 
Pre-1970 7.6 
1970-1979 6.3 
1980-1989 7.6 
1990-1999 11.4 
2000-2009 45.6 
2010-2015 21.5 
Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 
TABLE 2.12: Regional Distribution of SWFs, 2015 
Region Percentage 
Africa 2.7 
Europe 13.1 
Middle East 40.2 
Asia 39.8 
Americas 2.8 
Other 1.4 
Source: Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute 
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CHAPTER 3: ELITE MANAGEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
Under the miserable conditions of authoritarian rule there are two main functions 
of economic policies that allow us to consider these policies as way to manage leader and 
elite relations: more credible commitments through greater monitoring and transparency, 
and a connection to independent arbiters. Scholars suggest that legislatures are capable of 
tying the hands of greedy autocrats (Wright 2008). Others suggest that it is not the 
legislature that is associated with greater investments, but rather the corporate governance 
rules associated with the authoritarian legislature (Jensen et al 2013). Furthermore, others 
argue that internationally oriented economic policies can do the same (Zheng 2014).  
International organizations (such as the WTO) and regional organizations (such as 
ASEAN) can encourage cooperation under the conditions of international anarchy79 
through monitoring and enforcement (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Pevehouse 2005). 
International agreements of any kind that require iterative management cast a long shadow 
of the future on signatories (Axelrod 1984, Fearon 1998), meaning that once an agreement 
is signed, expectations of future cooperation or conflict surrounding the agreement 
constrain the choices of leaders (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004). Industrialization and 
technological advances mean that modern autocrats are increasingly courting international
                                                          
79 For non-political scientists, anarchy merely means that the state (country) is the highest form of legitimate government. 
Or in other words, there is no global government with the ability to force states to obey international laws, treaties, 
organizational statutes, etc. It is all mostly voluntary because every state has sovereignty according to the Treaty of 
Westphalia (1648) and the founding principles of the UN Charter. 
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investors and looking to invest internationally themselves, often through international and 
regional organizations and bilateral and multilateral agreements.  
Looking outward has led many autocrats to implement specialized policies of 
partial economic liberalization in line with the rules for the world created by IOs (Barnett 
and Finnemore 2004).80 Two of these policies are special economic zones (SEZs), or 
geographically delineated investment areas, and sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), or 
government run investment funds. These policies have been successful in generating 
revenues and they are widespread among non-democracies. My argument is that these 
internationally oriented policies generate important domestic effects in dictatorships. 
Specifically they enhance credible commitments, lower the costs of monitoring, raise the 
costs of conflict between the leader and the regime, and connect the regime to an 
independent arbiter. 
The implementation of internationally oriented economic policies such as SEZs and 
SWFs requires intense deliberations, contracts, and a variety of different actors with 
varying expertise. They require lawyers, economists, analysts, managers, investors, and 
planners. These deliberations generally create the rules of corporate governance. These 
rules have also been found to be mechanisms that constrain autocrats (Jensen et al 2013). 
In comparison to legislative bodies, the coalition of actors needed for economic policies is 
more diverse and far reaching. Legislative bodies do not produce anything but laws, and in 
a dictatorship legislators are often even restricted from legislating.  
                                                          
80 Constructivists argue that joining these IOs can change state and leader behavior by starting a process of legitimation 
– when they follow through on commitments, role redefinition – when the leader or the state reconsiders its position 
because of legitimation, and then reflection – or further changes. As an example with no evidence that I know of, China 
joining the WTO in 2001 and then following through with many of its regulations has caused the regime to redefine itself 
in a way, towards a more market orientation. 
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In a non-democratic legislative body, all that is needed from actors is loyalty (real 
or feigned).81  Loyalty in dictatorships often stems from the provision of goods to a small 
winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003) and the argument here is that loyalty and 
the collection and distribution of these goods is more credibly done through the mechanics 
of economic policy. It is more likely that direct management of economic policies through 
a diverse coalition of experts will generate credible commitments than a building called 
parliament full of people that print words on paper.82  
Furthermore, credible commitments are generated through economic policies 
whether the policies are aimed at generating public or private goods. Any leader could fill 
a room with sycophants, movie stars, and sports players that are trained and willing to do 
anything they are told, sign some fancy sheets of paper and then claim they are sharing 
power. This is precisely how many democratic executives approach filling their cabinets. 
Domestic political promises between elites are rarely credible in any type state unless there 
is a specific punitive consequence to not following through on the promise or specific 
economic benefits and costs attached to the promise. If there is no independent arbiter, 
there are no punitive consequences and economic costs and benefits become the foundation 
of rule. 
 A successful economic policy requires constant monitoring and modification. This 
generally compels all of those involved to meet often, collect data, and submit reports. 
                                                          
81 A recent study of all the legislatures of the world (193 national legislatures) by a group of architects revealed that there 
are only five basic geographic shapes of legislatures – opposing benches, semicircle, horseshoe, circle, and classroom 
(XML 2016, Cohen de Lara and Mulder van der Vegt 2017). Interestingly, they find that the classroom shape is most 
common in non-democratic countries and offer the armchair theory that this is likely because this shape discourages 
debate relative to any other used shape and allows a leader to lecture his ruling coalition. 
82 Economic policies are generally understood to be laws, but in a dictatorship, despite being “more than mere window 
dressing” (Gandhi 2008), legislatures are generally rubber stamps for the dictator and his small ruling coalition when it 
comes to policy. 
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These policies can also require strict, contractual rules on membership and jurisdiction to 
create the predictable results that most successful business ventures and large investments 
require. Combined, these necessities encourage elites and the dictator to closely and 
regularly monitor each other’s activities while working towards a common goal. The fact 
that these economic policies are often connected to IOs, trade agreements, and foreign 
elites means that the costs of monitoring are significantly lowered because they are shared 
among many actors – many of which exist independent of the leader and the regime. It also 
means that the costs of intra-regime conflict becomes higher because more actors are 
capable of observing it. 
 Having an arbiter with an independent source of power is likely the strongest 
deterrent to the use of destabilizing violence within dictatorships. The WTO has 164 
member states and 20 observer nations as of 2016. Dispute resolution within the WTO can 
be very complicated, but is considered by the organization and its members to be the 
foundational process of the entire trading system (Busch and Pelc 2015). Membership 
within the WTO allows elites in dictatorships to file trade disputes and have them 
adjudicated internationally instead of facing accusations of not living up to the dictator’s 
demands. Zhang and Li (2013) find that “in general, China is highly motivated to comply 
with the WTO DSS [dispute settlement system] due to the reputational costs of 
noncompliance.” Using IOs and their dispute systems also allow the dictator to monitor the 
behavior of his elites when complaints are filed from other countries. Regional 
organizations, large MNCs, and trade agreements have their own dispute resolution 
mechanisms as well. 
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 Specific examples of how these policies generate credible commitments and 
independent arbitration are given in the following subsections. The rest of this section sets 
out to explicitly outline the theory and explore the assumptions and implications of it that 
lead to hypotheses. The next subsections (3.1 and 3.2) outline the mechanisms under which 
commitments become more credible and the role independent arbiters play in authoritarian 
economic power-sharing. Following that are brief examples (case studies) of an existing 
SEZs and SWFs, detailing the specific ways in which each of these mechanisms work in 
specific environments. Chapter 3 ends with an empirical analysis of the effects of SEZs 
and SWFs on leader tenure. First, we will briefly walk through a generalized theory of 
power sharing between elites and the ruler through economic policies. 
Theory: 
 When a dictator announces to his ruling coalition the intent to build a SEZ or create 
a SWF he signals his willingness to share power outside of a legislature with his supporting 
elites, whether this signal is his intention or not. Elites in a dictatorship know that an 
economic policy designed to attract foreign investment (such as a SEZ) or designed to 
invest in foreign and domestic economies (such as a SWF) will bring along with it a torrent 
of international regulations, new domestic laws, and especially increased coordination 
between the ruler and his winning coalition. These new issues cannot be handled solely 
within the purview of an authoritarian legislature designed to be mostly a rubber stamp. 
They require expert consultation from economists and all sorts of coordination and 
transaction costs that reach outside of the political realm (legislature) and into the economic 
realm. Non-democratic legislatures are not necessarily designed for deliberation and 
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delegation (most authoritarian legislatures are shaped like classrooms), they are assumed 
here to be designed in dictatorships to keep the ruling group in power.83  
 Once the intent to create a SEZ or SWF is announced, the ruling coalition will work 
to figure out all the details. In this economic work, inside or out of a legislature, they do 
their best to please the dictator but they will also learn of the many checks and balances 
that come along with 1) being sure that the policy is exactly what the leader wants, 2) being 
sure that the policy has its intended outcome, and 3) designing an economic policy that is 
compliant with WTO regulations, regional trade agreements, and bilateral trade agreements 
(especially if this is the regime’s first economic liberalization policy). With all of this 
information in their heads, the ruling coalition will then be forced to decide whether it is 
worth it to invest the time, energy, and loyalty into making the policy a reality. 
 The calculation of the ruling coalition is crucially determined by the coalition’s 
perception of the dictator. The coalition will perceive with a probability that the dictator 
has a constrained management style and will delegate and deliberate and a different 
probability that he prefers an unconstrained management style and will basically do 
anything to be sure he is the only one in charge. If the coalition perceives the dictator as a 
more constrained manager than an unconstrained manager, then the coalition will set forth 
on the premise that the leader will continue delegating and deliberating even with the added 
scrutiny of policy management and independent arbiters like the WTO. The atmosphere of 
delegation and deliberation that existed prior to the policy (i.e. the perception of the leader 
as having a constrained management style), will merely continue and deepen at this point. 
In the event that they engage in delegation and deliberation, both the leader and the 
                                                          
83 In the authoritarian institutions literature it is rarely assumed that dictators create legislatures to deliberate and delegate, 
they do it to stay in office. Sometimes that requires deliberation and delegation, sometimes it does not. 
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coalition will be better off by both retaining their positions and all having increased power 
through economic growth. 
 If the coalition that perceived the leader to have a constrained management style 
decides to use the proposal of this economic policy as a tool to try and remove the leader 
by using the new publicity to expose grievances (such as defecting in a prisoner’s dilemma 
game and forcing the cooperating player to take the sucker’s payoff), the leader will act to 
remove these “bad eggs” quickly and replace them with loyal supporters, given he has 
sufficient monitoring and power to do so. This is an unlikely outcome as ruling coalition 
members that perceive the leader to be one that prefers to manage through delegation and 
deliberation will not risk the extraordinary costs of betraying the leader.84  
In the event that the ruling coalition perceives the dictator as one who prefers to 
manage through violence and corruption, the coalition will go along doing whatever it has 
to do to remain in the coalition as by definition an unconstrained autocrat will work to 
delegitimize and purge regime institutions. However, in this case if a leader perceived to 
have an unconstrained management style insists on creating a SEZ or SWF, it will happen, 
but the coalition will likely only put in the minimal effort necessary to not be eliminated 
by the dictator. They will work with the leader only in the manner that the leader allows, if 
he allows it, and the resulting payoff for both the leader and the coalition will be the status 
quo. This means that we should never expect to see very large or successful SEZ or SWF 
programs in autocracies led by autocrats with a management style characterized by 
corruption and violence. We should observe most SEZs started by autocrats with 
                                                          
84Thinking back to North Korea, feigning loyalty and actual loyalty is always better than being fed to a hungry pack of 
dogs (at least in economic terms). Psychologically, in the North Korea example, being fed to dogs might be more 
satisfying than worshipping the Supreme Leader as a god, to some.  
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unconstrained management styles to appear as if they were started and then basically 
abandoned. This also means that dependent upon who is in the unconstrained autocrat’s 
ruling coalition, they may use this new policy to expose grievances to the world. These 
grievances, if bad enough, can inspire insiders and outsiders to form a coup, assassination, 
or foreign intervention. Therefore, unconstrained autocrats that create these policies should 
experience higher risk of removal proportional to the magnitude of use of the economic 
policy. 
This is a surprising finding that has face validity.85 In the case with a dictator that 
is perceived to rule by corruption and violence and is insisting on a specific economic 
policy, the ruling coalition is actually now armed with the possible ability to impose costs 
on the leader through the same channels – credible commitments and independent arbiters. 
In this world, three situations become important. First, in the event that the coalition 
misperceives the leader or its perception is sufficiently low so it is close to chance, this will 
cause information asymmetry problems and make conflict between the leader and his 
regime more likely. Second, if there is a disloyal opposition within an authoritarian 
government (a secret “shadow government” or faction) that has an indivisible objective 
(such as “remove the leader”) when the policy is implemented, this could give the group 
its opportunity to make a move and will also make conflict between the leader and his 
coalition more likely. Or, third, in the event that perceptions of the leader’s type change 
over time, this can create elite rebellion as well.  
                                                          
85 Farole (2011) and many others (FIAS 2008) note that SEZs in Africa and any country with really bad corruption 
problems never get off the ground. They stagnate and sometimes disappear. The only case I know of where an SEZ was 
actually shut down after opening was in Senegal.  
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However, in the event that a conflict takes place, the theory is agnostic to which 
side will win (i.e. the leader purges the regime or the regime removes the leader). This is 
likely determined by available resources and exogenous conditions. This means that 
unconstrained autocrats (those that prefer to rule through corruption and violence) that 
conduct higher levels of international business through specialized partial liberalization 
policies may be more likely to be removed by internal rebellions (peaceful or violent) and 
foreign interventions than those that isolate and do not engage the larger global economy, 
but they are also more likely to purge those that try. Those that purge and isolate are not 
expected to survive in power any longer or shorter than the human life span will allow, but 
there is nothing in the theory that tells us how likely this violent leader is to be successful. 
We should expect that leaders with a constrained management style (i.e. prefer to manage 
through delegation and deliberation) will continue to exit power mostly through 
institutional turnovers and those that enact specialized liberalization policies will be more 
likely to survive their full terms than those without the policy and also exit power in a legal 
or orderly fashion. 
Assumptions: 
 A dictator prefers to stay in power. A leader can propose a specialized economic 
liberalization policy that involves increased power-sharing between himself and his ruling 
coalition. By sincerely engaging in the development of the policy, the dictator increases 
the credibility of his commitment to manage through deliberation and delegation. The 
ruling coalition prefers to keep their heads first, and if they see a way to increase their 
power over the dictator or to enrich themselves, all without losing their head, then they will 
pursue that also. The ruling coalition and the dictator, once engaged in the economic policy, 
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become attached to international actors that are capable of settling disputes that may or 
may not arise.  
There are two relatively distinct styles of elite management that exist on a 
continuum between the two. The more constrained a dictator’s management style is, the 
more likely he is to engage in deliberation and delegation. When a dictator engages in true 
deliberation and delegation through an economic policy, the more likely that policy is to 
succeed in its mission and continue into the future. A dictator with an unconstrained 
management style will not consent to a legal transition of executive power and will prefer 
to do whatever it takes to stay in power until forcibly removed. When an unconstrained 
management style, the ruling coalition, if given the opportunity, can try and use these 
economic policies against the leader in an effort to replace him, but the leader always 
retains the option to use violence and purge the ruling coalition.  
Hypotheses: 
 The implications that logically flow from these assumptions are that first, dictators 
with a constrained management style that create partial liberalization economic policies are 
more likely to enhance stable relations in the balance of power between the dictator and 
his ruling coalition, meaning that among autocrats with constrained management 
preferences, those that create these economic policies should survive full legal terms (and 
possibly longer ones) and will be more likely to exit in a legal orderly manner. Second, 
dictators with an unconstrained management style that do not create these policies will 
survive in office until they die or are removed or killed by a foreign power or a domestic 
coup. Unconstrained leadership styles in the presence of internationally oriented economic 
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policies will have similar tenures in comparison to those that do not and similar likelihoods 
of exit type.  
 
3.1 CREDIBLE COMMITMENTS 
 
Authoritarian regimes have a variety of ways in which they can signal the 
credibility of their commitments. Commitments become credible when the expected utility 
of a given choice is sufficiently high enough to eliminate the possibility of other choices. 
An unconstrained leadership style faces a steep uphill battle if it wishes to signal the 
credibility of a choice to delegate and deliberate, say through a legislature, SEZ, or SWF. 
The theory is agnostic as to why a leader would chose to manage his elites through 
corruption and violence. Of course, the basic economic assumption of rationality likely 
drives “need” for more power, but choice of this management style is likely more a 
personality predisposition (such as narcissism) that elicits such behavior.  
When opportunities to deliberate and delegate arise, we should expect leaders with 
an unconstrained management style to undermine them at every turn. In a legislature they 
will ban the opposition. In a SEZ they will purposefully restrict budgets and disrupt the 
process. This is all done by these violent leaders in order to reduce the costs of potential 
conflict with the ruling coalition. In other words, if a conflict arises between the ruling 
coalition and an autocrat with an unconstrained management style, then the easier it is to 
remove members of the ruling coalition the lower the cost of conflict (it is much easier to 
kill, exile or jail an opponent then to work through regime institutions to have them 
removed).  
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The low cost of conflict means that the leader’s utility of conflict increases. The 
easier it is to remove members of the ruling coalition, the easier it is keep threats to tenure 
in check and remain in power. The effect of this purposeful lowering of the costs of conflict 
means that as the dictator’s utility of conflict rises as his expected utility of deliberation 
and delegation lowers, meaning that in this instance the dictator cannot credibly commit to 
deliberation and delegation. His utility of marginalizing his regime is too high to credibly 
commit to working with the regime. Figure 3.1 illustrates this. 
 
FIGURE 3.1: Costs of Intra-regime Conflict with Leaders 
 
An autocrat with a constrained management style will recognize that he has already 
increased the costs of potential conflict with the ruling coalition by ruling through 
deliberation and delegation – typically described to be through a legislature. A leader that 
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is predisposed to deliberation and delegation will 1) already be able to credibly commit to 
his ruling coalition because of the high costs of potential conflict with the coalition, 2) will 
be more likely to be forced to adopt more deliberation and delegation policies precisely 
because of his previous credible commitment and 3) will be more likely to seek out new 
opportunities to delegate and deliberate in his bid to remain in office precisely because the 
ruling coalition already has a credible threat of punishment in this situation. 
Increasingly, dictators and their ruling coalitions have been looking past their own 
borders for ways to increase the costs of potential conflict in an effort to make 
commitments even more credible. One core aspect of the so-called “going global” strategy 
entails enormous media projects, such as Russia’s RT media empire, China’s CCTV and 
People’s Daily, or even Iran’s Press TV – all of which enjoy global reach and a substantial 
following in Western countries via the Internet.86 These efforts are clearly dedicated to 
changing, challenging, and undermining long held norms and perceptions of liberal 
democracy while promoting a distinct brand of authoritarianism. They are building 
strawmen so they can knock them down. 
This relates to credible commitments in that it exemplifies how the international 
advertising of ideas can increase the costs of conflict with regime elites. It is comparable 
to the process of international solicitation of foreign investment in SEZs. By advertising a 
sort of authoritarian ideology through international media outlets authoritarians raise the 
costs of potential internal conflict simply by globally promoting their own ideas. By using 
state media to broadcast propaganda internationally the leader places himself at risk of that 
                                                          
86 Other core aspects of authoritarian outreach outlined in initiatives at the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) 
include coordinated attacks on civil society, restricting cyberspace, promoting worst practices, spreading ‘counter-
norms,’ the ‘use and misuse of international organizations,’ ‘pseudo-election monitoring,’ and giving foreign aid to other 
authoritarians (2016). 
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same state media being used against him. Once an international media campaign is 
launched, the ruling coalition must also worry about it being used against them. In the event 
it is, the costs of conflict with the ruling coalition increase exponentially.87 
SEZs must be advertised globally as well. They require messaging and international 
travel that increase the costs of conflict between the ruler and the ruling coalition. SEZs 
begin by passing a formal law or decree through some form of a legislature. This law 
outlines the geographic area, how management works, and what benefits can be offered to 
investors. Regimes often enlist the help of friendly neighbors or allies to help in the initial 
setup. Once the SEZ program is established in law, the dictator and his allies must agree 
on how to advertise it, who to allow in,88 and how to deal with expansion – all requiring 
formal deliberative meetings between the dictator and his ruling coalition. Often times, in 
order to boost investment, regimes historically have joined the WTO to add an extra layer 
of international credibility. Thus, SEZs in dictatorships are formal, deliberative, publically 
advertised, and often linked to an independent arbiter (WTO) resulting in greater 
                                                          
87 All dictators have their own personal state-run media. Just by having a message out there that is connected to the 
regime, the costs and probability of conflict within the regime likely increases. For example, a dictator trying to globally 
promote a new form of authoritarianism may decide to offer asylum to a whistleblower that holds citizenship in a 
democracy in an effort to highlight contradictory state behavior of the democracy. However, by granting the 
whistleblower asylum, he opens himself up to the possibility that the whistleblower can do the same thing in his asylum 
granting dictatorship, given the whistleblower is able to obtain access to sensitive records. Or, state reporters could be 
sent to other states for stories, where they may defect and become regime opponents. If one counts national football 
players as elites and football as a form of global advertising, the Eritrean soccer team is an interesting example. In 2015, 
ten members of the Eritrean national soccer team defected in Botswana. In 2012, seventeen members defected to Uganda, 
in 2009 twelve defected to Kenya, in 2007, six defected to Angola (Taylor 2015). These high profile signals of disloyalty 
increase the costs of a leader’s potential conflict with the ruling coalition in a variety of ways, such as reputation costs 
and legitimacy costs. 
88 For example, the UAE has a history of excluding Jewish people. Today, Israeli passport holders are barred from entry 
and if one has an Israeli stamp in their passport book they are subject to being denied entry. In 2002, the UAE President’s 
research center published a report claiming that Nazis did not kill the Jews in Europe, rather it was the Zionists (US 
Department of State (2004), this is evidently a common belief in the region. In 2010, in response to the assassination of 
a Hamas leader in a Dubai hotel, the Dubai police chief claimed that anyone that looked or sounded Jewish would be 
given a language test and denied entry (Mackey 2010). Somewhat ironically, these “language tests” have a Jewish origin. 
In the Book of Judges tells us that the Gileadites and the Ephraimites sorted out ethnic groups after battle by making 
soldiers say “sibbolet,” which was a word for corn, but one group always pronounced it with a “sh” sound. Now, the 
word “shibboleth” is generic noun for these types of tests. In WWII (pacific theater) the nonsensical word “lallapolooza” 
was used to distinguish between Japanese and others approaching checkpoints. Soldiers were instructed that if the 
respondent repeated the word as “rarrapolooza” they were to shoot the respondent at the first r (Stimpson 1946). 
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transparency and a publically observable signal of commitment that increases the costs of 
potential conflicts. 
SWFs in non-democracies are encouraged by IOs and INGOs to be more 
transparent (Truman 2007). Within the regime, the large sums of money managed require 
a certain level of transparency between the leader, the regime, and the elites that manage 
the fund(s). SWFs cannot adequately profit off of global markets without proper 
monitoring protocols. Furthermore, SWFs often operate as the chief financier of popular 
domestic development projects, such as SEZs.89 However, in sum, economic policies can 
and do enhance the credibility of commitments (Zheng 2014). They do so through the 
mechanism of increasing the potential costs of conflict between a leader and his ruling 
coalition to the point that they are sufficient to induce cooperation or allow for a push to 
remove the leader. 
 
3.2 INDEPENDENT ARBITERS 
 
Regional organizations, recently theorized to be the bringers of democracy 
(Pevehouse 2005), are not off limits to authoritarians. Nursultan Nazarbaev is the current 
and only President of Kazakhstan (since 1991) who is routinely elected with upwards of 
98% of the vote. He has amended the constitution to allow himself (and only himself) to 
run for an unlimited number of five year terms, and has never held an election that met 
international standards (Holley 2007). Nazarbaev was awarded the 2010 Chairmanship of 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Cefalo 2009). How did 
                                                          
89 Because there are relatively few SWFs in the world, they may be better analyzed either by themselves or in detailed 
case studies. 
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that happen? That is a question all in its own, but this example provides an insight into how 
enthusiastically willing authoritarian rulers can be to join international organizations – so 
much so that they will join organizations that have explicit goals that run counter to 
domestic policy. 
Authoritarians also create their own international organizations. The Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) was created in 1981 and consists solely of Arab absolute 
monarchies working to unify their militaries and economies. Similarly, the Greater Arab 
Free Trade Area (GAFTA) and the Council of Arab Economic Unity (CAEU) both consist 
of almost exclusively non-democratic states. The oil cartel best known for its 1973 
embargo against liberal democratic nations that supported Israel in the Yom Kippur War, 
the Organization of the Petroleum Export Countries (OPEC), currently boasts 14 members 
– not one of which comes very close to being considered a democracy. Furthermore, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), excluding possibly the Philippines, is 
anything but a shining beacon of democracy in the region.    
Saudi Arabia has long been known spread its Wahhabi sect of Sunni Islam through 
funded Madrasas in Pakistan. Not only was Osama bin Laden killed in Pakistan, but it 
remains a fertile breeding ground for Islamic terrorists of all brands. Almost 70% of the 
school system in Pakistan is made of Islamic Madrassas funded by Saudi Arabia (Paul and 
Jacob 2013, p. 58). Qatar and Turkey worked hard to support the democratically elected 
Islamist President Morsi of Egypt in the wake of the Arab Spring, only to have Saudi 
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates pledge billions in aid to General Sisi the day after his 
military coup d’état (Worth 2013).  
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Saudi Arabia’s main geopolitical rival, Iran, has long been known to fund terrorist 
organizations and paramilitary operations globally (Wigginton et al 2015) and actively 
supports Assad’s regime in Syria while Russia actively supports Iran (Trotman 2014) and 
other dictatorships like Belarus financially (Razumovskaya 2013). Venezuela has long 
used its oil to prop up the Castro regime in Cuba and other questionable democracies in 
Latin America. 
 The point is that dictators and their regimes have friends. There are more IOs out 
there than the ones created by democracies.90 Authoritarians belong to and create their own 
international organizations and networks and they also are members in many of the same 
ones that democracies are. They blend in well, especially in the post-cold war era where 
international divisions are not as clear. What this means is that dictators and their ruling 
coalitions, whether they intend to or not, are engaging in behavior that connects them to a 
number of actors outside of the borders of the home state. Some of these actors are state 
actors in other non-democracies, some are foreign elites that may reside in democracies, 
and still others may be international organizations that can range in charter and scope from 
the WTO to OPEC. 
 Membership in any of these organizations is theorized to increase the potential costs 
of conflict between the dictator and his ruling coalition and reduces the cost of monitoring. 
Going back to the example of the mafia, when conflicts arose, bosses could murder 
anybody they wanted for any reason they wanted and then credibly either claim it was a 
misunderstanding or simply just stick with whatever reason they came up with. When 
                                                          
90 The IO literature tends to only write about IOs formed by democracies – typically the ones that came out of WWII 
(UN, WTO, NATO, etc.). Scholars would benefit from a systematic review or greater understanding of authoritarian IOs 
and how they operate. Arguably the existence of international cooperation among authoritarians that rule with less 
institutional domestic control is a greater or more complex feat than democracies cooperating internationally. 
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mafia families got together to stop the violence, they appointed a consigliere (an 
independent arbiter) to arbitrate disagreements and disseminate information, the same 
thing that IOs do. This reduced conflict between and within families because it raised the 
costs of conflict. One could imagine that in the mafia, murdering someone for doing 
something that an even slightly respected independent power source already publically said 
they did not do, is far worse and damaging than the same events in the absence of a 
consigliere. The same goes for dictators and dictatorships.91  
 
3.3 AN EXAMPLE WITH SEZS – KISH TRADE-INDUSTRIAL FREE ZONE 
(IRAN) 
 
These case studies are given in order to show the reader exactly what the zones look 
like within specific contexts and to conduct small qualitative tests of the theory before a 
large-N quantitative one at the end of this chapter. Kish is called a “Trade-Industrial Free 
Zone” inside Iran. It is a 35 square-mile island nicknamed the “Pearl of the Persian Gulf.” 
It hosts two stock exchanges and is now a major tourist destination. It sees around a million 
visitors per year. Specific statistics are difficult to come by. This is important to point out 
because it is the reason behind the slow development of the study of non-democracies. Data 
like “number of visitors per year to X” are readily available in democracies because of the 
open structure of democracies.92  
                                                          
91 Because dictators that prefer to manage their elites through violence and corruption are more likely to use extralegal 
means, there is corollary implication here that these autocrats are likely members in fewer international organizations. 
92 This is why democracy is a sufficient condition for capitalism (i.e. with it, capitalism will occur), but it is not necessary 
(i.e. a system can be authoritarian and capitalist). 
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At the moment, non-democracies generally report the bare minimum, if anything 
at all. As expected, autocrats that prefer to rule by deliberation and delegation generally 
report more data publically than autocrats that prefer to manage elites through corruption 
and violence, but none make it easy to come by. Most everything presented in this section 
was taken off of Wikipedia pages and government website pages. Data and information in 
this case has largely gone “underground”, along with many international business deals, 
most likely due to the Western sanctions placed on Iran.93  
Prior to the revolution, the Shah opened up one of the world’s largest casinos on 
Kish Island. After the Islamic Revolution in 1979 it became just another hotel (Mohajerani 
and Miremadi 2012). Often the rules within SEZs vary greatly, as do the names given to 
them. Chapter 2 outlined the four basic components of an SEZ (geographically restricted, 
single management, special benefits/incentives, outside the normal customs area). To give 
the reader a specific example of what these “special benefits” can include, below lists the 
benefits offered by a regime often called a theocracy. Kish Island (one example of many) 
offers the following investment incentives according to the Islamic Republic of Iran official 
government website: 
1. 15-year tax exemptions for economic activities since the operation date 
2. Visa-free entrance  
3. Full freedom for capital transfer 
4. More flexibility for banking operations 
5. Guaranteeing the legal rights of foreign investors 
6. No limitation for foreign investment and cooperation 
7. Speedy administrative activities 
8. Easy capital transfer from mainland, abroad and other free zones of Iran 
9. Exemption from customs tax and commercial interests for the imports of raw 
materials and industrial manufacturing machinery of Kish industries 
10. The possibility of foreign investment without Iranian cooperation 
                                                          
93 With the motivation (and the money) it is likely that a field researcher could gather specific data, but for this exercise 
what is available will do. In addition, as stated before, most non-democratic politics are non-institutional or actively try 
to subvert institutions, so that specific data may not be all that helpful for the more general questions being asked here. 
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11. The possibility of purchasing and selling land, renting out land for domestic 
investors, and leasing the land to Iranian and foreign investors 
12. No limitation for buying, selling, and exchanging currency 
13. Performing all transactions and currency transfers in the Zone through real legal 
persons 
14. Company registration and industrial and intellectual ownership through Free Zone 
Organization 
15. No limitation for any commodity entrance except for the ones which are 
inconsistence with the Islam orders or contrast specific regulations of the free 
zones. 
16. Transiting and re-exporting of foreign goods with the minimum formalities 
17. Exporting the goods produced in the Zone to other countries or other free zones 
with the minimum formalities 
18. Exporting the produced goods to the mainland considering their value added 
index 
19. Setting governing rules for employee-employer relations based on concluded 
contracts94 
 
Closer inspection reveals that Iran distinguishes between two types of zones. Many 
countries do this, but they all do it differently. Iran has Free Trade Zones (FTZs) and 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Here, the differences are negligible, but it may offer some 
promise for the future.95 It seems that the main difference is that there is no visa required 
to enter a free zone and anyone can engage in retail. Free Zones in Iran operate similar to 
a duty-free shop at the airport. Special Zones appear to have more restrictions and are more 
focused on specific needs. As far as I can tell, there are 7 FTZs and 15 SEZs in Iran today. 
Pars Special Economic Energy Zone is located on the Iranian coast, northwest of Kish. It 
was created in 1998 in an effort to develop and exploit all possible oil and gas resources in 
the region. It is a zone dedicated to energy trade, production, and refinement. The official 
government website for this SEZ does not give a list of benefits like it does for Kish, but it 
goes into some detail, stating that its objective is  
                                                          
94 It is interesting to note that only number 15 makes any mention of Islam. This striking lack of sharia enforcements in 
the Islamic Republic highlights the fact that all non-democracies are now trying to engage the larger global liberal 
economic environment. 
95 In the data, all policies that meet the four criteria of the World Bank FIAS (2008) are considered SEZs, regardless of 
what the home country calls them. 
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Facilitating for the on-time execution of various oil and gas projects, providing the 
appropriate foundation to attract local and foreign partnership with the aim of 
developing oil, gas and petrochemical industries as well as inter-related and 
downstream industries, creating local job opportunities and attracting skilled and semi-
skilled workforce from neighboring provinces with regards to its positive effects on 
economic prosperity in the provinces of Bushehr, Fars and Hormozgan.96 
 
This statement is interesting for several reasons. The first sentence, “on-time 
execution,” provides us with a glimpse of purpose behind the zone. It is seen as a way to 
make things more efficient. Further in the statement, it shows a belief that that the zone 
will “attract local and foreign partnership.” This is one way in which we can see that an 
internationally sanctioned state is still trying to connect itself to what could be considered 
independent arbiters. It also mentions “downstream industries” indicating that they expect 
some technology transfer. All of these aspects show that the Iranian Revolutionary 
government would like to use SEZs to generate better coordination among elites. It also 
shows that the government is forward looking towards the industries that will be affected 
by the development of other industries.  
 Figure 3.1 provides satellite imagery of Kish Island. The primary definitional aspect 
of a SEZ is that it is geographically delineated. It should be fairly obvious that geography 
is important to international politics (Starr and Most 1976, Starr 2000, 2015). It is equally 
important in domestic politics. In a non-democratic environment, geographic control over 
different types of economic policies translates to some form of control, but the delineation 
                                                          
96 I ask the reader to take a mental note of the last sentence – “creating local job opportunities and attracting skilled and 
semi-skilled workforce from neighboring provinces with regards to its positive effects on economic prosperity in the 
provinces of Bushehr, Fars and Hormozgan.” This strongly relates to the theory of labor fragmentation outlined in 
Chapter 4. 
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of geographic areas is not just an authoritarian strategy. Parents today put devices on their 
child’s first car that will alert them or kill the engine if the car exits a specified geographic 
area. This desire for control is the primary reason many people and states are fascinated 
with building “great walls” (figuratively, literally, and imaginatively). Figure 3.2 is there 
below so the reader can get a better idea of just how geographically determined zones can 
be. One of the future plans for this research project is to collect the geographic coordinates 
of all SEZs and map them into GIS (Geographic Information Systems). 97 
      
 
FIGURE 3.2: Satellite Imagery of Kish Island, Iran 
Source: NASA – Earth Observatory 
 
 
To provide a very brief outline of important events related to this case study, in 
1993 Iran passed a law on the administration of free trade and industrial zones. In 1999 it 
revised and adopted amendments to the law expanding zones in some legal areas and 
restricting them in others, but overall expanding the SEZ program. This revision turned 
into a new Act passed in 1999. In 2000 another law was approved by the Council of 
Ministers further diving into what is allowed and what is not allowed within the zones and 
                                                          
97 So far I have only been able to do this for three countries. The results are promising.  
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in 2002 a law was passed expanding them to different parts of the country.98 In 2009, the 
Iranian Green Revolution occurred and the regime cracked down hard on protesters and 
took a very hardline stance (Bakhtavar 2009, Hashemi and Postel 2011).  
Figure 3.3 plots out Iran’s SEZ score and compares it to its factor score of leader 
management style (or personalism – outlined in Chapter 2) over time. The factor score 
ranges from -1.5 to +1.5 and in this case never goes above zero, indicating that Iran’s two 
modern dictators have both preferred a management style closer to that of violence and 
corruption than that of deliberation and delegation.99 This arguably matches what we 
observe in reality, considering the failed 2009 Green Revolution and Iran’s generally 
obstinate behavior. We should always expect all new leaders to work to consolidate power 
immediately after taking office. A dictator, especially an established one, will act fast. We 
should also expect some power struggles in that move to consolidate power. The factor 
score for Iran just after the revolution is very low and then bounces back and forth as the 
first Ayatollah (Supreme Leader), Khomeini, worked to find that balance.  
SEZs were introduced in Iran just after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 
and the rise of Ayatollah Khamenei as the second Supreme Leader of Iran. This happens 
to coincide with a sharp rise in the factor score and the size of the Iranian SEZ program. 
The factor score dips back down right around the controversial rigged election of 2009. 
This evidence lends some support to many of the assumptions of the theory. The 
                                                          
98 The information on bills passed was taken directly from The Supreme Council of Iran’s Free Trade, Industrial & 
Special Economic Zones – Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. I have not found a way to confirm through 
secondary sources. 
99 Later in the dissertation, a cut point of -0.42 in the factor score is used to distinguish between dictators who prefer to 
manage their elites through violence and corruption (unconstrained) and those who prefer to manage their elites through 
delegation and deliberation. If this is the true cut point in this exploratory factor score, then Figure 3.3 indicates that 
Iran’s first Ayatollah was more of an unconstrained type manager and the current Ayatollah is more of a constrained type 
manager.  
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assumption that unconstrained managers will hold onto power until they die bears out. The 
hypothesis that a leaders with a more constrained management style (such as Khamenei) 
can deliberate and delegate through SEZs seems to be supported. Also the idea that all 
leaders prefer to be unconstrained and will move that way if they can seems to be 
exemplified by the 2009 Green Revolution. We should look at further evidence though. 
 
 
FIGURE 3.3: Iran SEZs and Factor Score 
 
 
Connecting this example back to the theory, we can look at the management of Kish 
Free Trade Zone to see if they are managed by the ruler’s ruling coalition (i.e. elites). 
Unlike most SEZs, Iran seems to be a little more secretive than others about the 
management structure of its zones. On the official website there is only one name listed 
and he has the title of “Secretariat of the Coordination Council for Free Trade-Industrial 
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Zones and Specific Economic Zones.”100 His name is Akbar Torkin, and according to his 
Wikipedia page he is a long-time regime insider and currently holds another title – “Senior 
Advisor to the President of Iran” – since 2013. If one does a cursory search for the 
managing directors of SEZs in non-democracies one will find that they are almost always 
regime insiders.101 Iran’s zones are arguably either more or less connected to independent 
arbiters because of the long-term sanctions Western countries have placed on the country. 
However, this just makes it more likely that the international connections are hidden or 
obfuscated, not that they do not exist.102  
 
3.4 AN EXAMPLE WITH SWFS – FERRARI WORLD (ABU DHABI, U.A.E.) 
 
The Abu Dhabi Investment Council (ADIC) is a SWF that was split off in 2007 
from a larger SWF, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA). The ADIC is a great 
example of how leaders 1) place elites (ruling coalition members) as the directors of these 
funds, 2) use SWFs to generate domestic development – often through financing SEZs and 
3) connect themselves and the regime to a host of independent arbiters able to settle internal 
and external disputes.  
To first show how elites make up the management teams of most SWFs, the 
following list displays the board of directors of the Abu Dhabi Investment Council.103 
Board members are appointed through official decree from the ruler of Abu Dhabi, His 
                                                          
100 I am not sure why the term “specific” is used. Visit the website at http://www.freezones.ir/Default.aspx?tabid=137  
101 The only other study I have found on this, Teti and Gervasio 2012, finds that in Egypt elites are heavily tied to the 
management of SEZs. 
102 Sanctions rarely work, they typically just drive business underground or to friendlier partners. 
103 Not to be confused with the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (another SWF) or the Abu Dhabi Investment Company 
(a private firm located in Abu Dhabi). This information was taken from Wikipedia and then confirmed through secondary 
news sources and the ADIC website. 
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Highness Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, meaning that he can replace or add 
members with a signature. They currently are almost all members of the royal family. 
 
Chairman of the Board: 
 HH Sheikh Mohammad Bin Zayed Al Nahyan (Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi 
and Deputy Supreme Commander) 
Members of the Board: 
 HH Sheikh Sultan Bin Zayed Al Nahyan (Representative of His Highness the 
President of the State) 
 HH Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed Al Nahyan (Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of Presidential Affairs) 
 HH Sheikh Hamed Bin Zayed Al Nahyan (replacing his deceased brother 
Ahmed bin Zayed Al Nahyan) 
 HE Mohammed Bin Habroush Al Suwaidi (special advisor to Sheikh Khalifa, 
ruler of Abu Dhabi) 
 HE Eissa Mohamed Al Suwaidi (Managing Director) 
 HE Younis Haji Khoori (Chairman of Etihad Credit Bureau) 
 
To draw connections between the ADIC and how SWFs work, I present the 
example of “Ferrari World” (in the UAE, SEZs are often called “worlds”, i.e. “Media 
World,” “Technology World” etc.). It is quite a complex picture, but I attempt to draw the 
connections in Figure 3.4 below. The SWF, ADIC, owns a majority share of the Abu Dhabi 
Commercial Bank (ADCB). The ADCB, managed by some of the same and other elites, 
then partners with large multinational corporations (in this case Pepsi and Lavazza) to hire 
another local development firm, Aldar Properties, to develop Ferrari World.  
Aldar Properties is owned by a mix of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private 
companies. There are many other SWF investments on Yas Island (where Ferrari World is 
located), such as the famous Yas Marina Circuit, a large number of hotels and residential 
housing, and other businesses. The entire Yas Island is generally considered to be a SEZ. 
Despite the messiness of Figure 3.4, it should make it clear that these economic policies 
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are 1) managed by regime elites and 2) are connected to independent sources of domestic 
and international power.  
  
FIGURE 3.4: The Investment Chain from ADIC to Ferrari World 
 
In this situation, a high-profile conflict between the Abu Dhabi ruling coalition and 
the emir would be catastrophically expensive for anyone involved – including the emir. 
Perhaps this is exactly why we do not observe high-profile conflicts in the UAE. Ferrari 
World is quite an achievement in itself. It is the largest “space frame” structure ever built. 
It houses the fastest rollercoaster in the world (the Formula Rossa). The roof is made of 
aluminum and covers around 925,696 square feet (86,000 square meters). The whole thing 
from start to finish was constructed in less than three years. 
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FIGURE 3.5: Aerial View of Ferrari World Abu Dhabi, 2010 
 
Figure 3.5 gives the reader a visualization of the scope and grandeur that can 
sometimes come along with these projects. Most people know of the artificial palm shaped 
islands off the coast of Dubai that are visible from space, the tallest building the world 
(Burj Khalifa), and the largest indoor ski slope with a bar where everything, including the 
cups, are made out of ice (and it’s in the dessert). All of these were either built within SEZs 
or with the help of SWFs. 
In sum, what is happening here is that elites and the leader are effectively 
deliberating and delegating through economic policy. As assumed in the theory, an autocrat 
perceived to have a constrained management style by his ruling coalition will tend to foster 
deeper power-sharing through these economic policies. The numerous local entities that 
are all staffed with regime elites must coordinate hundreds of extremely complex 
investment and supply chains.  
This setup requires the ruler and his elites to meet regularly, make decisions 
together and on their own, and put up a united front to everyone else in order to protect 
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their investments. The Pepsi Corporation and Lavazza Coffee could be considered to be a 
type of independent arbiter that in the event there is a clash between the ruling coalition 
and the emir, they could technically arbitrate in a number of ways, including threats to pull 
support if it is not resolved.  
It is important to note here that the UAE is a confederacy of seven monarchies. This 
poses unique analytical issues that cannot be easily dealt with in large-N statistical studies, 
but also provides us with an opportunity to address anticipated questions about the larger 
analysis. First, the case study here implies that the UAE’s ruler has a preferred management 
style of deliberation and delegation. In reality, this study is agnostic to this theoretically 
answerable question. This is because the UAE does not report statistics for a few of the 
variables used to calculate the factor score, so there is not an exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) score for it. It is classified by GWF as a monarchy. But it is not exactly a monarchy, 
it is a confederacy of monarchies. Second, typically monarchs rule for life, so, according 
to the theoretical expectations of leader exit, we must consider the monarch’s life 
appointment a legal term limit achieved through deliberation and delegation with his ruling 
coalition. 
Nothing can be done at the moment about the missing data, but that can be filled in 
eventually through field work and technology. If we recall Chapter 2, we see that there are 
observations of monarchies all across the factor score range. At first thought, one might 
think that monarchs are unconstrained rulers (meaning in this theory that they would prefer 
to rule through corruption and violence).  
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However, monarchs are not invincible. Abdications and successions happen, and 
can happen frequently. Private and public coups and assassinations occur in monarchies.104 
Furthermore, hereditary succession to the throne according to the succession rules of the 
kingdom are by definition an institutionalized turnover, albeit with longer terms than in a 
single-party dictatorship.105  
 
3.5 EXAMINATION OF LEADER TENURE 
 
In the examination of leader tenure there are several expected outcomes. First, 
leader tenure should be shorter for a leader that prefers to manage elites through 
deliberation and delegation (constrained management style) and chooses not to create 
internationally oriented economic policies as compared to the same type leader that does 
create these economic policies. Second, leader tenure should be longer for a leader with a 
preference for managing through violence and corruption (unconstrained management 
style) and chooses not to create internationally oriented economic policies as compared to 
the same type leaders that do create these policies.  
The theory’s assumptions lead us to a hypothesis that the use of SEZs and SWFs 
should increase leader tenure, however, violent autocrats will be less likely to create these 
policies in the first place. When a violent autocrat creates these policies, the policies have 
                                                          
104 There is also some evidence that monarchies are more susceptible to revolutions, but the question here is about how 
the leader manages his ruling coalition. Questions about popular management are addressed in the next chapter. 
105 Dealing with seven subnational units in a confederacy is not an easily answerable point because as far as I know the 
UAE is the only modern nation-state that operates as a confederacy. It should also be pointed out that ever since the 2008 
economic crash, Abu Dhabi has exerted the most power in the UAE, so it is possible that the small country is not exactly 
a confederacy anymore. But these are questions for a different project. The case studies are not presented as definitive 
support for the theory. They are explanatory, exploratory, and supportive cases that exemplify “the facts on the ground.” 
Similar processes occur in all other non-democracies that I have studied. This is where we turn to look at the whole 
picture of leader survival and economic policies. 
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the possibility of increasing the likelihood of conflict between the ruler and the ruling 
coalition. Because the policies give the regime and the leader the same tools (credible 
commitments and independent arbiters), the likelihood of the regime winning a conflict is 
equal to chance or less than chance since the leader has more resources to begin with. This 
implies that statistically there could be null results for the effect of these policies on the 
tenure of a dictator that manages elites through violence and corruption. 
Since the factor score for management style ranges in time from 1981-2008, I have 
taken the universe of non-democratic leaders for that period as my sample. I did this by 
taking Svolik’s (2012) leader data (mostly taken from the ARCHIGOS data base – 
Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009) and compared it to my panel data on SEZs, SWFs, 
and the factor score. I then abbreviated everything down to one observation per leader 
using the following process.  
First, I calculated the exact number of days each leader was in power by subtracting 
Svolik’s (2012) “begin date” from the “end date.” Later I divide the number by 365 in order 
to get a score for years in office so the results are more readable. Next, if the leader created 
SEZs or SWFs during his tenure, I simply average the SEZ or SWF score over each year 
the leader was in power to create an average SEZ and SWF score. If nothing changes during 
the leader’s tenure, then the score remains the same, even if the leader inherited the 
economic policies. For the factor score, I created a variable for the score at the beginning 
of tenure, one for the year he exits, and an average for the entire term. I also went through 
and coded each dictator for 6 specific geographic regions in the world: Latin America & 
the Caribbean, Europe & Central Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East & North 
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Africa (MENA), South Asia, and East Asia & the Pacific.106 What results is 333 
observations of dictators for the time period.107  
Because this analysis is exploratory, the tests designed to evaluate these hypotheses 
are kept as simple as possible. First, in order to try and distinguish between autocratic 
management styles, I take the median factor score from the sum of factor scores on the last 
date a leader was in office. The last date is likely a better choice than the average because 
a majority of non-democratic leaders leave office with a worse score than they started out 
with. In practice, this exit factor score median is close to the average of averages and the 
median of average. The decided cutoff comes out to be -0.45. Lower or equal numbers are 
considered “unconstrained managers” (-1.5 to -0.45) and higher numbers are considered 
the “constrained managers” (-0.46 to +1.5).108 
Table 3.1 is by no means a definitive test of the implication that unconstrained 
managers are more likely to meet a violent extralegal exit, but it does provide some 
evidence that the exploratory factor analysis and cut point is working. The first thing we 
should notice is that there are many more constrained managers than there are 
unconstrained ones in this time period.  
Using the leader as the unit of analysis, only 34.12% (115 of 333) of all dictators 
between 1981 and 2008 practice unconstrained management of elites (what is called 
personalist at the regime level). Table 3.1 is subtotaled after exits that could roughly be 
considered extralegal (such as coups) and again after those that are roughly considered to 
                                                          
106 I include region because many scholars have exposed clear regional trends in the behavior and structure of 
dictatorships (Ezrow and Frantz 2011). This can be explored in more depth in future analyses. Because this is an 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) the modeling is kept as simple as possible on purpose. 
107 51 of these dictators drop out because they are still in power today. Another 50 have missing data in the exploratory 
factor score. This leaves us with 236 observations for analysis. 
108 In future work I will look at “close call” cases deeper, i.e. if the factor score is -0.47 or -0.43 or around there. 
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be legal (such as a resignation or election loss). A simple majority (58.76%) of leaders 
considered to be unconstrained leaders exited office through assassination, civil war, coup, 
foreign invaders, popular rebellions, and dying of old age or sickness while in office. The 
largest types of exits for unconstrained managers are coups (21), revolts (12), death (12), 
and step-downs (17).  
 
TABLE 3.1: Leader Exit by Management Style, 1981-2008 
 
                           Unconstrained Management Constrained Management 
 Frequency (Percentage) Frequency (Percentage) 
Assassination 2 (1.74) 2 (0.92) 
Civil War 6 (5.22) 4 (1.83) 
Coup 21 (18.26) 35 (16.06) 
Foreign 4 (3.48) 4 (1.83) 
Revolt 12 (10.43) 8 (3.67) 
Natural (death) 12 (10.43) 29 (13.30) 
Subtotal 57 (58.76*) (49.57) 82 (44.09*) (37.61) 
No Contest 3 (2.61) 3 (1.38) 
Resignation 3 (2.61) 15 (6.88) 
Stepdown 17 (14.78) 20 (9.17) 
Term Limit 5 (4.35) 27 (12.39) 
Interim  5 (4.35) 20 (9.17) 
Elections 3 (2.61) 9 (4.13) 
Consensus 2 (1.74) 5 (2.29) 
Other 2 (1.74) 5 (2.29) 
Subtotal 40 (41.24*) (34.78) 104 (55.91*) (47.71) 
Total Exited 97* (100*) 186* (100*) 
In Power Today 18 (15.65) 32 (14.68) 
Totals 115  (100.00) 218 (100.00) 
Source: Svolik (2012) and author’s research. Note: Established is a factor score less than or equal  
to -0.45, the median score for all autocrats in the time period. Contested autocrats are those with a  
factor score greater than -0.45. *=percentages taken from total exited. 
 
 
Out of 218 constrained managers, a simple majority (55.91%) of those that exited 
power did so through roughly non-violent means such as elections (9), serving as interim 
leaders (20), resignations (15) and term limits (27). These exits more closely reflect what 
is generally referred to as institutionalized turnover and is expected of constrained autocrats 
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that manage through deliberation and delegation. This all falls generally in line with the 
expectations of the theory and gives hope for future iterations of this approach to analyzing 
dictators and dictatorships. However, one should note that no single type experiences solely 
one type of exit.109  
Some interesting trends appear when looking at leaders compared to their SEZ 
score. Table 3.2 displays cross tabulations of leader exit by type of leader and SEZ score 
at exit. The first thing to note, which is not in the table, is that unconstrained managers in 
the sample never reach the highest value of SEZ program (6), only 2 of 115 reach the 
second highest score of 5, and only 3 of 115 reach the third highest score of 4.110 Also, 
constrained managers are very unlikely to have an SEZ score of 1 (not displayed in the 
table). In fact, only one constrained type manager in the sample exits with a SEZ score of 
1 (Ortega in Nicaragua). Recall that this score of 1 means that the regime has passed a SEZ 
law, but has not physically built an operational one yet. There are 8 unconstrained 
managers that exit with the specific SEZ score of 1. This indicates that constrained leaders 
are likely more credible than unconstrained leaders, meaning that they follow through on 
their promises.111 It also provides some evidence that unconstrained managers are more 
likely to undermine or delegitimize anything that may shorten or weaken their rule. 
Furthermore, among constrained managers during this time period, none with a SEZ 
score higher than zero exited by assassination or civil war. Only one constrained leader 
with a SEZ score higher than zero exited by foreign intervention (Noriega). In sum, what 
Table 3.2 tells us about constrained leaders that manage elites through deliberation and 
                                                          
109 This does not diminish the explanatory power of the factor score, rather it reminds of its nuance and the reasons why 
we should probably not be using blunt categorical dummy variables as typologies. 
110 Compared to contested autocrats, out of 218, 4 reach SEZ=6, 11 reach SEZ=5, 19 reach SEZ=4. 
111 This would be a good area to explore audience costs theories in future research. 
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delegation in this sample is that those that do not have SEZs, or even an SEZ law, face a 
probability of chance (0.50) that they will meet a violent removal or a non-violent removal 
from office. Those constrained managers that have any sort of SEZ program have a greater 
likelihood of exiting office with their head still attached and functioning (68%) while only 
32% of contested leaders with a SEZ program face violent removal. 
 
 
TABLE 3.2: Leader Exit by Type and SEZ score, 1981-2008 
                                           Unconstrained                        Constrained 
 SEZ>0 SEZ=0 SEZ>0 SEZ=0 
Assassination 2 0 0 2 
Civil War 1 5 0 4 
Coup 5 16 5 30 
Foreign 1 3 1 3 
Revolt 3 9 2 6 
Natural (death) 2 10 11 18 
“Violent” Subtotal* 14 (42%)* 43 (67%)* 19 (32%)* 63 (50%)* 
No Contest 1 2 3 0 
Resignation 1 2 11 4 
Stepdown 8 9 8 12 
Term Limit 5 0 6 21 
Interim  4 1 5 15 
Elections 0 3 4 5 
Consensus 0 2 1 4 
Other 0 2 2 3 
“Non-violent” Subtotal* 19 (58%)* 21 (33%)* 40 (68%)* 64 (50%)* 
Total Exited* 33 (85%) 64 (84%) 59 (71%) 127 (94%) 
In Power 6 (15%) 12 (16%) 25 (30%) 8 (6%) 
Total 39 (100%) 76 (100%) 83 (100%) 135 (100%) 
* = Subtotal percentages are calculated from the total exited. Note: Non-violent and violent are in  
       quotations because they are definitively mutually exclusive. Elections can be violent and revolts  
       can be non-violent. 
 
In comparison, unconstrained leaders that manage their elites through corruption 
and violence in the sample with a SEZ score of zero face violent removal at 67% (non-
violent at 33%), whereas the same type rulers that have any size of SEZ program face a 
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violent removal at 42% and a non-violent removal at 58%. Among unconstrained rulers 
with SEZs, two exited by assassination (Sadat – Egypt and Rahman – Bangladesh) and one 
by civil war (Doe – Sierra Leone). It should be noted that these tables tell us very little 
(actually nothing) about time or the effects of time. It should also be noted that these tables 
are not arguing that SEZs are the primary cause of the type of leader exit. Rather, the factor 
score is theorized to have the biggest effect on leader exits.  
To design a test of the general hypothesis that these economic policies affect leader 
tenure (not necessarily exit), I use the data described above to do some simple OLS 
estimations on the continuous outcome variable of time in office.112 Table 3.3 displays the 
results. I subset the sample because we theoretically expect different things to be occurring 
in different sets.113 The ruling coalition will behave differently depending on what type of 
manager they perceive their own autocrat to be. I include a set of regional indicators to 
account for regional variation. The unit of analysis is each individual dictator that held 
office at some point between 1981 and 2008. The outcome variable is years in office, which 
is calculated by taking the total number of days in office and dividing by 365. The special 
economic zones variable is the 0-6 indicator explained in Chapter 2, however, if the SEZ 
score changed during the leader’s tenure, I use the average over all years in office. The 
sovereign wealth fund score is a binary indicator of the presence of a SWF – if it was 
created during a leader’s tenure I take the average.  
                                                          
112 Diagnostics are available upon request. There were some slight problems, but after correcting the same results were 
obtained. Therefore I left most variables untransformed to make interpretation easier. Duration models are presented after 
OLS and all basically point in the same direction (see below). OLS is just the simplest and works because the transformed 
outcome variable is true continuous variable. It also highlights the “management trap” better. 
113 Managers above the cut point manage through deliberation and delegation, those below manage through violence and 
corruption, two distinct processes. 
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The outcome is interesting. It also falls squarely within the assumptions of the 
theory. It seems that on the leader level, the use of these economic policies have no 
significant effect on time in office for constrained managers but the coefficient is in the 
right direction (positive) and weak, which is what the theory predicts. However, we find 
that for a one unit increase in the factor score (i.e. becoming more violent and corrupt), an 
unconstrained autocrat can expect to survive almost a full decade longer than staying where 
he is (assuming everything is specified correctly and this sample is representative of the 
universe of dictators).  
This finding exemplifies the trap that unconstrained managers find themselves in 
and possibly explains why they end up resorting to violence. If an unconstrained dictator 
worked to be less violent and corrupt enough to change his factor score from -0.45, the 
cutoff point, to +0.45, he would cease to be an unconstrained manager and will become a 
constrained manager that will likely face institutional turnover, or loss of office. But what 
is really interesting is that for a one unit increase in the level of SEZs, an established 
dictator can expect to survive almost 2 years less than if he would have held SEZs constant, 
typically at zero.  
This creates a trap, where the unconstrained manager much choose between 
becoming more violent and corrupt or developing a management style of deliberation and 
delegation. If he does the former, he faces outright internal rebellion or foreign intervention 
or nothing (which we will assume for now all happen with a probability of chance). If he 
does the latter he faces institutional turnover. Any way the unconstrained manager looks at 
a situation involving internationally oriented economic policies, he faces some higher 
probability of losing office, hence the trap. 
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                  TABLE 3.3: OLS Estimates of Predicted Dictator Years in Office, 1981-2008 
 (1) (2) 
 Constrained 
Dictators 
Unconstrained 
Dictators 
VARIABLES Years in Office Years in office 
   
Management Factor 3.380 9.459** 
 (3.376) (3.797) 
Special Economic Zones 0.410 -1.656** 
 (0.583) (0.768) 
Sovereign Wealth Funds 1.744 3.600 
 (2.558) (3.997) 
2. Europe & Central Asia 3.504 5.061 
 (4.213) (4.580) 
3. Sub-Saharan Africa 3.151 7.553** 
 (3.326) (3.078) 
4. Middle East & North Africa 9.461** 16.98*** 
 (3.716) (4.429) 
5. South Asia -2.470 3.443 
 (3.628) (3.640) 
6. East Asia & Pacific -0.211 6.861 
 (2.570) (4.605) 
Constant 6.610** 15.07*** 
 (2.795) (4.265) 
   
Observations 119 117 
   
Note: Establishment score ranges from -1.5 to + 1.5. Cutoff for subsets 
is taken as the median score amongst the universe of dictators from  
1981-2008, at -0.45. Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This authoritarian “bad manager trap” finding provides support for the theoretical 
argument that when (and if) an unconstrained manager creates these economic policies, the 
costs of conflict to the manager (i.e. removing coalition members) increase as they decrease 
for the regime, making the likelihood of conflict between the two higher. This is visualized 
in Figure 3.6 which plots the predicted years in office for unconstrained and constrained 
management styles by level of SEZ program. The confidence intervals around the predicted 
unconstrained manager tenure are very wide because very few of these dictators build large 
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SEZ programs, just as the theory predicts. Maybe this is because violent leaders 
intrinsically know that these policies will weaken their rule because they already know that 
the foundations of authoritarian rule are mostly economic, or perhaps unconstrained 
autocrats that share power through economic policies are merely removed from power 
before the policies ever grow into anything large. 
 
FIGURE 3.6: Predicted Leader Years in Office 
 
The confidence intervals in Figure 3.6 connect between SEZ levels of 4 and 6. 
These post estimations are from two separate models, but I interpret this to mean that 
possibly at these high levels of SEZ program is where leadership styles may be forced to 
transition, but this will have to be addressed in future research. Of course, in Table 3.3 we 
also see that the regions of MENA and sub-Saharan Africa are the most full of leaders with 
unconstrained management styles. This has been well established in many studies on 
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personalism in Africa and the Middle East due to the highly significant coefficient in model 
2. Another thing to point out is that on the leader level, constrained managers, who are 
expected to have shorter survival rates because they tend towards institutional turnover 
(and they are shorter, between 8 and 12 years), do increase in their predicted tenure by level 
of SEZ program. Interestingly enough, the maximum predicted tenure for contested 
autocrats is not much longer than average term limits in general (typically 2, 5-7 year terms 
in non-democratic presidential and semi-presidential systems).114  
To be sure that the finding here are robust, I estimate two different survival models 
better suited at capturing the element of time. The models only include a limited number 
of variables that have already been described.115 Survival models were developed in 
biostatistics to evaluate the effects of drugs on terminally ill patients over time. The models 
calculate a hazard and a survival function, which estimate the increasing risks or the 
decreasing likelihood of survival, respectively. The models are very prone to specification 
errors and distributional errors. Table 3.4 displays the results of a Weibull distribution 
survival model and Cox-proportional hazards model (a lognormal distribution gives the 
same results).116 The table displays coefficients rather than hazard ratios, but one can tell 
from the direction and significance what is happening.  
Negative coefficients represent a hazard ratio less than 1 – a decreasing hazard in 
which the leader becomes less likely to exit. Positive coefficients represent a hazard ratio 
                                                          
114 Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) were not significant in any of the models. This is likely because they are relatively 
rare, especially during this time period. 
115 This is done because of the exploratory nature of this chapter and more variable will be added in the future to gain 
better fit. 
116 The Weibull distribution assumes that hazard rates change over time in either direction and is generally considered to 
be the best fit to many questions in political science.  
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greater than 1 – meaning an increasing hazard over time. SEZs reduce the risk of loss of 
office significantly and management style increases risk of losing office significantly.  
 
                                  TABLE 3.4 Leader Survival 
 (1) (2) 
   
 Weibull Cox 
VARIABLES   
   
SEZs 0.876*** 0.837*** 
 (0.042) (0.043) 
Management 1.327** 1.369** 
 (0.181) (0.187) 
SWFs 0.915 0.888 
 (0.119) (0.129) 
Constant 24.65*** 0.970*** 
 (1.387) (0.055) 
   
Observations 227 227 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                           Note: Table displays hazard ratios, not the traditional coefficients.  
                                           A negative coefficient or a less than 1 hazard ratio means that  
                                           subjects experience less of a hazard compared to a reference group.  
                                           A positive coefficient or a hazard ratio larger than 1 means that a  
                                           subject experiences more of a hazard from the treatment compared  
                                           to the reference. 
 
  
Figure 3.7 plots out the survival function by type of management and sizes of SEZ 
programs. There is a significant increase in the length of predicted survival for leaders with 
a constrained management style when they have large SEZ programs as compared to other 
constrained and unconstrained leaders, which supports the hypothesis. However, there 
appears to be no significant difference between leaders with an unconstrained management 
style and SEZs or no SEZs. Unconstrained managers are estimated in the graph at a SEZ 
level of 3. This is because empirically we observe almost no unconstrained leaders with an 
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SEZ program larger than 3. If estimated at the level of 6 (which we do not observe 
empirically, the unconstrained management type is predicted to survive about the same 
amount of time as a constrained manager at that level. Kaplan Myer survival estimates are 
in Appendix C.  
 
                                              FIGURE 3.7 Survival Post-Estimation
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CHAPTER 4. POPULAR MANAGEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
General populations in dictatorships are largely presented as having little or no 
agency due to their disenfranchisement or lack of a legitimate opposition. Some may call 
them subjects rather than citizens. Others refer to them as the residents and largely exclude 
them analysis (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003). Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) bring the 
people into the picture by arguing that economic inequality can have effects on the 
prospects of the development of dictatorships and democracies, but most analyses center 
disproportionately on elites.  
It is difficult to deny that general populations play an important role in authoritarian 
rule. Ask former Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovych living in self-imposed exile in 
Russia, former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak living in legal limbo in a military 
hospital, former Tunisian President Ben Ali living in exile in Saudi Arabia, or the disputed 
Yemeni President Mansour Hadi living in exile in Saudi Arabia.117 Alternatively, one could 
also ask Turkish President Recep Erdogan about the importance of people after his calls to 
supporters through social media helped thwart an attempted military coup in 2016.  
People have power. Recent studies have found that not only is non-violent 
resistance often more effective than outright violent rebellion, but it only takes 
approximately 3.5% of a national population committed to nonviolent resistance in order 
                                                          
117 The point is that the list is extensive and these are all rulers that are still alive. Dead ones that might appreciate the 
power of people would include Serbian President Slobodan Milošević convicted of war crimes and died in prison in The 
Hague or Augusto Pinochet voted out of his Chilean dictatorship in a disastrous 1988 miscalculation of public opinion.  
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to topple a dictator (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). This means that to survive, 
authoritarian regimes must devise a way to fragment, repress, and harness the power of 
people all at the same time. Remember, the concept of popular management here is not the 
classical conception of violent repression or coercion, it is the rational use of economic 
policies to limit or exclude negative externalities from affecting the largest number of those 
residing outside of the ruling coalition during the process of liberalization. Popular 
management in this sense is inducing loyalty through incentive structures and reducing 
opposition through a political monopoly on the process of liberalization.118  
Violence and repression are constants within all dictatorships. Indeed, to be fair, it 
is a constant in all governments in general across all times and spaces. Of course it exists 
at different levels in different states, but the theory and analysis here treats violent 
repression as a constant.119 However, we should briefly consider other forms of repression. 
The use of economic policy as a form of repression is not only a strange idea, but highly 
unlikely to succeed in a society that enjoys any level of economic development other than 
abject poverty. For example, in Saudi Arabia two-thirds of employees work in the public 
sector (Kerr 2016). King Salman is unlikely to convince many Saudi nationals to comply 
with his decrees or become more loyal by withdrawing large public sector salaries, housing, 
and car allowances. This is more likely to incentivize rebellion. However, in Swaziland 
where 27 percent of the population is infected with HIV, life expectancy is 49 years, and 
                                                          
118 In the previous sentence, replace opposition with “bad behavior,” political monopoly with “authority,” liberalization 
with “process of becoming an adult,” and most parents would easily recognize this as, well, parenting. In essence this is 
the sense of control meant here, but on a different level, one that involves armies and police and economies of scale. It is 
historically common for people to refer to their own dictators as “fathers.” Founders of all sorts of systems are often 
called “fathers” as well. This conception of political control is deeply rooted in the development of all systems of 
governance. 
119 Sort of. Certain forms of political violence are calculated into the establishment score in Chapter 2, so technically it 
is included in the later analyses, but theoretically it is treated as a constant. See below. 
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50 percent of the population lives on less than two dollars a day, King Mswati III lowers 
public sector wages with no immediate effect.  
Therefore, even though violence and repression are constants within all 
dictatorships, due to the ineffectiveness of economic policy as a form of repression in poor 
and rich dictatorships, here I will focus on how economic policy can prevent rebellion 
through harnessing economic expectations and capabilities and encouraging loyalty 
through labor fragmentation and sunk investments in the pursuit of economic gain. We 
should not expect that regimes create SEZs or SWFs with the expressed intent of increasing 
levels of political control, although it is possible (but it would seem a little silly). They 
likely do it to encourage FDI and development. However, the increased loyalty and control 
(popular management) theorized to result is most likely a side-effect of the policies. The 
effect begins with the regime’s desire to control any possible negative externality that may 
stem from the policy.  
The most peaceful way to encourage complicity in large societal groups is to 
manage the relative distance between perceived value expectations and value capabilities 
(Gurr 1970). This is the theory of relative deprivation. Values is a vague concept that can 
mean a number of things. For the purposes of this analysis I will only briefly explore 
political values before moving to economic values. In a dictatorship, political expectations 
will likely stay low because the autocratic regime’s central goal is to maintain a monopoly 
on power, and by definition, the people in autocracies lack certain forms of political agency 
such as voting, free press, or various other civil liberties (but this does not mean that the 
people have no political agency). In other words the costs of exit and voice (political 
participation) are very high. Political expectations will likely stay low because of these 
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high costs, so regimes must manage political capabilities. This is relatively easily done 
through censorship, surveillance, and repressive violence and is achieved at varying levels 
of depravity dependent upon the ruler’s personality and the role of the military in the 
regime and other various structural factors like wealth, geography and demography. In 
contrast, economic value expectations will typically tend to rise in all societies due to the 
general nature of economics (i.e. expansion, inflation, comparative advantage, etc.) and the 
growth of transport technology and global communications networks that increase local 
knowledge of neighboring and far flung economies.    
Rising economic value expectations requires the regime to carefully increase 
economic capabilities in order manage the margin between the two. If expectations outstrip 
capabilities too far (the relative deprivation gap), people become frustrated and one 
external cue, such as a fruit vendor self-immolating (Tunisia – the Arab Spring 2011), can 
fuel a frustration to anger cycle in the populace capable of toppling the regime. One way 
to manage economic expectations is to use propaganda, censorship, and fake data, but these 
are short term solutions that can backfire – especially in the information age. A more 
concrete approach to managing the expectations gap would be to limit access to 
employment and increasing economic activity to small geographic areas, therefore 
reducing a potentially deprived population into smaller groups. Once these limited access 
areas are created, the people within and around them can be closely monitored, surveilled, 
censored, and most importantly, bargained with in a more private manner – if necessary. 
Figure 4.1 on the next page is a graphic depiction of how this works. 
The private bargains a regime can make with residents within a controlled 
geographic area (Areas A & B in Figure 4.1) act to manage economic capabilities and work 
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to prevent economic expectations from travelling to groups outside of the area. However, 
it is unlikely that the regime can completely stop economic expectations from rising 
because they are constantly rising and, well, people talk, even in dictatorships. When 
people outside hear of rising economic capabilities within the geographically limited 
economic area, this knowledge increases the outsiders’ economic expectations and creates 
a relative deprivation gap. When these outsiders, such as the dissatisfied group in Figure 
4.1, become frustrated they will choose the less costly option of moving closer to the 
economic area before the extremely costly option of rebellion. This labor fragmentation 
helps alleviate the problem of authoritarian control whether there is a political party 
associated with the regime or not. It fragments the dissatisfied populations into smaller and 
more easily marginalized groups. 
Laborers, skilled workers, and managers will migrate to the more developed areas 
in search of economic gain when labor is fragmented by purposively uneven development. 
This migration represents a sunk investment in the success of the limited access economic 
policy. Moving can be risky, especially where there is uncertainty and a lack of assured 
forms of political agency. The delayed incentive structure of employment in one of these 
economic areas encourages loyalty to the regime that created it, for if the policy does not 
succeed, the worker will not only lose employment, but all the costs associated with the 
move – including monetary, familial, and interpersonal costs as well.  
For the laborers that already live within or around the area (Areas A & B), they will 
remain fiercely loyal and will likely marginalize all coming migrants out of their own self-
interest, but they will especially attack those that may wish to do harm to the new policy 
or organize against it in some way. They have something special within their special 
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economic zone and they want to keep it that way, whether or not a political party or the 
military is involved. This process works where labor pools are native to the regime and 
those where laborers are imported from abroad. The process is generally apolitical, yet it 
generates political control through popular management even when that is not the 
expressed intention. It does so uniquely in dictatorships due to miserable atmosphere of 
authoritarian rule.120 
 
 
FIGURE 4.1 Graphic Depiction of Labor Fragmentation  
 
 
SEZs are a prime example of how authoritarian regimes fragment a labor pool. 
SWFs are involved in the process because these funds are often used to create SEZs, but 
they are not directly involved. The remainder of Chapter 4 clearly states the theory and 
gives specific examples of this process in a case study. Chapter 4 concludes with an 
empirical examination of the effects of SEZs and SWFs on regime longevity. The findings 
                                                          
120 For more information on ways in which SEZs are different in democracies, see Moberg 2015 or Jenkins et al 2014. 
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indicate that these policies, especially SEZs, significantly extend the life of the regime in 
dictatorships regardless of the presence of a political party or leader management style.  
Theory: 
 What follows is a general stylized argument built from the previous discussions. It 
is important to note that this chapter takes the full regime as the unit of analysis, not the 
leader. When a non-democratic regime announces its intentions to build a place where 
foreign companies will come set up and jobs will be available, the people listen. They 
instinctively know that the decision represents an opportunity. A laborer in an authoritarian 
economy has little in the sense of rights or protections, but they still are an integral part to 
the regime’s encompassing interest (Olson 1993). After all, in order to govern, one must 
have a population to govern. Most countries have generally uneven levels of development 
around the country. The areas that are less developed tend to be areas where opposition 
groups will rise – or, conversely the area could be less developed precisely because it 
contains historically rebellious groups. This could also be due to climate, geography, or 
any other number of factors. The point is that opposition groups reside within these less 
developed areas because in these areas the relative deprivation gap (i.e. the relative distance 
between economic expectations and economic capabilities) is larger than in more 
developed areas.  
By announcing plans to build a special economic zone (SEZ) in a specific 
geographically delineated area where more employment will be available, the regime 
effectively distracts disgruntled laborers from their political and economic plight. The 
laborer knows that he has little agency on his own to change the politics in a non-
democratic regime, so he will need to join large groups of other unhappy workers to pool 
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enough agency to rebel against the regime. Faced with the opportunity costs of not moving 
to or near the SEZ to look for better employment, he will choose to go and work at the SEZ 
over staying home and protesting or rebelling (these are examples of negative 
externalities). The costs of protesting or rebelling in a dictatorship are usually prison or 
death…and sometimes worse. In 2015 Saudi Arabia arrested a 17 year old ostensibly for 
participating in a small peaceful protest and being the son of a Shiite cleric. He was 
sentenced to death by beheading in the public square followed by crucifixion to display his 
dead body as warning to others.121 
 The regime benefits handsomely from the use of SEZs in many ways. First, they 
get specific choice on the exact geographic coordinates within which economic 
liberalization will take place. Typically, the regime will select an area based on two factors, 
1) the geographic landscape – such as a natural deep port or a border crossing and 2) the 
relative loyalty of the labor pool in the specific area. For example, if there is a natural deep 
port but very few people live there, the regime will choose this port for an SEZ. In a 
landlocked state, such as Belarus, the regime will choose to locate SEZs either along 
natural trade routes, in capital cities where the regime has the most capacity and presence, 
or a combination of both. Specific choice of location by the regime (a form of economic 
segregation) also means that the regime will continue to collect revenues from the broader 
economy, creating a slow stable and conservative process that assuredly will minimize any 
negative externalities from the liberalization policy.122 
                                                          
121 His name is Ali Mohammed al-Nimr and he is still on death row today at the age of 22 waiting to be beheaded and 
crucified. There is a small international effort to try and have him freed. 
122 This is one of the core reasons why democracy is a sufficient but not necessary condition for capitalism. This topic 
is discussed in other writings by the author.  
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The regime also benefits from foreign investment, increased employment, 
technology transfer, and many other things listed in Chapter 2. A regime always retains the 
option to close down a SEZ and kill the liberalization experiment at any time for any 
reason. After all, an authoritarian regime maintains a monopoly on power. This geographic 
quarantine contains “spiritual contamination” within the zone and reduces the possibility 
of negative externalities from the process of liberalization spreading too far beyond the 
perimeter of the SEZ before they can be managed. Furthermore, the decision of the laborer 
to pursue employment in an SEZ rather than rebel represents a sunk investment by the 
laborer into the success of the policy and by extension the regime.  
By forgoing rebellion, the laborer makes a costly investment in looking for better 
economic opportunities near the zone. By focusing on improving his own economic status 
through the prescribed policy introduced by the regime (a SEZ in this case), the laborer 
consciously or subconsciously increases his or her personal loyalty to the regime by 
attaching the expected utility of employment in the zone to the premise for success of the 
zone – regime survival.     
However, the entire theory is based on the premise, or assumption, that the regime 
is able to credibly commit to building an SEZ and actually attract firms that will employ 
the people. Based on previous discussions, we know that this premise will not hold across 
all non-democratic regimes. Remember that we specified that leaders that prefer to manage 
their elites in an unconstrained style will work to destabilize power-sharing arrangements 
in his quest to stay in office and in fact, we saw in Chapter 3 that no ruler of this type ever 
succeeds in creating large successful zones. Ruling coalitions that support an unconstrained 
autocrat will do the bare minimum necessary to retain their position in the regime, meaning 
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that at the regime level, those that are led by an unconstrained manager will be less likely 
to succeed at creating effective zones.  
Assuming that the assertion that SEZs represent a way to deliberate and delegate 
among elites, no regime led by an unconstrained autocrat can credibly commit to the people 
to build a large successful SEZ program. This means that the above theory will mostly 
apply to regimes that are led by constrained managers. This may make it seem that SEZs 
will not increase regime survival in regimes led by an unconstrained autocrat, but this is 
not the case. Recall in Chapter 3 that the theory is agnostic to who will win in the event of 
conflict between the regime and the ruler. Just because a ruler is assassinated or steps down 
(exits), or even if the regime is purged of disloyal actors, this does not mean that the regime 
dies. Often times the ruling coalition can and does appoint a successor and maintain some 
continuity in the ruling coalition and often times the leader successfully replaces or does 
without those that he purges. In this sense, it is possible that SEZs extend the rule of 
regimes led by an unconstrained manager precisely because the low cost of conflict makes 
it more likely that the regime can toss out a bad leader and the leader can remove bad 
eggs.123 
Assumptions: 
 The theory assumes that laborers in a non-democratic society are utility maximizers 
and treats them as if all workers are the same. Of course no labor pool makes decisions as 
a single unit, but it is clearly possible. The theory speaks of individual laborers for clarity, 
but in reality labor pools in all countries organize themselves along various lines and 
                                                          
123 However, this process leads to a logical trap where we do not know at which point an regime that is successful at 
removing its leader becomes a regime led by a constrained autocrat. I am confident that this can be worked out 
empirically, but data and time limitations make it difficult at this point in time. 
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subdivisions and will typically follow the directives of the leaders of these divisions. This 
is the whole idea behind labor unions, guilds, and professional associations.  
The theory further assumes that the regime acts as a unitary actor that takes on the 
character of its leader. While this assumption is not necessarily realistic, it is helpful for 
this particular question of popular management. When it comes to managing a large 
population, truly no dictator rules alone. In the effort to exert control (or limit negative 
externalities), the regime must act as whole or surely whatever opposition groups that do 
exist will seize upon and exploit any perceived divisions between the dictator and his ruling 
coalition. Now, this does not mean that all regimes act the same way or even always 
function as rational utility maximizers. But it is clearly possible that a leader can surround 
himself with like-minded advisors.  
The theory assumes that regimes led by an unconstrained manager will typically 
wipe away the prospects of success with an SEZ before the laborers even have a chance to 
make a choice to move there. Likely, the people (laborers) will already know this and note 
the regime’s decision to build an SEZ as not credible, hence stopping the process of 
management through economic policies before it even starts. This is likely one of the 
reasons why unconstrained autocrats tend to rely on violent repression for popular 
management – they fail to produce it through economic policies.  
 The theory also assumes that there are geographically diverse groups of laborers 
that are looking for better economic opportunities. This assumption is not so controversial, 
but it becomes difficult to generalize when applying it to very geographically small 
authoritarian states such as the U.A.E. and its constituent Emirates. This is elaborated upon 
in the following subsection on labor fragmentation.  
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There is also a built in assumption of labor mobility. While it is true that domestic 
mobility is typically more restricted in non-democratic states, the global phenomenon of 
economic migration shows us that when individuals feel that they have a better economic 
opportunity in a different geographic location they will do just about anything to get there, 
regardless of how high the wall is or how many laws there are against it. This assumption 
gets to the heart of why management through economic policy is likely more effective than 
traditional conceptions of control such as violent repression – i.e. “the economic 
foundations of authoritarian rule.”  
Hypotheses: 
 The hypothesis that flows naturally from the theory and its assumptions is that SEZs 
will increase regime longevity through the mechanisms of labor fragmentation and sunk 
investments. In regimes managed by an unconstrained ruler, the addition of SEZs provide 
a possible way in which to throw him out and possibly replace him with a leader prepared 
to share power, but we cannot know who will win (the leader or the regime). In all regime 
and management style configurations, SEZs will increase political control through 
minimizing negative externalities and thus extend regime survival.  
 
4.1 LABOR FRAGMENTATION 
 
Labor fragmentation refers to the strategic use of geographically dispersed labor 
markets. In the international business literature, the term fragmentation has been used to 
describe the splitting up of production processes in globalization. By fragmenting an 
integrated production process, one “opens up new possibilities for exploiting gains from 
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specialization” (Jones and Kierzkowski 2000). Here, by fragmenting the process by which 
laborers look for better economic opportunities, authoritarian regimes are able to exploit 
gains from labor specialization even if specialization means moving from subsistence 
agriculture to garment manufacturing. In developing countries, the people often are the 
integrated production process. The building of a SEZ represents the creation of new labor 
market that is geographically limited and can entail any number or level of requisite labor 
capabilities. The opening up of these labor markets provides the regime with an opportunity 
to exploit gains in connection with the sunk investments required to work within the zones. 
Labor fragmentation comes in two varieties, one involving domestic labor markets 
and one involving foreign labor markets. I will first discuss the domestic variety, which 
tends to be used in geographically larger countries where there is a larger labor pool, and 
then I will discuss the foreign variety, which tends to be used in geographically smaller 
countries with smaller domestic labor pools.  
In domestic labor fragmentation in a large country, the non-democratic regime will 
use policy to concentrate economic development and activity in specific areas close to 1) 
a desirable geography (a deep port, border crossing, or population center) and 2) in close 
proximity to a preferred labor pool. The reasoning behind the criteria of a strategic 
geographic location, like a port, a border crossing, or an airport, is pretty straightforward. 
These are the areas that allow the most traffic of goods. The preferred labor pool merely 
means that the regime feels comfortable with the people of a certain region immediately 
having more economic opportunity. This assumption stems from the idea that autocratic 
regimes are naturally conservative, but the general idea can travel anywhere, including 
democracies. For example, if a Republican Party president in the US decided to give a 
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series of subsidies or economic packages to specific geographic entities in the US, it is 
highly unlikely that the first entity to receive it would be California, or Vermont, or any 
other Democratic Party stronghold. The same and opposite would be true for any 
Democratic Party president of the US.  
Democrats (politicians in a large winning-coalition democracy) must compete for 
power through providing good policy that benefits everyone, or public goods (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al 2003). Authoritarians compete for power by bribing their smaller coalitions 
with economic goods that keep them loyal, or private goods. Therefore, authoritarians in 
power, like any regime with a monopoly on power, generally like the status quo and are 
cautious about anything that may change it, especially something that could increase the 
size of its winning coalition and dwindle the amount of private goods available to buy them 
off. Autocratic regimes know that if they undertook a complete macroeconomic 
liberalization plan and increased the living standards of everyone in the country they would 
de facto also increase the capabilities of the regime’s opposition, and there are opposition 
groups in every country waiting for those opportunities. 
Labor fragmentation is a conservative way of increasing economic activity while 
maintaining a monopoly on political power. In large countries it works through the 
geographic mechanism of it. By increasing employment, skills, and benefits in one area, 
the regime sets off a sort of demonstration effect to the other labor pools that are less 
developed or may not be so friendly to the regime. The effects are exponential over time 
as success in one zone leads to the creation of more zones until there are so many zones 
that the economy becomes de facto liberalized. One could call this conservative 
liberalization, in the sense that the liberalization process is done slowly and with specific 
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geographic constraints in an effort to reduce or eliminate any possible negative externalities 
associated with liberalization.  
China is a great example. Not only was China one of the first enthusiastic non-
democratic adopters of SEZs, but it has leaned on the policy and expanded it so much that 
in some sense the entire economy has lurched towards complete liberalization. Wang 
(2013) uses a rare municipal-level Chinese data set on the development of SEZs in that 
country. While it is not known if the inferences are generalizable outside of China, the 
findings are instructive in understanding how labor fragmentation works. Wang (2013) 
finds that SEZs in China 1) increase FDI per capita in provinces where they are created, 2) 
SEZs do not crowd out domestic investment, and 3) they create significant increases in the 
wages of local workers relative to the cost of living. All three of these findings are 
consistent with the assumptions of my theory that SEZs increase a regime’s ability to 
manage its popularity through the reduction of negative externalities. 
Looking at Figures 4.2 and 4.3, one can see that whether it was intentional or not, 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chose to experiment with SEZs first only on the 
coastline near ports and where the majority ethnic Han Chinese live. Notice that even in 
2006, after 20 years of experimenting with SEZs, they had not spread into the troubled 
Tibetan areas. It is also interesting to note that in Figure 23, Wang (2013) counts Taiwan 
(or the Republic of China - ROC) seemingly as part of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC or mainland China). Furthermore, the SEZs did not show up in Taiwan until after 
they had had already spread to other ethnic areas on the mainland. Many of the SEZs in 
Taiwan do a lot of trading with mainland China.  
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FIGURE 4.2: Wang (2013) Development of SEZs in China over Time  
Note: Figure Reuse License#4063760734833 with Elsevier Publishers  
 
 
FIGURE 4.3: Ethnolinguistic Groups in China 
Note: Image reproduced under “fair use” doctrine.  
Originally published by Rand McNally & Co. 
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The second variety of labor fragmentation occurs in a geographically small state 
and is one of tapping foreign labor markets in order to spur a diversification development 
model focused on foreign investment. Here, the non-democratic regime will ship in 
workers from foreign countries in order to build infrastructure aimed at attracting a more 
diverse set of foreign investors with the hopes of diversifying the economy. The UAE is a 
great example. The UAE inhabits about 32,300 square miles with 819 miles of coastline.124 
China, in contrast, sits on around 3.71 million square miles with about 9,000 miles of 
coastline. This is roughly the equivalent of comparing the size of the US State of South 
Carolina to the entire territorial space of the United States of America. The UAE and China 
were both early and enthusiastic adopters of SEZ programs.  
With labor fragmentation in a geographically small state, the state is still able to 
exploit specialization and attract laborers through the geographic nature of SEZs, however, 
what is different is that they recruit laborers from overseas. The regime still chooses the 
geographic location of the SEZ and they also choose which labor pools to recruit from. In 
these small geographic country examples it is easier to see clearly the manner in which 
regimes choose friendly labor pools to come and work in SEZs. Table 4.1 shows the 
unofficial demographic breakdown of the UAE (the confederacy does not publish public 
demographics). Only 11% of all people living in the UAE are actually Emirati (Snoj 2015). 
The overwhelming majority are South Asian laborers. Furthermore 70% of all people 
residing in the UAE are male (which is another issue that the UAE shares in common with 
China).  
                                                          
124 The coast was referred to periodically as the “Pirate Coast” and then later the “Trucial Coast” once the British signed 
truces with the local tribes that kept raiding East India Co. ships. After the discovery of oil in the 1960s, the tribes began 
pushing for independence and achieved recognition as the UAE in 1972. See Fuller (2010) for an in-depth qualitative 
case study. 
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Most of the South Asian workers in the UAE are low-skill immigrant workers, 
much as the theory of labor fragmentation explains. These workers are selected from 
populations that are thought by the regime to be “friendly” or at a minimum will bring with 
them the fewest negative externalities. Notice, for instance how low the geographically 
close Iranian population is or that, despite all of its rhetoric, there are very few Palestinian 
(or even Arab) workers in the United “Arab” Emirates. One could imagine that the regime 
feels safer with foreign workers that are not directly connected to the state’s international 
and regional conflicts and ones that are of a different ethnicity (i.e. “look different”) than 
the small national population. 
 
                                      TABLE 4.1: Demographic Breakdown of UAE 
Nationality Percentage 
India 28% 
Pakistan 13% 
Emirati (UAE) 11% 
Bangladesh 7% 
Philippines 6% 
Iran 5% 
Egypt 4% 
Nepal 3% 
Sri Lanka 3% 
China 2% 
All Other 18% 
Total 100% 
                                                         Source: Snoj (2015) – BQ Magazine 
 
As said previously, the UAE government does not actually publish statistics on 
nationality, but these numbers roughly match what has been estimated by numerous other 
sources. The above table (Snoj 2015) was made by visiting the diplomatic consulate for 
each country and asking for an estimate. Foreign employers in the UAE typically reside 
within a SEZ and are afforded different rights and operate under a different set of laws than 
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the rest of the country. For example, Western employers can apply for a license that allows 
them to consume alcohol and pork. There are separate beaches for Westerners and 
Muslims. Women in the UAE that are raped have no legal recourse other than to leave and 
file charges from a different country. If they go to the authorities they will be charged with 
extramarital sex and imprisoned according to Sharia Law. These examples are given to 
show the types of negative externalities that can occur within and around SEZs and how 
the regime is able to contain or limit them.  
                        
 
FIGURE 4.4 Collection of Posters Advertising Work in UAE and Qatar  
Note: Reprinted under the “fair use” doctrine. 
 
Gulf News reported in 2009 that one SEZ (JAFZA – Jebel Ali Free Zone) in one 
Emirate (Dubai) employed 169,000 people. Dubai had a total population of ~2 million in 
2009. There are around 30+ SEZs in the UAE, and this one in Dubai employs almost 10% 
of its population. Figure 4.2 displays a collection of advertisements in Malaysia and India 
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for jobs in the UAE and Qatar. There have been many accusations of these types of 
recruiters confiscating the passports of women and then selling them into slavery. 
 
4.2 SUNK INVESTMENTS 
 
Sunk investments refer to an individual’s willingness to invest time, money, and 
labor in the success of a macroeconomic policy like SEZs, despite the fact that there may 
be better opportunities out there. A very large body of work has shown that people will 
typically violate the assumption of economic rationality by permitting sunk costs (or non-
recoverable investments) to sway decision making. The basic idea that people faced with 
sure gains will be risk-averse and people faced with sure losses (a sunk investment) will be 
risk-acceptant is one of the key elements of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) 
and is used frequently in studying international relations (Levy 1992, 1997, McDermott 
1992).  
This effect is readily and easily found in purely economic transactions, especially 
gambling and insurance. However, the theory of sunk investments here is about more than 
just economic transactions. It is about laborers deciding to move across country, put in 
more effort, and marginalize competitors. Another line of the sunk costs literature branches 
over into psychology and applies sunk costs to personal involvement (Arkes and Blumer 
1985, Cuncha Jr. and Caldieraro 2008). All of the studies I have looked at find some 
evidence for “behavioral sunk-cost effects” through various forms of experiments, but most 
heavily qualify the findings by pointing out that everyone has a different metric for the 
economic value of behavior – i.e. I value “effort in finding employment” differently than 
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laborer X, but $1 is generally valued at $1 or close to it by most. A highly cited article in 
political science and international relations in the analysis of foreign policy decision 
making is Fearon’s “Tying hands versus sinking costs” piece (1997, cited 898 times as of 
March 2017). For Fearon though, sunk costs were financial and audience costs were 
behavioral. Here it is a mix of both also. 
The effect of sunk investments here is similar to how Svolik (2012) conceptualizes 
sunk investments through a party structure. With Svolik, people are convinced to join the 
political party and they then put in costly work up front, such as proselytizing, spying, 
ballot stuffing, or surveillance, and then continue to remain loyal to the regime because 
these sunk investments become sure losses if he walks away from the party. This 
explanation is more behavioral than financial, but Svolik notes that one reason the party 
member continues to sink investments and remain loyal to the party is for the delivery of 
future economic benefits. With economic policies, sunk investments arise among ordinary 
citizens through their own effort to better their own lot. People living in underdeveloped 
areas move in and around SEZs to find work. This move entails a sunk investment. Once 
they spend the money, time, and effort to move near an SEZ, that cost can only be recovered 
through continued support of the SEZs and continued work to make it better.  
The sunk investment encourages citizens to “buy in” to what the regime is trying 
to do at an early stage, therefore delaying the benefits of an increased standard of living to 
them and at the same time restructuring preferences so that individuals will be more likely 
to comply with other policies. This is a much more efficient approach to popular 
management than literally “buying off” everybody. It is much more beneficial to all actors 
than violent repression. Sunk costs work in tandem with labor fragmentation. They both 
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reduce the number of negative externalities a regime will likely face, thus increasing the 
levels of political control over the populace. 
 
4.3 AN EXAMPLE WITH SEZS – BREST SEZ (BELARUS) 
 
SEZs in Belarus are called FEZs or Free Economic Zones. They also have High 
Technology Parks (HTPs) and boast of a coming new “special economic zone” in 
conjunction with China. This specific SEZ is a pet project of President Xi Jingping of China 
and is slated to be the endpoint of his signature economic policy, the “One Belt, One Road” 
(OBOR). This proposed endpoint is referred to specifically as a “special economic zone,” 
but the zone’s actual name is the “China-Belarus Industrial Park Great Stone.” Is it a SEZ 
or an industrial park?125 I point this out because it highlights the difficulty in studying 
SEZs. One of the principal challenges is to find a way to classify the many different diverse 
forms that SEZs take and the cascade of names assigned to them. Without being able to 
personally look at each SEZ it is difficult to design a precise way of measuring them. This 
is why the next step in this project is to collect the geographic coordinates of all SEZs and 
map them out in a GIS (geographic information systems).  
The way I get around this in the data is by looking at the incentive structures within 
zones of any type of name to see if they fall within the World Bank definition of an SEZ 
given in Chapter 2. As of October 2016, the Belarussian government advertises that its six 
FEZs have a total of 419 resident firms that employ 124,000 Belarussians. They claim $4.6 
billion in foreign merchandise trade in the first quarter of 2016 and calculate that this has 
                                                          
125 Industrial parks are considered SEZs in most instances. It depends on the incentive structure.  
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afforded Belarus a $742.3 million trade surplus. The government publishes statistics in the 
form of professionally crafted infographics.126 Some of the statistics seem exaggerated, 
seeing how Belarus has been in an economic recession for a while now. However, it also 
reports a 24.3% growth rate in the output of merchandise in the first quarter of 2016 or a 
44.6% increase in profits and a 13% increase in government revenues. Getting non-
democracies to accurately and clearly publish economic statistics has always been 
somewhat of a challenge due to the closed nature of them. The reporting is also very 
sporadic. There seems to be no rhyme or reason to when or where government studies on 
SEZs are published, but assuredly it has something to do with advertising to foreign 
investors. This should give the reader a clearer picture of why I developed such a blunt 
measure of SEZs (a 0-6 scale). Data are time inconsistent and missing in an unknown 
systematic way, so I created my own measure.  
Belarus sits strategically in the geographic center of Europe, straddling the border 
between the European Union (EU) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Belarus 
has chosen to place SEZs in each of the capitals of its subnational units (Oblasts), which 
happen to also be close to major border crossings in most areas. Brest Free Economic Zone 
was the first zone built in Belarus (1996). It exists around the Oblast’s capital city and sits 
near and on the border with Poland, and by extension the EU. There is a major highway 
that goes through the FEZ that is said to handle solely freight traffic day and night from 
the EU to Russia. There is also a major railway that is assumed to play the same role. The 
zone has its own international airport and a direct waterway leading to the Black Sea. It 
claims to host over 70 businesses and employ 15,000 people. The Belarussian government 
                                                          
126 Visit the website with the infographic I am referring to at http://www.belarus.by/en/business/business-environment  
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website says that it exported $750 million in goods and attracted $83 million in investments 
in 2008, mostly from Russia, Poland, and Germany.127 
 
 
                            FIGURE 4.5: FEZs of Belarus 
Source: www.belarus.by “Official Website of the Republic of Belarus”    
http://www.belarus.by/en/invest/Investor-country-profile. Image reproduced  
under the “fair use” doctrine. 
 
This case illustrates several points regarding the theory. First, Brest, and in fact all 
Belarussian FEZs, were geographically selected according to the theory (Figure 4.5). They 
exist first in locations of high traffic and secondly close to friendly or more easily 
monitored labor pools. A 2009 UN study estimates that around 70% of the ~9.5million 
population lives in urban centers.128 The overall population is rather homogenous. Over 
80% are ethnic Belarussian and about 8% are ethnic Russian. About half the population is 
Orthodox Christian and about 40% atheist or agnostic. The state is divided into six 
                                                          
127 Find all this information at http://www.belarus.by/en/invest/Investor-country-profile/brest_oblast_investor_profile .  
128 View the UN website at http://un.by/en/aboutbelarus/population  
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administrative “oblasts” that are each governed by an executive appointed by President 
Lukashenko and a legislature (or regional council) elected by the people. Furthermore, each 
of the six regions are divided into 118 “raions” (districts) that have a raion council elected 
by the people and executive appointed by the oblast governor.  
The Brest FEZ has its own administration. Unlike the example in Chapter 3 of the 
UAE, I was not able to directly connect the managing team to the ruling government. The 
FEZ Brest website lists a CEO, assistant, and two deputy chiefs. There are no email 
addresses, but there are names and phone numbers (calling several of them received no 
answer and no answering machine). Google searches for their names came up with very 
few hits outside of the FEZ website. One produced a LinkedIn profile with no picture and 
no other information other than the title “direcktor.” This exemplifies yet another one of 
the difficulties in studying SEZs in general. However, on the news feed on the Brest FEZ 
website, it reports that its FEZ administration received the Ambassador of Sweden on Feb. 
2, 2017 and the French Ambassador visited on a fact-finding mission Jan. 1, 2017. This 
indicates that whoever is administering this particular zone is well connected in the 
government. 
 
4.4 EXAMINATION OF REGIME SURVIVAL 
  
The problem of popular management is a regime level issue. Popular management 
is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for leader survival, but is both necessary and 
sufficient for regime survival. Many leaders stay in office despite losing control of big 
portions of the population. Many leaders stay in office throughout civil wars and nation-
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wide insurgencies. Many leaders step down or are forcibly removed despite having full 
control over the population. Therefore, for the question of popular management the regime 
is the unit of analysis. The natural consequence of loss of control is regime de-
legitimization and ultimately failure. 
The data are in panel format. They range from 1946-2015 and include all states of 
the world. For this analysis I limited the sample down to only non-democracies (determined 
by Cheibub, Antonio, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). Missing data are always problematic 
and rarely, if ever, missing at random. List-wise deletion is the method used here for two 
reasons. First, much of this analysis centers on the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and 
is designed to provide a justification for getting rid of the personalist regime type and 
modeling personalism as a behavior instead of a structural environment. Second, after 
looking at what was missing, it is the usual culprits. Interregnums and especially those 
autocrats in places like North Korea and Equatorial Guinea. Therefore, these missing data 
likely make this test a more difficult and conservative test. 
I use the same SEZ and SWF data that were explained in Chapter 2 and averaged 
out in Chapter 3. Here, they are all in standard country-year panel format. I include a 
standardized GDP per capita variable to account for variation in personal income. I include 
the natural logarithm of the total population in order to account for variation in the size of 
labor pools being fragmented (or not in the absence of SEZs). For controls in other models 
I also use oil income as a percent of GDP and the effective number of political parties in 
order to account for the traditional explanations of legislatures, parties, and elections. The 
idea here is to keep it simple. If a regime has more than zero political parties, then they 
have 1) a legislature, 2) elections, and 3) political parties.  
163 
The evaluation includes four Weibull survival models displayed in Table 4.2. The 
outcome variable (survival) is in year format.129 A regime losing power (failure) means 
that it has been restructured in a way that is distinguishable from the previous regime and 
is coded by GWF 2014. The Weibull distribution is the most appropriate here because it 
allows for variation in the effects of time. The models utilize the classic regime typologies 
used in the literature. Monarchies and military regimes are kept as the reference category 
because there are no monarchies in the data that failed (and only 7 total) and there are only 
two military regimes today. The expectation is that the use of SEZs by any regime type 
will extend regime loyalty, so all models interact SEZs with regime type. The base model 
(model 1) only includes land area, population, and political parties as control variables. 
The trend in political science for a while now (especially in international relations) is to 
include every possible control one can think of to improve fit, and I want to try and avoid 
it for various good reasons (see Achen 2002, i.e. “ART – a rule of three”).  
The second model includes a fourth control for oil wealth. It is measured as 
percentage of GDP that comes from oil extraction. The third (“manage”) model includes 
the factor score from Chapter 2 to control for leader management style. The fourth model 
includes the factor score interacted with SEZs (as well as regime type interactions). 
Survival models can be exceedingly difficult to interpret and there is no standard approach 
to interpreting them, especially given the different variables in these particular models. The 
models in Table 4.2 report hazard ratios rather than coefficients. Hazard ratios can be 
considered to be either increasing or decreasing hazards (or likelihood of failure) relative 
to a reference group. A hazard ratio of 1 means there is no change. Higher than a 1 can be 
                                                          
129 It should be noted that the outcome variable is not exactly “political control” per se, but regime duration implies an 
ability to control the population. 
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interpreted as an increasing hazard and hazard ratios smaller than 1 can be considered a 
decreasing hazard.   
 
 
TABLE 4.2: Regime Survival 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Base Oil Manage Interact 
VARIABLES Weibull Weibull Weibull Weibull 
     
SEZ 0.722*** 0.711*** 0.790** 0.741*** 
 (0.074) (0.073) (0.089) (0.082) 
Personalist Regime 0.471*** 0.446*** 0.308*** 0.349*** 
 (0.102) (0.098) (0.095) (0.106) 
Party Regime 0.328*** 0.322*** 0.316*** 0.310*** 
 (0.081) (0.081) (0.107) (0.106) 
SEZ*Personalist 1.344** 1.401** 1.373* 1.219 
 (0.201) (0.205) (0.235) (0.231) 
SEZ*Party 1.077 1.140 1.095 1.060 
 (0.182) (0.186) (0.201) (0.198) 
SWF 0.378* 0.421 0.650 0.624 
 (0.205) (0.266) (0.418) (0.420) 
Land Area 0.950 0.961 0.944 0.955 
 (0.082) (0.075) (0.078) (0.081) 
Population 1.137 1.187 1.120 1.098 
 (0.129) (0.133) (0.141) (0.141) 
ENPP 0.880 0.889 0.815** 0.807** 
 (0.072) (0.076) (0.081) (0.084) 
Oil Rents  0.909* 0.952 0.941 
  (0.050) (0.052) (0.054) 
Management Style   0.617** 0.900 
   (0.133) (0.230) 
SEZ*Management    0.762** 
    (0.096) 
Constant 0.000204*** 0.000192*** 6.61e-05*** 5.53e-05*** 
 (0.000259) (0.000266) (0.000125) (0.000104) 
     
Observations 3,662 3,265 2,502 2,502 
N Countries 108 105 101 101 
N Failures 168 147 107 107 
Reported in Hazard Ratios.  Robust seeform in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 However, using interaction terms complicates the interpretation in all statistical 
models, but especially in survival models. From the table, there are few things that can be 
substantively interpreted. One finding is that SEZs are highly significant across many 
specifications. Also, interacting SEZs and regime type flips the direction of the hazard for 
both types of regimes and is significant for personalist regimes, indicating that the 
interaction between the two is creating substantively different hazard functions. Oil rents 
and SWFs are marginally important. This is expected, given that the findings of the 
resource curse literature are extremely mixed and that SWFs tend to play a backseat role 
in the question of popular management. Political parties become significant when the factor 
score (a measure of leadership style – violence and corruption or delegation and 
deliberation) is included and again when the factor score is interacted with SEZs. This 
would follow the empirical reality that leaders that prefer to rule through delegation and 
deliberation often do so through political parties. 
 Typically, the best way to interpret survival models is through graphing the hazard 
curve or the survival curve. The hazard function and the survival function are related and 
essentially show the same thing in a different way, but here it makes more sense to plot the 
survival function because we want to see how long a regime is predicted to survive rather 
than when exactly it comes to an elevated risk of failure (hazard). Figure 4.6, plots the 
survival curves for personalist and single-party regimes in model 1 that have the largest 
levels of SEZ program and SWFs and those that do not have any. The two dashed lines are 
personalist regimes and the two solid lines represent single-party regimes. There is a 
noticeable increase in the predicted survival of each regime when SEZs and SWFs are 
present. This increase in survival occurs monotonically as SEZ program size increases. 
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FIGURE 4.6: Predicted Survival 
 
 Probably the most significant finding here is that at 60 years into the rule of single-
party regimes that have SEZs and SWFs, the regime is expected to survive into the next 
year with a 90% probability. Whereas, a single-party regime with no SEZs and no SWFs 
at 60 years out only has about a 40% chance of surviving into the next year. For personalist 
regimes, those that have SEZs and SWFs are expected to have a somewhat greater than 
chance probability of survival at 60 years out and one without these economic policies is 
predicted to have less than a 30% chance at survival. 
To conclude this chapter, I think it is important to point out two analytical things 
before driving home the implications of this full project in the conclusion. First, it is very 
easy to fall into a levels of analysis trap here. I have tried to avoid it, but admittedly 
probably stepped in it somewhere. Second, this “test” in Chapter 4 does not directly test 
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the theory. It does so in a very roundabout way by testing the implication that labor 
fragmentation will lead to longer regime survival. So these results should not be interpreted 
as fully predictive of behavior or outcomes. It should be interpreted as evidence that 
economic policies in non-democratic states have political effects that are likely very 
important to a whole host of people. We should study them more. The next step is to  test 
directly for the effects of labor fragmentation and sunk investments. 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
 
No political scientist, economist, or anybody that I know of has ever created a 
measure to comprehensively measure SEZs. SEZs are extremely diverse and perform a 
number of different functions. SEZs are not the same as FDI, even though they are designed 
to attract FDI. They are also designed to attract employment and perform any other number 
of goals preferred by the governments that create them. They are quickly becoming the 
supply chain workhorses for the global economy and demand sharper scrutiny. The 
measure I created for SEZs is admittedly blunt, but this is done precisely because SEZs are 
so diverse and go by so many different names. It is also because authoritarian leaders will 
not give me data on their zones and especially will not allow me to come visit them and 
interview elites. Dictators are extremely vain and they will frequently ban academics that 
do not portray them in the best light from travel to their country. I expect to be banned from 
several of them once this dissertation is published, however, I do not expect any of them 
to stop advertising their SEZs and I am willing to bet that if enough investors grouped 
together and called on all countries to regularly report comprehensive SEZ data, most 
would. It is in the interests of investors to do this because it brings more predictability. 
What has been published about SEZs, including a recent book on the political 
economy of SEZs (Moberg 2017), utilizes case studies and country specific data when it is 
available. To bridge their findings I offer my global data. The data definitely can be made 
better (with time and money). The next step is to collect all the GPS coordinates for all the
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SEZs of the world and map them out in GIS for spatial analysis. Another step already 
underway is to collect employment numbers, number of firms, types of firms and 
investment dollars for cross-sectional analysis. I also plan to use these data to create a 
typology of SEZs that captures their diversity better than just the names that different 
countries give them. 
Economic policies such as SEZs and SWFs can both substitute for and compliment 
the roles of authoritarian legislatures and political parties. SEZs can help stabilize rulers 
and ruling coalitions and they can help manage the populace through minimizing the effects 
of negative externalities on the broader population in the process of liberalization. SEZs 
are theorized to possibly facilitate the removal of violent and corrupt leaders (such as 
Teodoro Obaing of Equatorial Guinea) and some evidence is provided of this. The 
academic implications of these findings are that delegation and deliberation often occurs 
outside of legislatures and loyalty can be induced regardless of the presence of a political 
party. This is what is meant by the “Economic Foundations of Authoritarian Rule.” I have 
not directly shown it here, but I believe that precisely because authoritarian regimes are 
historically and contemporarily politically secretive, the role of economics is actually more 
important than authoritarian legislatures and parties. Future research will address these 
questions, but this is a good start. It is important first to establish that economic policies 
play an important role in authoritarian politics. 
What this dissertation has established is that 1) the analysis of specific economic 
policies in authoritarian regimes is important and 2) analyzing dictatorships through a bi-
level conceptual approach and a factor score of the underlying latent variable of leadership 
style is a viable new path worthy of further exploration. The dissertation will likely benefit 
171 
in the future from applying a formal modelling approach in order to possibly find a more 
direct empirical test on the implications. There are also many opportunities for field work 
contained within this research. Furthermore, after establishing that SEZs and SWFs have 
specific effects in non-democracies, it logically stands to reason that although the effects 
are likely completely different, these policies might have significant effects in democracies 
as well. If they do not, then democracies could benefit from more explicit theorizing about 
them so they can make the ones they have work better for them.  
The policy implications of these findings are important and far-reaching. First, the 
whole idea of SEZs and SWFs needs more scrutiny by academics and especially by the 
WTO. SEZs at face value seem to clearly violate the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (ASCM). In authoritarian economies the state acts with a 
monopoly on power and seems to have found a way to fit SEZs into their political toolkit 
seamlessly. This does not necessarily mean that SEZs should be banned or more regulated, 
these zones have been great for the global economy. SEZs represent a form of power-
sharing that can stabilize dictatorships. Stability is a good thing. Also, it is likely that 
increases in the level of power-sharing should logically increase the likelihood of a regime 
transitioning to democracy.  
In any case, I believe that it is time for the study of authoritarian politics to move 
from a focus on legislatures, parties, and elections to a more concrete theoretical 
underpinning of the economic foundations of authoritarian rule. Western scholars have 
spent so much time studying legislatures, parties, and elections that we have tricked 
ourselves into believing that they are the only possible way to govern. If an election is truly 
rigged is it still an election? If all but one political party is banned, is the remaining one 
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still a political party? If the legislature merely listens to lectures and signs off on decrees 
is it really a legislature? These are deep constructivist questions that I believe in time we 
will answer all with a resounding “no.” Authoritarian political institutions are not 
democratic institutions and each are designed and used for very different purposes. 
Legislatures, parties, and elections may predict outcomes in democratic settings, but that 
is not so clear in authoritarian settings. Furthermore, when institutions do not exist, the 
personality (or style of rule) of the ruler becomes the institutions. Authoritarian rule is the 
oldest form of governance and its foundations are economic.
172 
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APPENDIX A: Alternate Graph to Figure 2.2 
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APPENDIX B: Factor Score Loading 
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APPENDIX C: Kaplan Meier Graphs 
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